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Abstract
This thesis contains three chapters examining firms’ behaviour and decisionmak-
ing when they seek to influence policies in the US through lobbying activities.
The first chapter studies the main trade-off that firms face when they face the
decision to integrate or outsource knowledge workers. The chapter proposes a
model that predicts that firms requiring large firm-specific skills, or low levels of
issue-specific skills, or facing a large number of transactions will integrate as op-
posed to outsource the service provider. Using a newly collected dataset on the
US federal lobbying industry, I conduct firm-fixed effect estimations and I find
strong evidence supporting the theoretical predictions. To provide further em-
pirical evidence, I exploit a quasi-experiment that the Oil and Gas industry faced:
The BP oil spill. The spill increased the issue-specific skills needed to conduct ad-
vocacy activities and in line with the theory developed in the chapter, I show that
the affected industry started usingmore external, as opposed to internal lobbyists
after the oil spill.
The second chapter studies the effect of a technological upgrade on firms’
vertical integration decision. I use themodel proposed in the first chapter to show
that a technological shock, introduced by the Open Government Act decreased
the cost of acquiring issue-specific skills, which in turn, made firms less likely
to outsource. Then, I use structural models to measure the magnitude of this
technological effect and conduct counterfactual exercises to study the influence
that the regulation had on the industry.
The third chapter studies the relationship between lobbying expenditures and
market structure. I show that less and no more concentrated industries spend
more on lobbying. To explain this empirical puzzle, I propose a theoretical model
that includes the level of excludability in the payoffs. I provide empirical evi-
dence that firms in less concentrated industries tend to lobby for more exclud-
able goods and I show that including this dimension can explain the empirical
puzzle. To provide causal evidence, I use national-level mergers that change city-
level market structures. Collecting a new data set of city-level lobbying expen-
ditures, I show that controlling for the level of excludability in the payoffs, more
concentrated industries spend more on lobbying efforts.
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Chapter 1
Sourcing of Expertise and the
Boundaries of the Firm:The Case
of Lobbyists1
Abstract
This chapter proposes and tests a theory of vertical integration with
knowledge workers. Outsourcing allows rms to solve hard problems at the
cost of transmitting rm-specic knowledge. By hiring someone internally,
rms save on these communication costs, with the downside of incurring costs
of acquiring knowledge. Exploiting the increasing returns to the use of knowl-
edge implies conducting easy and frequent activities in-house and harder and
less frequent tasks in the external market. The economy saves communica-
tion costs when rms with large rm-specic knowledge conduct activities
in-house. I conrm the empirical validity of this theory using data from a
knowledge-intensive industry: US Federal Lobbying. First, I validate the
main theoretical predictions using client xed-e¤ects estimations with infor-
mation at both the industry and bill levels. Second, I exploit the 2010 BP oil
spill as an exogenous increase in the di¢ culty of the lobbying activities for the
oil and gas extracting industry, and I show that it led to a disproportionate
increase in the use of external lobbyists for the a¤ected industry.
1I am deeply indebted for the precise and insightful comments made by Jordi Blanes i Vidal,
Luis Garicano, Gilat Levy, Jim Snyder, Jr., John Sutton, Catherine Thomas and Glen Weyl. This
project has beneted from several interviews, comments and suggestions made by tens of lobbyists
that have decided to remain in the anonymity. I acknowledge the comments and suggestions made
by Oriana Bandiera, Heski Bar-Isaac, Giuseppe Berlingieri, Christopher Berry, Matilde Bombar-
dini, Tim Bresnahan, Cheng Chen, John M. de Figueiredo, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Matej
Drev, Liran Einav, Alessandro Gavazza, Matthew Gentry, Anna Gumpert, Nan Jia, Lisa Kahn,
Karam Kang, Peter Klein, Timothy Lambie-Hanson, Jin Lin, Rocco Macchiavello, Alan Manning,
Luis Martinez, Guy Michaels, Jeanine Miklós-Thal, Pablo Montagnes, Suresh Naidu, Derek Neal,
Steve Pischke, Brian K. Richter, Roberta Romano, Ra¤aella Sadun, Mark Schankerman, Pasquale
Schiraldi, Paulo Somaini, Alois Stutzer, Chad Syverson, Guido Tabellini, John Van Reenen, Rick
G. Vanden Bergh, Stephane Wolton, Hye Young You as well as participants at Work in Progress
seminars at LSE, UChicago and Stanford University, 14th IIOC, 2016 TADC, 15th IOEA, 20th
Annual Conference of the SIOE . A previous version of this paper was awarded the 2016 IOEA First
Prize Award. Finally, I am extremely grateful to the comments received from my PhD fellows:
Michel Azulai, Alexia Delno, Tam Hiu Fung, Christos Makridis, Stephan Maurer, Frank Pisch,
Oleg Rubanov and Giulia Zane. Financial support from STICERD is gratefully acknowledged.
E-mail: m.espinosa@lse.ac.uk.
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Clearly there is. . . a problem of the Division of Knowledge which is quite
analogous to, and at least as important as, the problem of the division of labor. But
while the latter has been one of the main subjects of investigation ever since the
beginning of our science, the former has been as completely neglected, although it
seems to me to be the really central problem of economics as a social science(von
Hayek, 1937, p.49) (emphasis in original).
1.1 Introduction
Firmsdependence on knowledge workers such as lawyers and managers has in-
creased remarkably in recent years.2 Firms face a fundamental question when they
use these workers: under which circumstances should rms hire them internally
and when should they outsource their services? The decision has implications not
only for the internal dynamics of the rm and the functioning of markets, but also
for other important issues in the economy, such as the distribution of earnings.3
Thanks to the vertical integration research conducted over the last 80 years, we
now have a better understanding of the causes and consequences of the integra-
tion decision. However, all of the leading theories have equated the study of the
integration decision with the study of incentives.4 That is, they have focused on
the appropriate management of incentive alignment problems. As knowledge is the
key input in the production process of knowledge workers and, more broadly, is at
the heart of the organizational design problem, a natural alternative approach is
to put aside the incentive issue and focus on the acquisition and communication of
knowledge. This is the approach that I take in this chapter.
I provide a theoretical framework inspired by Arrow (1974) and Garicano (2000)
to guide the empirical analysis of the integration decision with knowledge workers.
Firms use knowledge workers to solve problems. Solving problems requires issue-
specic and rm-specic knowledge. More frequent problems require less issue-
specic knowledge. I refer to a problem with a low (high) level of issue-specic
2Berlingieri (2014) shows that the professional business services industry (NAICS codes 54, 55
and 56) exerts the biggest inuence on the rest of the economy in terms of forward linkage measures.
He also shows that this industry has the largest change in input-output linkages, an increase close
to four times in 60 years, and is the sub-industry with the greatest growth. Remarkably, more than
90% of the industrys output is used as an intermediary input in other industries. Goldschmidt
and Schmieder (2015) provide empirical evidence on the increase in outsourcing for low-knowledge
occupations in Germany.
3For examples of these implications for the rm, markets and distribution of earnings, see
Holmstrom and Roberts (1998), Holmstrom (1999) and Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2015), re-
spectively.
4See, for instance, Williamson (1971, 1979, 1985) and Klein et al. (1978) for the Rent-Seeking
Theory ; Simon (1951) Williamson (1971, 1973, 1975, 1991) for the Adaptation Theory ; Grossman
and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995) for the Property Rights Models; and
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991, 1994) and Holmstrom (1999) forMulti-Tasking Models. According
to Gibbons (2005), the rst two focus on the ex-post incentive problems and the other two on
the ex-ante incentive problem. The rst two are associated to the transaction cost economies
paradigm.
13
knowledge as an easy (di¢ cult) problem. In-house workers know more about the
rm than external service providers do. This leads to the main trade-o¤ in the
economy: bringing someone in-house saves on costs of communicating rm-specic
knowledge but requires the rm to pay for the workersacquired skills. Although
outsourcing allows to access to a larger amount of issue-specic knowledge, it implies
paying higher communication costs.
I study this trade-o¤ under a simple but powerful insight: there are increasing
returns to the use of knowledge, as the cost of acquiring it is independent of its
rate of use. The optimal organization of the economy requires that these returns
are exploited in-house by solving frequent problems and in the external market by
solving infrequent problems for several rms. Thus, rms with frequent problems
bring someone in-house, and in-house workers solve routine, easy tasks (as less-
knowledge-intensive problems are more frequent). As di¢ cult problems occur infre-
quently, rms facing these problems cannot exclusively nance a service provider.
However, the external market allows rms to join interests and nance the large
acquisition of issue-specic knowledge that they need to solve problems. Therefore,
rms with infrequent problems outsource the service, and external providers solve
rare, harder tasks. This organization of the economy implies that the issue-specic
knowledge level di¤ers across the rm and the external market. As earnings are
proportional to this type of knowledge, external service providers earn more than
in-house sta¤. Furthermore, external service providers who work for more rms
-more leverage- have more knowledge, and, as a consequence, higher earnings than
providers who work for fewer rms. Finally, the communication costs are minimized
when rms with greater rm-specic knowledge solve their problems with in-house
workers. Summing up, the main theoretical predictions are that rms with more
rm-specic knowledge or that face frequent or easy problems will use in-house
instead of external workers.
I test these predictions for a particular knowledge-intensive occupation: US fed-
eral lobbyists. Acquiring information on legislative proposals and persuading policy
makers are two typical examples of lobbyiststasks. The latter task occurs less often
than the former, as not all legislative proposals a¤ect the rm or simply because
policy makerspreferences are inexpugnable. The activities of acquiring information
and persuading policy makers di¤er by their level of knowledge requirements. For
instance, several government and private databases facilitate knowledge acquisition
by providing updated and detailed information on legislative proposals.5 In con-
trast, persuading policy makers requires more knowledge: lobbyists need to know
who is the best policy maker to persuade, the best persuasion strategy and so on.
Thus, nding out what is happening in Washington is a (relatively) routine, easy
5See, for instance, www.govtrack.us, www.congress.gov, www.sunlightfoundation.com,
www.opensecrets.org, among other sources, such as the US Senate and US House of Representative
web pages.
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task, whereas persuading a senator is a less common, harder task. Anecdotal ev-
idence shows that the rst activity is conducted with in-house lobbyists, whereas
the second is conducted with external advocates.
The unique database that I build for this study is comprised of the universe of
US federal lobbying transactions in which I can di¤erentiate not only between in-
house and external transactions, but also the specic identity of rms and lobbyists,
the period of the transaction, and the main advocacy activities, such as the bills in
which the rm is interested. Since it contains transactional-level information and
allows me to di¤erentiate the specic identities of all of the agents demanding and
supplying advocacy services, the database used in this study overcomes common
challenges that researchers face when they study the integration decision.6 To test
the predictions from my theoretical framework, I enrich this database by including
the industry of rms, lobbyistssociodemographic variables, and information about
the committees studying the lobbied bills, among other variables.
Despite the richness of this dataset, the main challenge is to measure activities
that di¤er by knowledge requirements and frequency. I argue that variation in
the characteristics of the rmsindustries and the bills that a¤ect them leads to
variation in the frequency and knowledge intensity of the lobbying activities. Firms
respond to this variation by choosing in-house or external lobbyists. For the case
of the bills, it is useful to understand how they are studied. Bills are sent to
congressional committees after their introduction in Congress. Policy makers then,
interview witnesses to acquire relevant knowledge about the legislative proposals.
Variation in the composition of witnesses provides a rich source of heterogeneity in
the types of problems that rms face. I construct as a rst measure of knowledge
requirements of the lobbying activities an index at the committee-semester level
that accounts for the fraction of high-knowledge witnesses.7 I proxy frequency with
the total number of bills studied in the committee-semester combination.
A shortcoming of these measures is that not all the rms lobby for bills. An
alternative source from which to construct proxies for these theoretical variables is
the RegData 2.2, a database that uses text analysis and machine learning algorithms
to create regulation measures at the industry-year level.8 I use two measures from
this database: the number of words related to the regulation of the industry and
6Berlingieri (2014, 2015) mentions, that it is usually di¢ cult to di¤erentiate between internal
and external transactions. Additional challenges that this literature has faced include being able
to di¤erentiate the specic identity of the agents in both sides of the market and to have the
universe of transactions in the market. Examples of studies in which the demand side and not
the supply side is known are Anderson and Schmittlein (1984), Abramovsky and Gri¢ th (2006)
and Galdon-Sanchez et al. (2015). On the other hand, Garicano and Hubbard (2007, 2009) are
examples of papers with information on the supply side of the market, but a lack of information
on the identities of the demand side of the market.
7This is similar in spirit to Azoulay (2004), in which the proportion of academic investigators
(over the total number of participants in clinical studies) captures the relative importance of
knowledge-intense activities.
8See Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin (2015).
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number of times that ve strings -measuring the di¢ culty of the regulation- appear
among these regulation words.
In this chapter, I conduct two sets of empirical exercises with the aforemen-
tioned data: Fixed E¤ects and Di¤erence in Di¤erence Estimations. I rst show
the validity of the most important theoretical predictions using xed-e¤ect esti-
mations at the rm and time levels. I nd that rms lobbying for bills studied
by high-di¢ culty-index committees or belonging to industries with a more di¢ cult
regulatory environment -large fraction of restraining words over the total number of
regulating words- tend to advocate with external rather than in-house sta¤. More-
over, rms lobbying for bills studied in committees that receive more bills use in-
ternal instead of external advocacy services. The e¤ects are economically relevant.
For instance, a one-standard-deviation decrease in the di¢ culty measure based on
the witnessesknowledge is associated with an increase in the fraction of lobbying
reports conducted in-house by 21%.
In the theoretical framework, rm-specic knowledge can also be easily inter-
preted as industry-specic knowledge. Given the lack of a comprehensive measure
at the rm level, I use the total number of regulating words as a proxy for industry-
specic knowledge. Firms explain their industrys regulations when they hire ex-
ternal service providers. The larger the number of regulating words in the industry,
the longer it takes to explain them and, therefore, the larger are the communication
costs. As my model predicts, I nd robust empirical evidence that rms belong-
ing to industries with a large number of regulating words tend to conduct their
advocacy activities in-house.
These analyses, though, do not provide causal evidence for my theory. To go a
step further, I run di¤erences in di¤erences estimations using the British Petroleum
(henceforth BP) Deepwater Horizon oil spill of 2010 as an exogenous shock to the
di¢ culty of lobbying activities for the oil and gas extracting industry. I show that
rms belonging to this industry decreased their use of in-house sta¤ after the spill.
The point estimates are signicant and economically relevant. For instance, the
a¤ected rms decreased the fraction of transactions made in-house (fraction of in-
house lobbyists) by about 26% (21%) after the oil spill.
To tackle concerns over the simplifying assumption that problems have only
one type of issue-specic knowledge, I also consider the possibility that rms face
two di¤erent types of issues. In this case, the main theoretical predictions are
robust, but new insights emerge. Service providers can work on one (specialists)
or two (generalists) topics. I show that generalists exist due to complementarities
across issues, and, although both specialists and generalists exist in both internal
and external markets, specialists (generalists) are more common in the external
(internal) market. I conrm the empirical validity of this prediction for several
knowledge-intensive industries.
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I also show two additional empirical patterns accounted for by my model. First,
I provide evidence of a novel mechanism to explain the fact that large rms tend
to be more vertically integrated than smaller rms: small rms tend to face easy
(di¢ cult) problems less (more) often than large rms.9 Second, proxying lobbyists
knowledge level with their work experience as federal lobbyists and any previous
work experience in the federal government, I provide empirical evidence that more-
knowledgeable lobbyists have both greater leverage and higher earnings.
In the nal section of the chapter, I address concerns about the external validity
of my results. Acknowledging that each industry has its own peculiarities, I show
that there are some similar empirical patterns between lobbyists and other Profes-
sional Business Services (henceforth PBS). For instance, I show that, in contrast
to the literature which nds that low-skill workers earn more in the internal mar-
ket, external service providers in both PBS and lobbying industries earn more than
in-house workers.10
This chapter enriches our understanding of the vertical integration decision in
several ways. First, to the best of my knowledge, this is the only manuscript
to simultaneously propose and test a vertical integration theory with knowledge
workers that does not consider incentive-alignment issues.11 Second, using newly
compiled data, I propose new ways to measure knowledge intensity of workers
activities. Although the lobbying reports database has been used before, I am
not aware of an e¤ort to complement it with information at the rm, lobbyist,
industry, bill and committees levels.12 I believe that these data and knowledge-
based measures will allow researchers to answer other important questions, either
in the incentives literature or as extensions of my theoretical framework. Third,
I provide a theoretical framework and new empirical facts to both the Political
Economy and Organizational Economics literatures. While the former has focused
on the relationship between either lobbyists and policy makers or rms and policy
makers, in this chapter, I enrich the understanding of the scarcely studied rms-
lobbyists relationship.13 Furthermore, to the best of my knowledge, the e¤ect of
the BP spill on vertical integration patterns has not been studied before. For the
Organizational Economics literature, I enrich the understanding of the reasons to
9Contrary to the explanation developed in this chapter, Antras and Helpman (2004), de
Figueiredo and Silverman (2006), Bombardini and Trebbi (2012), and Kerr et al. (2014), among
many others, have associated these patterns by the di¤erences in the cost of outsourcing and
running an in-house o¢ ce.
10For evidence on the di¤erences of wages for low-skill workers, see for instance Abraham and
Taylor (1996), Dube and Kaplans (2010) and Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2015)
11My paper focuses on the acquisition, use, communication and distribution of knowledge to
explain rm boundaries. An alternative approach for instance taken by Henderson and Cockburn
(1996) and Nickerson and Zenger (2004) focus on the creation of knowledge and capabilities and
its relationship with the rm boundary.
12For example, Blanes-i-Vidal et al. (2012) and Bertrand et al. (2014) have used the lobbying
reports database.
13For example, Hirsch and Montagnes (2015) and Kang and You (2016) point out the scarcely
studied rm-lobbyist relationship.
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hire knowledge workers internally or externally, the characteristics of in-house and
external sta¤, and the distribution of knowledge and earnings across the rm and
external markets.
Related Literature
Although my approach di¤ers sharply from the leading incentive-based vertical
integration theories, this chapter nds support for some of the previous predictions
but questions the general applicability of other results.14 The Transaction Cost
Economics literature predicts that the probability of integration increases with the
specicity of the transaction. My results are consistent with this prediction, but
the underlying mechanisms are di¤erent. In my case, the larger the rm-specic
knowledge, the more costly it is to outsource (i.e. larger communication costs) and,
therefore, the more likely to use in-house workers. In the existing literature, the
more specic the transaction is, the more likely the rm is to face a hold-up problem;
thus, in order to avoid it, the activity should be conducted internally.15 However, as
Klein (1988) points out, this literature does not clarify how this mitigation occurs
in the case of human assets. Furthermore, in a context in which there is rm-
specic knowledge, the hold-up problem can be intensied inside the rm, as workers
that have received specic knowledge can attempt to hold their employers up and
vice versa. Therefore, it seems that the hold-up explanation, is in the best case,
incomplete.
Another prediction from this literature is that the more di¢ cult the transaction
is, the more likely it is to be vertically integrated.16 My results show the opposite,
as only the external market provides ways to accumulate high levels of knowledge.
A nal prediction from this literature is due to Williamson (1985): the cost of a
hierarchical structure is easier to recover when the transactions are more frequent.
This chapter complements his insight by providing both theoretical and empirical
support to this idea.17
The empirical context of this chapter does not easily translate to either the
Property Rights or the Multitasking theories. With respect to the property rights
literature, as Dube and Kaplan (2007) and Bresnahan and Levin (2012) argue,
there are no clear theoretical implications when non-human assets are completely
nonexistent or irrelevant, as in the case of PBS industries. Clearly, the di¤erence
is that the law does not provide control rights over human beings. So, buying a
14This paper includes, in Section 1.5.1, an extensive discussion of the leading incentive-based
vertical integration theories and their relationship with my theoretical framework.
15See, for instance, Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), Monteverde and Teece (1982), Ander-
son and Schmittlein (1984) and Joskow (1988).
16See, for instance, Monteverde and Teece (1982), Masten (1984), Anderson (1985) and Tadelis
(2002). Empirical papers in this branch of the literature have proposed to measure di¢ culty of
the transaction with its skill requirements.
17Strikingly, the issue of the frequency has not received much attention. For instance, two of
the most comprehensive and recent literature reviews of the subject, Lafontaine and Slade (2007)
and Bresnahan and Levin (2012), neglected the topic.
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machine and hiring someone in-house are totally di¤erent because the employee
can always quit. I interpret this chapter as a useful way to understand the vertical
integration decision for the case of human assets. With respect to Multitasking
models, a standard prediction from this theory has no empirical support in the
lobbying context. As the outcome of persuading policy makers is harder to measure
than the outcome of investigating the political environment, theMultitasking theory
predicts that the latter activity should be conducted externally and the former
internally. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that this is not the case.
A comment on the labor economics literature is warranted. While this literature
has recognized the advantages of hiring internally and externally separately, I am not
aware of any work connecting these two forces. Some papers argue that one reason
to hire employees is to receive returns from rm-specic knowledge, whereas another
branch argues that the reason for contracting out is to access greater amounts of
knowledge.18 It seems natural to think that what matters in understanding vertical
integration patterns is the relative gain in one with respect to the other. To the best
of my knowledge, this chapter is the rst manuscript to make the natural empirical
and theoretical connections between these two.
Although the economics literature has not focused on knowledge as one of the
key inputs in the production process, a eld of the Management literature has done
so. The starting point in the eld is the Resource-based-view of the rm. This litera-
ture focuses on explaining heterogeneity in rm performance by arguing that these
di¤erences are due to rmsdi¤erent resources or capabilities.19 The knowledge-
based-view of the rm argues that knowledge is rmsmost important resource or
capability.20 One of the main results from this literature is that knowledge-based
resources can di¤er across rms and produce competitive advantage across rms.
This type of advantage explains performance heterogeneity. In this literature, the
integration decision is explained by the fact that di¤erent pieces of knowledge are
complementary, and, therefore, conducting activities through the market can be
ine¢ cient. That is, if the knowledge used to produce one activity is useful in pro-
ducing a di¤erent activity, the activities should be conducted in an integrated way.
The focus on knowledge as a way to understand organizational design is the main
element that my analysis shares with these theories.21 The economics literature has
studied the integration decision concentrating on how to manage the misalignment
18Examples of the rst argument are Becker (1964) and Autor (2003). On the other hand,
Abraham and Taylor (1996) and Grossman and Helpman (2002a, 2005) among others argue that
one of the reasons to contracting out is specialization in the external market. In this literature,
the specialization corresponds to high-levels of issue-specic knowledge.
19See, for example, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), Teece et al. (1997), Barney (1991), Peteraf
(1993), Wernerfelt (1984) and Penrose (1959).
20See, for example, Foss (1996), Grant (1996, 2002), Kogut and Zander (1992, 2000) and
Nickerson and Zenger (2004).
21For an early discussion of the advantages of focusing on knowledge to understand the rm
boundaries problem, see Demsetz (1988).
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of incentives. However, the knowledge-based-view of the rm, and this chapter,
point to the fact that knowledge plays a role in dening rm boundaries even in
the absence of any misalignment of interests. In this chapter, contrary to the
knowledge-based view, knowledge complementarity is not relevant in explaining the
integration decision. Instead, rms face problems that di¤er in their knowledge
requirements, and the cost of acquiring or communicating knowledge determines the
relative benets of integration. Thus, although, this chapter focuses on knowledge
like the management literature, I study di¤erent theoretical mechanisms, propose
new empirical measures and use di¤erent empirical methodologies to test theoretical
predictions.
This chapter is divided into ve sections. Section 1.2 presents my theoretical
framework. In Section 1.3, I begin by presenting the data used and the institutional
context. Then, I present the results of client xed e¤ect estimations and the rela-
tionships among generalists, specialists, rmssize and leverage. I end this section
with the BP example. In Section 1.4, I discuss the external validity of my theory
with regard to other PBS occupations. Then, I nish this section with a short
discussion summarizing the main results from the chapter and proposing further
developments.
1.2 Theoretical Framework
This section is divided into two subsections. In the rst part, I present the main
setting in Section 1.2.1 and the results of the model. To gain some intuition, I
rst present results for the case in which rms face problems in only one issue in
Section 1.2.2 and then I move to Section 1.2.3 where I present results for the case of
two issues. The second part discusses the robustness of my theoretical framework
in Section 1.2.4 and the relevant related literature in Section 1.2.5. I end up this
Section by summarizing the main results of the model in Section 1.2.6. All the
proofs can be found in Appendix 1.5.4.
1.2.1 Preliminaries
I consider an economy with a large numberM <1 of ex-ante homogeneous clients
(rms) and an innite set N , of ex ante homogeneous service providers.22 Clients
exogenously receive one problem per unit of time spent in production for each issue:
A and B.23 Service providers, not clients, solve problems.
Demand. Problems di¤er by the level of issue-specic knowledge requirements
(i.e., di¢ culty of the problem). I denote this level by Zi 2 [0; 1] with i = A;B.
Within each issue, the problems are ordered by increasing level of di¢ culty. The
random variable Zi is independent and identically distributed according to a con-
22I assume a large number of clients in order to apply Law of Large numbers below. I use the
words clients and rms to refer to the individual unit of the demand side.
23An issue can be interpreted as a type of general knowledge.
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tinuous cumulative distribution function Fi  0 with Fi(0) = 0, F 0i = fi > 0 and
f 0i < 0. That is, easy problems are more common. Solutions to problems in both
issues are equally valuable to these clients. Clientspayo¤function is production mi-
nus labor costs, and the normalized value of production is 1 when a service provider
solves a problem and 0 otherwise.
Supply. Solving problems requires knowledge. All service providers must learn
the easiest (most common) problems before learning the harder (less common) ones,
so that the more knowledgeable agents know everything that the less knowledgeable
ones do, and more. That is, knowledge is cumulative.24 Providers are characterized
by a vector (zA; zB) 2 [0; 1]2. Service providers with issue-specic knowledge zi
solve any problem in issue i if the di¢ culty of the problem lies between 0 and zi.
Service providers increase this knowledge at a cost proportional to the size of the
interval of knowledge. That is, learning how to solve problems in the interval [0; zi]
costs cizi, where ci is the constant per-period unit cost of acquiring knowledge.
This setting captures the fact that harder problems are more costly to learn. As in
Rosen (1983), the cost of acquiring knowledge about problems is independent of its
utilization. Therefore, the model is characterized by increasing returns to the use
of knowledge. Without loss of generality, I assume that the outside option of not
working in any market is 0.
Markets. There are four markets in this model- two internal and two external.
First, there is an internal market for each issue, each of which is characterized by a
one-to-one relationship between the client and the service provider. Second, there
is an external market for each issue. In the external market i, each service provider
works for ni 2 R+ clients (i.e., leverage), which is an endogenous variable to the
problem.
Communication Cost-Firm-Specic Knowledge. In addition to the knowledge
required to solve problems, clients need rm-specic knowledge for production. As
in Arrow (1974) and Cremer et al. (2007), rms develop codes within the organiza-
tion. Therefore, in-house and external service providers di¤er by the levels of this
type of knowledge.25 I capture this idea with a communication cost in the external
market. This cost, denoted as hi 2 (0; 1) is the time that external providers spend
on each client in addition to the time that it takes to solve problems. Intuitively, the
more specic the knowledge that the rms use, the larger is the cost of externally
contracting, as it takes more time to communicate that knowledge. There is only
one communication cost per issue and this knowledge may di¤er across issues. A
24Knowledge is cumulative within an issue. That is, low levels of knowledge in one issue are
not necessary to acquire higher levels of knowledge in another issue.
25As anecdotal evidence supporting these knowledge di¤erences across markets, Drutman (2010,
p. 43) cites one in-house lobbyist comment about external lobbyists: I dont believe most folks
understand this stu¤ [the company-specic issues], and its not worth their time to get up to
speed.
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way to interpret hi is with the average rm-specic knowledge of M clients.26
Any study on rm boundaries requires, at least implicitly, a denition of what
a rm is. In this chapter, a rm is an abstract place that allows agents to develop
a common code. That is, it is the place where the owner attenuates communica-
tion costs due to di¤erences in rm-specic knowledge across internal and external
markets. This concept of a rm di¤ers sharply from the aforementioned vertical
integration literature. In the incentive literature, a rm is an abstract place that
attenuates renegotiation or monitoring costs or maximizes the surplus via ex-ante
investments due to the command or residual control rights of the rms owner.
Time constraint. Each service provider has a time constraint with total labor
supply endowment normalized to 1. As in Garicano (2000), the constraint implies
that the expected time for solving problems has to be equal to the total labor
endowment. That is, 1  Pr(problem)ni [1 + 1externali  (hi   1)]. Let Pr(problem)
be the probability that service providers face problems and ni the leverage (number
of clients) of the service provider for issue i. The leverage is 1 in the internal
market and is endogenously determined in the external market. Finally, 1externali is
an indicator function equal to 1 in the external market of issue i and 0 otherwise. I
assume that the burden of this cost falls fully on the receiver, as is standard in the
literature.27
Wages. Service providers receive a constant per-period unit wage compensation
w. The total wage compensation is wz if the service provider has knowledge z. Let
wji be the wage in the j-th market (j=I for Internal and E for external) for issue
i = A;B. The wages are endogenous to the problem.28
Summing up, the total number of clients and set of service providers (M; N),
the distribution of problems (Fi), the cost of acquiring issue-specic knowledge (ci),
and the average rm-specic knowledge of the economy (hi) for each issue i = A;B
are exogenous parameters in the economy. The endogenous variables are the vector
of wages (wji ), allocation of clients to each market and levels of acquired knowledge
(zi) and leverage (ni) for each service provider for each issue.
Timing. First, service providers choose the breadth (market in which they want
to work) and depth of the level of issue-specic knowledge. Then, the problems of
the clients are realized. Finally, clients are allocated to markets; the markets clear
and production takes place. This timing is similar in spirit to Murphy (1986) and
Garicano and Hubbard (2007). To decrease the burden of this chapter, I assume
that a matching technology allocates clients across markets by maximizing the total
surplus of the economy. In section 1.2.4, I show that the main results obtained under
26Clearly, more complicated codes can a¤ect in-house sta¤. An intuitive way to understand this
di¤erential result across markets is as the extra cost of acquiring rm-specic knowledge between
internal and external service providers.
27See for instance, Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) and Garicano (2000).
28To simplify the presentation of the main setting, I will introduce the notation of the wages
for generalists and specialists in Section 1.2.3.1.
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this arrangement are robust to several other alternatives.
Solution. As service providers take decisions before the problems are realized,
they do so by maximizing the expected surplus of the client and the service provider
given the market they choose to go. Then, the demand is realized and the optimal
organization of the economy allocates clients across markets. In this setting, there
is a xed cost of acquiring knowledge that is independent of its utilization. The or-
ganization of the economy maximizes the net payo¤of all the agents in the economy
by exploiting the increasing returns to the use of knowledge. I rst characterize the
optimal cuto¤s that dene the rm and the market boundary, respectively. The rm
boundary is characterized by the level of di¢ culty at which the expected benet of
increasing the issue-specic knowledge equals the cost of doing so in the internal
market. This is the maximum level of knowledge that the in-house service provider
would reach. On the other hand, the market boundary is characterized by the level
of di¢ culty at which the expected benet of increasing the issue-specic knowledge
for n clients equals the cost of doing so in the external market. The number of
clients is determined by the external service providers time constraint. With an
innite labor supply, the wages compensate for the costs of acquiring knowledge
and, given a perfectly elastic labor supply, the demand determines the employment
level in each market.
In this setting, service providers are ex-ante homogeneous and di¤er ex-post
due to knowledge investments. This allows me to determine the distribution of
knowledge as an equilibrium of a vertical integration model and to abstract from
innate or pre-market comparative advantage. Under this framework, I learn not only
about the service providersearnings distribution, but also about the distribution
of agents across vertical integration possibilities and, within each possibility, the
degree of specialization.
In order to gain some intuition, I start by solving the problem when there is
only one issue. Then, I move to the case in which clients face problems in both
issues, and I consider the service providersdecision to become either a generalist
or a specialist.
1.2.2 Benchmark: One Issue
Consider the case with only one issue. The problem is solved recursively: rst, I
characterize the in-house solution and then do the same for the external market. An
intuitive way to think about this problem is that there is a set of service providers
that try to increase the probability of solving their clientsproblems as much as
they can. As these providers are limited by the cost of acquiring knowledge, they
cannot solve any problem. Then, a second set of service providers will choose the
necessary level of knowledge to solve the problems of clients for whom the rst set
of providers could not nd a solution.
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1.2.2.1 Internal market: Firm Boundary
The time constraint of the provider 1 = (1 F (0))  1. That is, the service provider
allocates her one endowed unit of time to one client, who faces problems with proba-
bility (1 F (0)). The joint surplus in the internal market is F (z) cz. The problem
is, thus, to choose the length of the interval of issue-specic knowledge acquired to
maximize the expected output. The solution of this problem is characterized by the
following rst-order condition:
f(z) = c
The level z represents the knowledge level at which the marginal benet of
having someone in-house is equal to the cost of acquiring knowledge. The marginal
benet of this problem represents the increase in the probability that a problem
will be solved.
1.2.2.2 External Market: Market Boundary
The ex-ante payo¤ function for a client in the external market is [F (z)  F (z)] 
wEz. The net earnings of the service provider are nwEz cz, given that the external
provider has leverage equal to n clients. Each of these clients draws one problem.
External service providers are asked to solve (1   F (z))  n problems, which they
can address in (1   F (z))  n  h units of time. Therefore, the external service
providers time constraint is represented by 1 = (1   F (z))  n  h and is limited
by the in-house providers issue-specic skill z. Since each service provider has one
unit of time available, the leverage of the external provider n is implicitly given by
the time constraint.
The joint surplus in the external market is [F (z)  F (z)]  c
n
z.29 Finally, notice
that, from the time constraint, I can solve for 1
n
= h  (1   F (f 1 (c))). Then, the
objective function is [F (z)  F (z)]   czh(1   F (f 1 (c))). The solution of this
problem is characterized by the following rst-order condition:
f(z) = ch(1  F (f 1 (c)))
The external market allows service providers to acquire higher levels of skills
by sharing the costs of acquiring these skills with several clients. Since in this
market, for each problem, the marginal benet (given by the frequency) of bringing
someone in-house is lower than the marginal cost, no single client can hire an internal
provider. However, the beauty of the market is that it allows several clients to share
the acquiring-skills cost of the service provider to the point at which the marginal
cost per client intersects the per-client marginal benet. Comparing the two rst-
order conditions and applying the implicit function theorem, I state my rst result.
29As the expected surplus of one client is [F (z)  F (z)] wEz, the total surplus for n clients
is n [F (z)  F (z)]  nwEz + nwEz   cz.
24
Lemma 1.1 The knowledge of external service providers is larger than the knowl-
edge of internal service providers (i.e., z < z), and both knowledge levels are
decreasing in c (i.e., @z

@c
; @z

@c
< 0). The larger the rm-specic component, the
lower the knowledge acquired by the external providers (i.e., @z

@h
< 0).
This result simply states that service providers di¤er by their level of issue-
specic skills according to their breadth, and in turn, this knowledge is always
strictly decreasing in the cost of acquiring knowledge. As in-house sta¤own the code
within the organization, they are not a¤ected by changes in rm-specic knowledge.
However, external service providers acquire a lower level of issue-specic knowledge
when the rms have more specic codes within their organizations. I see this re-
sult as a corollary of Becker and Murphy (1992). They claim that the degree of
specialization (depth of issue-specic knowledge) is limited not only by the extent
of the market, but also by the costs of coordinating specialized workers. In this
chapter, the relevant coordination cost occurs between clients and external service
providers and is given by the rm-specic knowledge. The next results provide a
characterization of the optimal way to allocate clients to markets.
Lemma 1.2 There are two cuto¤s of knowledge levels zand z. Clients with suf-
ciently easy (very frequent) problems (i.e., z  z) go to the internal market,
while clients with intermediate levels of di¢ culty (medium-level of frequency) (i.e.,
z < z  z) hire external service providers. Finally, clients that face hard (infre-
quent) problems (i.e., z > z) do not hire any service provider.
Figure 1.1 shows these two cuto¤s. The left shaded (green) area represents
the activities for which the marginal benet of conducting the activities in-house
is larger than or equal to the marginal cost. The cut-o¤ z represents the rm-
boundary, whereas the cut-o¤ z denotes the market boundary. The white (in-
termediate) area represents the activities in which clients outsource the service,
whereas the right, dark (black) area denotes clients that do not use service providers.
The organization of the economy gives rise to consulting by exception, whereby in-
house workers deal with the most common problems, and external service providers
deal with the less frequent and harder problems. The next result provides some
intuition for when clients di¤er by their level of rm-specic knowledge. The ex-
pected (ex-post) surplus is the surplus in the economy before (after) the problems
have been realized.
Lemma 1.3 The expected surplus in the external market is maximized when clients
with high rm-specic knowledge are allocated to the internal market. The ex-post
surplus in the external market can be increasing or not in the clientsrm-specic
knowledge h.
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The basic intuition behind the ex-ante surplus result is that the economy saves
communication costs when clients with high rm-specic knowledge avoid the ex-
ternal market and conduct their activities in-house.30This is straightforward and
comes directly from applying the Envelope theorem to the objective function of the
external market. For the ex-post case, the main trade-o¤ in the economy is given
by the leverage and the wage bill. When rm-specic skills are greater, the time
constraint kicks in, and, therefore, external service providers have less leverage. As
a consequence, the service provider acquires a lower level of issue-specic knowledge
and, therefore, is cheaper to hire. The economy maximizes the ex-post surplus al-
locating clients with more, rather than less rm-specic knowledge, to the external
market when the marginal e¤ect on leverage is larger than the marginal e¤ect on
the wage bill. This depends on the specic distribution of problems F and the value
of the cost of acquiring knowledge c.
1.2.2.3 Equilibrium
Let NI (NE) be the number of service providers in the internal (external) market.
As there are M homogeneous clients, and each receives one and only one problem
independently and identically distributed according to F , this distribution is also
useful to represent the total demand in the economy. Intuitively, if there are 1
3
tasks that are easy, for M large, there will be M
3
clients facing easy problems. The
equilibrium conditions in this economy are for the internal market:
M
f 1(c)Z
0
f(x)dx = NI
This condition establishes that the number of providers that go to the internal
market is equal to the number of internal market demanders. And for the external
market:
M
n
f 1(ch(1 F (f 1(c))))Z
f 1(c)
f(x)dx = NE
That is, the total number of service providers needed equals the total number
of clients demanding external services divided by the number of clients that each
service provider works for. Finally, as all the service providers should get the same
ex-ante payo¤:31
30For an early discussion of this, see Monteverde (1995).
31Notice that this is without loss of generality. If the individual rationality constraint in the
internal market is wIz   cz  E , where E is the payo¤ in the external market, wI = Ez + c,
which implies that the objective function in the internal market is F (z) cz E . In this case, the
rst-order condition does not change. For the external market, the individual rationality constraint
implies that wE = 
I
nz +
c
n . The objective function in this market will be [F (z)  F (z)]   czn  
I
n , which would give us the same rst-order condition. The payo¤s are
 
wI   c z   E =
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0 =
 
wI   c z =  nwE   c z
That is, the equilibrium wages are given by wE = c
n
= w
I
n
for z; z > 0.
To characterize the optimal organization of the economy, I solve it as follows:
rst, internal and external market-clearing conditions give me the number of in-
ternal and external service providers. Note that, as (1  F (f 1 (c)))h = 1
n
, the
external providerstime constraint uniquely determines the number of clients for
whom each external provider works. Finally, wages are given by the ex-ante equal-
ity payo¤ condition. Although the net earnings in equilibrium are zero for both
types of providers, the earnings for internal providers are cz, whereas the earnings
for external providers are n c
n
z. Thus, the excess of gross earnings for external
providers is proportional to the di¤erences in knowledge levels and is given by
c [f 1 (ch(1  F (f 1 (c))))  f 1 (c)] > 0.
Vertical Integration The fraction of vertically integrated clients is given by:
V I =
f 1(c)Z
0
f(x)dx=
f 1( cn)Z
0
f(x)dx
and using the fundamental theorem of calculus I get:
V I =
F (f 1 (c))
F (f 1
 
c
n

)
=
F (f 1 (c))
F (f 1 ((1  F (f 1 (c)))hc))
Theorem 1.1 The fraction of vertically integrated clients increases with rm-specic
knowledge h and decreases with the cost of acquiring issue-specic skills.
An increase in rm-specic knowledge h decreases the knowledge level acquired
by external service providers z. This modies the market boundary without chang-
ing the rm boundary. As a consequence, the fraction of vertically integrated clients
is larger. The e¤ect of the cost of acquiring knowledge on the integration patterns
is not trivial, as it modies both the rm and market boundaries. The theorem
states that the change in the cost a¤ects disproportionately more the internal than
the external market. Therefore, a decrease in this cost, increases the integration in
the economy.
Comparative Statics Before I explore the case with two issues, I conduct some
simple comparative static exercises using the case in which the CDF is the exponen-
tial function F (z) = 1  e z, as in Garicano (2000), Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg
(2006) and Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012). In this case, the knowledge levels
for internal and external service providers are given by:32 
nwE   c z   I = 0 , which is equal to I   E = E   I = 0. This implies that E = I
and 2I = 0:
32I include the restrictions  > c and 2 > c2h, to ensure that z; z > 0.
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z =  1

ln(
c

) and z =  1

ln(
c2h
2
)
and it is easy to see that z > z.33 The levels of earnings in the economy are:
wIz =   c

ln(
c

) and nwEz =   c

ln(
c2h
2
)
It is easy to see from these equations that external service providers earn more
than in-house sta¤ due to their additional issue-specic skills. From the time con-
straint, it is easy to see that the number of clients that a particular external provider
has is given by n = 
hc
, whereas the total number of suppliers in equilibrium is:
NI =M
(  c)

and NE =Mhc2
(  ch)
3
Total clients are NI in the internal market and M2 (c  c2h) in the external
market. Finally, the fraction of vertically integrated clients is given by:
V I =
 (  c)
2   c2h =
n (  c)
n  c
Once I have characterized the equilibrium objects, I can obtain some compara-
tive static results. Table 1.1 summarizes the signs of these e¤ects. Unfortunately,
some of these e¤ects do not have a clear sign and, thus, depend on the specic
values of the parameters.
The rst row gives the comparative static results when I change the rm-specic
knowledge component h. The internal providersknowledge does not change; how-
ever, as h is larger, the external providerstime constraint is more restrictive, and
their knowledge decreases. As the time constraint binds, a change in some other
variable must compensate for this increase in the specic component h. In this case,
a decrease in leverage. Finally, the lower the level of external service providers
knowledge, the smaller is the mass of clients that can solve problems in the external
market and, as a consequence, the lower the vertical integration fraction.
The second row shows the comparative static results when I change the cost
c. The e¤ects of this variable on the rm and market boundaries are derived in
Lemma 1.1. As the leverage is dened by the time constraint, a decrease in the cost
c makes it more likely that service providers face problems; therefore, each of them
can work with fewer clients.34
33Notice that given that  > c and h 2 (0; 1),  > ch, which implies that n > 1, and given that
z =   ln( c2h
2
)
 
1


=   ln( cn )
 
1


, I have that z > z.
34The comparative static exercises for the parameter of the CDF, , show that sign(@z

@ ) =
sign(ln( c ) + 1)), sign(
@z
@ ) = sign(ln(
c2h
2
) + 2)) and sign(@V I@ ) = sign(
2 + hc2   2ch). The
signs of these functions depend on the specic values of the parameters.
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1.2.3 Problem with two Issues
1.2.3.1 Internal Market: Firm Boundary
The ex-ante objective function for the client is S (zA; zB; cA; cB) = FA (zA) +
FB (zB)   wIAzA   wIBzB, as the client faces problems in both issues, A and B.
With two issues, there are two relevant cases to look at: one in which the client
uses two providers, each of whom works on one issue; and another in which the
client uses only one person to deal with both issues. A service provider that works
on only one issue is called a specialist, whereas a provider working on more than
one issue is a generalist.
Hiring Two Specialists
As the time constraint for a service provider working on issue i = 1; 2 is 1 =
(1  Fi(0))  1, the solution of this problem is given by:
fi(z

i ) = ci
Hiring One Generalist
If the client hires only one person, it is necessary to include the time allocation
decision to maximize the joint surplus. Let tA 2 [0; 1] be the fraction of time that
the service provider spends on issue A. In this case, the objective function for the
client is:
tAFA (zA) + (1  tA)FB (zB)  wI [tAzA + (1  tA) zB]
where wI is the wage for the generalist internal service provider. The service
providers earnings depend on the time she spends on each issue. She will receive
a payment tAwI for each level of knowledge acquired in issue A and (1  tA)wI for
each unit of knowledge in issue B. The time constraint implies that the service
provider has one unit of time to allocate a fraction tA to problems of issue A and
a fraction (1  tA) to problems of issue B. Each of these problems will occur with
probability 1   Fi(bzi), where bzi  0 is an endogenous object that represents the
minimum issue-specic knowledge problem that the service provider will face. As
the time constraint is 1 = tA(1 FA(czA))+(1  tA) (1 FB(czB)), tA can be expressed
as follows:
FB(czB)
[FB(czB)  FA(czA)] = tA
Lemma 1.4 The optimal time allocation is characterized by a corner solution. The
provider should give all her time to the activity she is more likely to face. That is,
if type i problems are more likely to occur, then the provider should not devote any
time to activity j 6= i.
The previous lemma states that the time constraint that I have used cannot
29
characterize generalists in the internal market. Rosen (1983) provides a solution to
the existence of generalists: complementarities among tasks. With complementari-
ties, the service provider spends less time solving the same number of problems or,
alternatively, more problems in the same time. As the service providers time con-
straint determines the time allocation, a natural way to include complementarities
is with a constant  > 1 as follows:35
1 =  [tA(1  FA(czA)) + (1  tA) (1  FB(czB))]
and solving for tA: 36
(1  ) + FB(czB)
 [FB(czB)  FA(czA)] = tA
Proposition 1.1 There is a range of  such that tA 2 (0; 1). For this range of
values of , generalists do not exist for czA = czB = 0.
This result states that the inclusion of complementarities allows the existence
of generalists and that these service providers are never allocated to solve the most
frequent problems for both issues in the internal market. Figure 1.2 provides more
intuition on this result. Plugging tA into the objective function, I get:
G (zA; zB; t

A; cA; cB) = t

A [FA (zA)  FB (zB)] + FB (zB)  cAzA   cBzB
The rst-order conditions for the levels of issue-specic knowledge for each issue
are:
[zA] : t

AfA (zA)  cA = 0 =) zgA = f 1A

cA
tA

;
[zB] :  tAfB (zB) + fB (zB)  cB = 0 =) zgB = f 1B

cB
1  tA

where zgi denotes the level of issue-specic knowledge that a generalist in the
internal market will reach on issue i. Notice that for tA 2 (0; 1), zgA < zA and
zgB < z

B. That is, if there are generalists in the internal market, they know less
about each issue than the internal service providers working on the rm boundary.
Let z=A ; z
=
B be the set of maximum values for which a client prefers to have two
35To understand this better, assume that there is one time unit of endowment to solve a number
of problems x, and each problem requires t units of time. That is, the time constraint is 1 = tx,
which implies that we need 1x units of time to produce x units. With complementarities, 1 = tx,
and then one needs fewer units of time 1x <
1
x to produce the same quantity x. A larger  implies
a larger level of complementarities.
36It is easy to see from this equation that sign(@t

A
@ ) = sign(FA(bzA)   FB(bzB)). That is, if
the provider is more likely to face problems of issue B than of issue A, the larger the level of
complementarities between issues A and B, the larger the fraction of time spent on issue A.
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specialists rather than one generalist; that is,
z=A ; z
=
B 2 max

zA; zBjG (zgA; zgB; tA; cA; cB) + " = S (zA; zB; cA; cB)
	
For the sake of understanding, suppose that zj  zi  z=j  z=i , where zj is the
rm boundary of issue i.
Proposition 1.2 There are at most two cuto¤s (excluding the rm boundary) in
the internal market for each issue. For issue j, the relevant cuto¤s are z=j and z

i .
Clients with zj  z=j hire two specialists; clients with zi  zj  z=j hire a generalist;
and clients with zj  zi hire one specialist.
Corollary 1.1 If (z=A ; z
=
B) = (z

A; z

B), there is only one cuto¤. In this case, the in-
ternal market contains only specialists. If (z=A ; z
=
B) < (z

A; z

B), clients with (z
=
A ; z
=
B) 
(zA; zB) will hire two specialists, and clients with (z=A ; z
=
B)  (zA; zB)  (zgA; zgB) will
hire one generalist.
Figure 1.2 shows the inclusion of the levels z=A ; z
=
B with z
=
A < z
=
B . In this gure,
clients with zB; zA  z=B use two specialists. For z=B  zB; zA  zA, clients use
one generalist. Finally, clients with zB  zB > zA use only one specialist in the
internal market. Here, the main forces at play are the frequency and di¢ culty of
problems. Intuitively, a single service provider can solve both types of problems
if they are easy enough; however, as easier problems are more frequent, the single
service providers time constraint kicks in and restricts the provider to solving the
most frequent problems for both issues.
To sum up, generalists may exist because of complementarities. The internal
market may have, at most, two di¤erent cuto¤s. If there is no cuto¤, then there
are only specialists. If there is at least one cuto¤, there are both specialists and
generalists. In the case of one cut-o¤, specialists solve the most common problems,
while generalists solve less common problems. With two cuto¤s, some specialists
solve the most common problems and other specialists solve the less common prob-
lems. The generalists solve the medium-frequency problems of one market and the
less frequent problems of the other market.
1.2.3.2 External Market
Hiring Two Specialists
The ex-ante prots for a client in the external market i are (Fi(zi)  Fi(zi ))  
wEi zi, and the net earnings of the service provider are niw
E
i zi   cizi, given that the
external provider works with ni clients. The service providers time constraint is
1 = (1 F (zi )) ni hi; then, the joint surplus is [Fi(zi)  Fi(zi )] cizi(1 F (zi ))hi.
The solution of this problem is characterized by the following rst-order condition:
fi(z

i ) = ci(1  F (zi ))hi
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Hiring one Generalist
The time constraint for a generalist in the external market is given by:
1 = 

tEA [(1  FA (ezA))ngAhA] +  1  tEA [(1  FB (ezB)ngBhB)]	
That is, a generalist spends a fraction tEA of her time dealing with problems of
issue A. As in the internal market, ezi is an endogenous variable representing the
easiest problem that the provider will face. The service provider has to allocate her
available time to ngi clients, each with hi industry-specic knowledge (communica-
tion costs). This time constraint is the same as that of an in-house generalist when
ngi = hi = 1 for i = A;B. Solving for tA, I get:
1   [(1  FB (ezB))ngBhB]
 [(1  FA (ezA)ngAhA)  (1  FB (ezB)ngBhB)] = tEA
Lemma 1.5 Generalist external service providers can only exist for the combina-
tions of ngAhA and n
g
BhB such that ezA 2 QA 1  1ngAhA ; QA 1  ngBhBngAhA andezB 2 zBI ; QB 1  ngAhAngBhB (1  FA (ezA)) or ezB 2 QB 1  1ngBhB ; 1, where Qi
is the quantile function of the i-th issue.
Notice the trade-o¤ in the combinations of ngAhA and n
g
BhB. When n
g
AhA in-
creases, the lower and upper bounds for ezA increase. That is, the generalist external
provider can handle harder problems in topics A. However, this increase in the lever-
age in issue A decreases the maximum level of di¢ culty in issue B that the provider
can handle. Once I have characterized the service providers time constraint, I can
solve the problem for both the clients and the service provider. The main di¤erence
here with respect to the internal market is that the acquisition of knowledge will
depend on ngA + n
g
B clients. Let w
g
i be the wage of the generalist in the external
market for issue i.37 The joint surplus for the external service provider and her
clients is:
tEA n
g
AFA (zA) +
 
1  tEA

ngBFB (zB) 

wgAt
E
A n
g
AzA + w
g
B
 
1  tEA

ngBzB

In this problem, there are ngi clients looking for solutions to issue i problems.
The total cost of this joint surplus is given by the wage bill of the knowledge acquired
to solve type i problems, times the total number of clients of issue i and the time
invested in type i problems. The rst-order conditions imply that:
zgA = f
 1
A

cA
tEA n
g
A

;
37As it will be clear below, I cannot guarantee at this stage that I can obtain a single wage
for generalists in the external market. This is di¤erent from the internal market case, as the
knowledge for both issues can be represented by a cuto¤ level in only one issue.
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zgB = f
 1
B

cB
(1  tEA )ngB

where zgi denotes the level of issue-specic skills of the generalist in the external
market i-th.
Lemma 1.6 If tEA = 1, then the generalistsknowledge is the same as the special-
istsin the market boundary zgA = z

A . Furthermore, sign(t
E
A  n
s
A
ngA
) = sign(zgA zA ),
where nsA is the leverage of specialists in market boundary for market A.
The rst part of this result states that when generalists tend to spend all their
time on one issue, they converge to have the same knowledge level as specialistsin
the market boundary. The second part of the result states that external generalists
acquire less knowledge on issue A than external market specialists located in the
market boundary if the fraction of time spent on issue A is lower than the ratio
of the leverages of specialists and generalists. So, here again, as above, there is a
positive relationship between leverage and knowledge.
Lemma 1.7 For a given issue, external providers always acquire more knowledge
than any type of internal providers.
This result is similar to Lemma 1.1, and implies that external service providers
have higher earnings.
Table 1.2 shows all the possible combinations of vertical integration and external
contracting that clients can face. Figure 1.3 shows an alternative way to present
this result. In the gure, left shaded areas (green) represent the regions of vertical
integration for each issue. The black areas show the range of values in which clients
prefer not to hire any service provider. Finally, the white area shows the regions in
which clients prefer to contract externally.
1.2.3.3 Equilibrium
The total number of employed service providers is N IA+N
I
B +N
E
A +N
E
B , where N
k
i
denotes the number of service providers in market k=internal or external for issue
i = A;B.
Internal Markets
Suppose that zj  zi  z=j  z=i . Then, the internal market-clearing condition
for topic i is:
M
ziZ
0
fi(x)dx = N
I
i and M
264
zjZ
0
fj(x)dx 
ziZ
z=j
fj(x)dx
375 = N Ij
and the clearing condition for the external markets is:
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Mni
ziZ
zi
fi(x)dx = N
E
i , and
M
264
zjZ
zj
fj(x)dx=nj +
zgjZ
ezj
fj(x)dx=n
g
j
375 = NEj
Finally, as the service providers are ex-ante equal, and there is an innite supply,
they get the same expected earnings; that is, in the internal market, the payo¤ of
specialists facing problems that appear too often is 0 =
 
wIi   ci

z=j =
 
wIj   cj

z=j
, and this should be equal to the payo¤ of the generalists wI [tAz

i + (1  tA) zi ]  
cAz

i   cBzi , which must be equal to that of specialists working on the least fre-
quent problems
 
wIi   cj

zi =
 
wIj   cj

zj . In the external market, specialists earn 
niw
E
i   ci

zi =
 
njw
E
j   cj

zj , whereas generalists earn
 
wgAt
E
A n
g
A   cA

zgA + 
wgB
 
1  tEA

ngB   cB

zgB. This implies that the wages in equilibrium are w
I
i = ci,
wI = cA + cB, wEi =
ci
ni
, wgA =
cA
tEA n
g
A
and wgB =
cB
(1 tEA )ngB
. Finally, the earnings
in the internal market are ciz=j for specialists with frequent problems, ciz

i for spe-
cialists with infrequent problems and (cA + cB) zi for generalists. In the external
market, the earnings are cAz
g
A + cBz
g
B for generalists and ciz

i for specialists.
Finally, the following result shows that the relationship between vertical inte-
gration and the rm-specic levels found in Theorem 1 still holds in the case of two
issues.
Lemma 1.8 The level of vertical integration in the industry is decreasing in the
rm-specic knowledge levels hi and hj.
1.2.4 Alternative Arrangements
The following cases are alternative arrangements for the economy when there are
one or two issue-specic knowledge levels. To simplify the discussion, I present
the results only for the case of one issue. The main point here is that changing
some assumptions of the model gives the same key predictions: clients with easy
or frequent problems solve their problems in-house, whereas clients with harder or
infrequent problems ask for help in the external market.
1.2.4.1 Multiple Layers in the External Market
Above, I have considered a situation in which there is only one layer in the external
market. The problem with several layers is similar and is also solved recursively.
The solution of the problem for the i-th layer is given by:
zi = f
 1  ch(1  F (zi 1))
with ni = 1h(1 F (zi 1)) .
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Lemma 1.9 For any two layers in the external market, i and j, with i < j, zj >
zi and nj > ni.
This result states the positive relationship between levels of knowledge and lever-
age of clients. I provide preliminary empirical evidence in Section 1.3.3.3. There
are at least two di¤erent interpretations for this result. First, service providers with
more knowledge can solve problems for a larger set of clients. Second, a larger set of
clients can nance the service providers acquisition of more knowledge.38 The im-
plications for earnings are clear. External service providers in layer j earn njwEj z

j ,
where wEj represents the wage for the j-layer in the external market. This means
that for two layers, j and i with j > i, njwEj z

j > niw
E
i z

i . Service providers in
layer j earn more than i as they acquire a higher level of knowledge. The equilib-
rium condition in the internal market is the same as before; however, for the case
of the external market, the total number of external service providers required is
M
hX
i
h
F (zi ) F (zi 1)
ni
ii
.
Lemma 1.10 Let z  Exp(), ni =
 

ch
i
and zi =   ln
h
1
hni+1
i  
1


. In this
case, the di¤erence in knowledge between any two layers i and i  1 is given by the
constant zi  zi 1 = 1 ln( ch); the total number of required layers to cover the entire
external market area is given by the ceiling function of 1 z

zi zi 1 ,
l
1 z
zi zi 1
m
=
+ln( c

)
ln( 
ch
)
. The di¤erence in the leverage of the external providers is given by ni   ni 1 = 

ch
i 1   
ch
  1, which is increasing in i. Finally, the cost that each client pays in
the external market decreases at an increasing rate as leverage increases. That is,
c
ni
  c
ni+1
=
 

ch
  1 =   
ch
i+1
, which is decreasing in i:
Figure 1.4 represents the case with three layers in the external market. The
level zi represents the level of knowledge in the i-th layer of the external market.
This level is characterized by the marginal condition f(zi ) =
c
ni
.
1.2.4.2 Clients receive a continuum of problems
Consider a situation in which all the clients receive a continuum of problems in the
interval [0; 1] from F - an extension that can be easily included in my setting. In
this case, all the clients will hire in-house providers for the most frequent tasks and
external providers for the least frequent tasks. In this economy, all the clients will
be the mixed-type; that is, they will go to both internal and external markets.
1.2.4.3 Clients with in-house and external providers
Consider a situation in which the joint surplus of n clients and n+1 service providers
is maximized, and each client receives only one problem. Here, again, the clients will
38This positive relationship between knowledge and the number of clients is due to the super-
modularity of z and n in the objective function. To see this, notice that the objective function is
argmax
zi

F (zi)  F (zi 1)
  czini . Then, the cross-derivative of this function with respect to both
zi and ni is cn2i
> 0.
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hire someone in-house for the most common activities and an external provider for
the least common activities. There are two natural settings: in one, the joint surplus
is maximized over the external providers level of knowledge once the knowledge of
the internal providers has been decided. In the other, the joint surplus is maximized
by simultaneously choosing the knowledge levels for both internal and external
service providers. I call the rst situation the sunk in-house investment and the
second one the exible in-house investment situation.
Sunk in-house investment
In this case, the joint surplus is given by nF (z)   cz   ncz with the time
constraint for the external provider equal to 1 = (1 F (z))nh. Notice that, in this
case, the production of all the clients depends on the external and not the internal
service providers knowledge. The external service providers knowledge maximizes
the joint surplus where:
f (z) = c(1  F (z))h
This level corresponds exactly to the level of the external providers knowledge
found in Section 1.2.2.2.
Flexible in-house investment
In this case, the joint surplus is given by nF (ze)   cze   nczi, where ze (zi)
represents the knowledge level of the external (internal) provider. As in the sunk
in-house investment, the maximum di¢ culty level of problems that can be solved
for any of the n clients is given by the knowledge of the external provider. In this
case, the external providers time constraint is equal to 1 = (1  F (zi))nh, and the
rst-order conditions are given by the following equations:
[zi] : f (zi) =
1
hze
;
[ze] : f (ze) = c(1  F (zi))h
Although I have not been able to precisely compare the in-house and external
knowledge levels with z and z, Proposition 3 in Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg
(2006) suggests that in-house workers acquire less knowledge than they would ab-
sent the exible in-house investment, since in-house workers substitute learning for
asking (i.e., zi < z and ze > z).
The relevant point here is that in-house workers solve the most common prob-
lems whereas external service providers solve the least common problems, as zi < ze
and f 0 < 0. Since their knowledge levels di¤er, external service providers earn more
than in-house sta¤.39
39For the case of the exponential function, zi = ze + log
 
ch


, which implies that ze > zi as
 > ch:
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1.2.4.4 Matching clients and providers at the beginning
I have considered a situation in which clients are allocated to the market in which
they can nd solutions to their problems once the service providers have made
knowledge investments. Alternatively, clients and service providers can be randomly
matched before the problems are drawn; they maximize the joint surplus, and then
the problems are realized. Consider the initial matching of M1 < M clients with
service providers. Let M2 be the number of clients that are not initially matched.
The joint ex-ante surplus is given by F (z)   cz with a rst-order condition equal
to f(z) = c. Then, the problems are realized. Among the Mi clients with i = 1; 2,
a fraction F (z) will have problems that can be solved in-house, and a fraction
1   F (z) will have problems that need to be addressed in the external market.
Therefore, (M1 +M2)F (z) = M F (z) will nd solutions in the internal market,
while M [1  F (z)] will go to the external market. Therefore, assuming one layer
and leverage equal to n, the number of required in-house providers will be M1 +
M2F (z
) and the number of required external service providers will be M [1 F (z
)]
n
.
The leverage depends on the external service providers time constraint, which in
this case is n = 1
h[1 F (z)] . For the equilibrium characterization, the total number of
service providers and clients in the external market is the same, and the di¤erence
in the total number of clients in the in-house market is given by M1F (z). With
ex-ante homogeneous service providers and innite supply, wages compensate for
the cost of acquiring skills (i.e., w = c). The predictions in this case are almost
identical to those in the case considered above: in-house workers solve the most
common problems which are the easiest ones, while external service providers solve
most di¢ cult problems and, as a consequence, acquire more knowledge and earn
more.
Finally, I present two simple results for the case in which clients have problems
in two periods.
1.2.4.5 Two Consecutive Periods
For the case of one issue, once the clients have hired someone in-house, they may
face a di¢ culty level in the future that the internal provider cannot manage. The
probability that, in the rst period, they hire someone in-house is F (z), and the
probability that, in the second period, that provider cannot manage the di¢ culty
level is F (z)(1 F (z)). Therefore, a fraction of the clients F (z)2 will use internal
providers in two consecutive periods; a fraction (1   F (z))2 will use external
providers in both periods; and a fraction 2F (z)(1 F (z)) will use both types. The
following result compares the probability of nding clients using only the internal
market versus using only the external market.
Remark 1.1 After two periods, the fraction of clients using in-house sta¤ exclu-
sively is larger than the fraction of clients using external providers exclusively if
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, where Q represents the quantile function.
For the case of two issues, I have an additional result. The probability that in
the rst period they have hired someone in-house for topic i-th is Fi(zi ) and the
probability that they need an external provider for issue i is (1  Fi(zi )).
Lemma 1.11 If Fj(zj )  Fi(zi ), it is more common to nd that clients with in-
house providers in issue i in the rst period hire external service providers for issue
i in the second period.
1.2.5 Discussion
1.2.5.1 Building Blocks
Rosen (1983) elaborates on the intuition that the return to the investment in knowl-
edge is increasing in its rate of utilization because investment costs are xed. Becker
and Murphy (1992) propose that communication costs limit the extent of the mar-
ket. Garicano (2000) builds upon these two previous intuitions by suggesting that
the key trade-o¤ of the organization occurs between the costs of communicating
and acquiring knowledge. Using Garicanos approach, I think of the economy as an
organization and transform the rst (second) layer of the organization into the rm
(market) boundary. My model is close to that of Garicano and Hubbard (2007),
who focus on the role of hierarchies in the organization of human-capital intensive
production. This chapter is di¤erent because I focus on the vertical integration
problem and not on hierarchies and their relationship with the size of the mar-
ket. Murphy (1986) and Garicano and Hubbard (2007) explains the existence of
generalists with market uncertainty. My approach is closer to Rosen (1983), who
explains generalists with complementarities. Furthermore, in my model, clients al-
ways have problems in two issues, whereas in Murphy (1986) and Garicano and
Hubbard (2007), the models allow the possibility of not having problems in a given
issue.
1.2.5.2 Ex-ante and Ex-post di¤erences
The assumption of ex-ante homogeneous service providers is not realistic, but it
simplies the burden of my analysis. The important point, which is fully devel-
oped in Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), is that the introduction of ex-ante
di¤erences accentuates the sorting in the economy. The initially more knowledge-
able people have comparative advantage in the external market, so they go to that
market, and, in equilibrium, they end up acquiring even more knowledge than in
the case of ex-ante homogeneous agents. The less knowledgeable agents go to the
internal markets. Therefore, the di¤erences (between in-house and external) in
knowledge patterns hold for both cases: ex-ante homogeneous and heterogeneous
service providers.
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1.2.5.3 Other Skills
Knowledge may not be the only skill required to solve problems. For instance,
Blanes-i-Vidal et al. (2012) and Bertrand et al. (2014) conclude that both connec-
tions and knowledge are important skills for lobbyists. My model can accommodate
this view in two di¤erent ways. First, the choice variable of the service providers
contains both social and human capital. So, what I call knowledge or skills in the
model can be interpreted as an index that comprises both types of capital. This is
certainly valid, as acquiring a network of policy makers is independent of the rate of
use; thus, making connections has increasing returns to scale to their use. Second,
one can think of the level of connections as an ex-ante di¤erence among service
providers (i.e., family networks), which, therefore, does not matter in an ex-ante
homogeneity setting.
1.2.6 A Summary of the Main Predictions
In this section, I summarize the main results of the theoretical section:
1. Activities that occur often (or have low issue-specic knowledge requirements)
are conducted in-house, whereas activities that occur less often (or are more
di¢ cult) are outsourced;
2. The economy saves communication costs with external service providers when
clients with high rm-specic knowledge conduct their activities in-house;
3. Service providersknowledge levels di¤ers according to the market they are in.
External providers have more knowledge than internal service providers. This
implies that the levels of earnings di¤er across internal and external markets
proportionally to the di¤erence in the level of knowledge acquired. As a
consequence, external providers earnings are larger than their counterpart
internal ones;
4. The possibility of sharing the cost of acquiring knowledge with several clients
allows external service providers to acquire more knowledge. Each of these
clients is not able to form a protable one-to-one match with the service
providers, as the clients face problems that occur too infrequently. However,
the beauty of the external market is that it allows clients to join interests and
pay the learning costs for harder (non-frequent) problems;
5. In the case of one or two issues, the fraction of vertically integrated clients
is increasing in rm-specic knowledge, decreasing in the cost of acquiring
knowledge c and ambiguous in the parameters of the distribution of problems
F ;
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6. When there are two issues, generalists and specialists exist in both internal and
external markets. Generalists exist due to the presence of complementarities
among issues. In the internal market, there can be, at most, three types of
service providers. Specialists work either for the most or the least frequent
issues faced in the internal market, whereas generalists solve the intermediate
or less frequent problems.
1.3 Empirics
This section is divided into four subsections. In Section 1.3.1, I present the data and
the institutional context. Section 1.3.2 presents the xed e¤ect estimation results
at both the client and the transaction levels. Then, in Section 1.3.3, I provide some
empirical evidence for other results derived from the theoretical section. Finally, in
Section 1.3.4, I use the BP oil spill event to provide causal evidence on the e¤ect of
di¢ culty on vertical integration decisions.
1.3.1 Data and Institutional Context
The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (henceforth LDA) requires lobbyists to regis-
ter and to report on their lobbying activities to the Senate O¢ ce of Public Records
(henceforth SOPR). According to the Act, lobbying activity is dened as contacts
with o¢ cials, including background work performed to support these contacts.40
Two types of registrants are required to report under the LDA: external and in-
ternal lobbyists. External lobbyists, who work for lobbying rms, take on lobbying
responsibilities for a number of di¤erent clients and, under the LDA, they are re-
quired to le a separate report for each of their clients. Internal lobbyists are
self-ling organizations that conduct in-house lobbying activities. Both types of
registrants are required to report good-faith information every three months. Up
until the end of 2007, they were required to report these estimates biannually.41
The starting unit of observation is a lobbying report. Each SOPR report not
only contains the name of the client and individual lobbyists, but also species the
House(s) of Congress and federal agencies contacted, as well as the bills in which the
client was interested.42 Clients can have more than one report in a given period, as
they can use both internal lobbyists and one or more groups of external lobbyists.
The lobbying reports dataset starts at the rst semester of 1999 and nishes with
the second semester of 2014. It contains 44,039 clients and 56,759 lobbyists.
40The LDA denes a lobbyist as a person spending 20% or more of her time engaged in lobbying
activities.
41For the sake of a better comparison, for most of the estimations, I will focus on semester-level
time variation.
42Although, lobbying reports contain information on expenditures, I have not considered this
variable in most of my analysis, as in-house reports include non-disaggregated expenditures not
directly related to advocacy activities (i.e. o¢ ce space).
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1.3.1.1 Bills, Committees and RegData
Bills are legislative proposals that can be introduced at any time while the Congress
is in session by any member of either house.43 After introduction, the bill is referred
to the appropriate committee or committees, based on the committeesjurisdiction,
which is dened by congressional rules.44 In the House of Representatives, this refer-
ral is controlled by the Speaker, following the advice of the House Parliamentarian;
in the Senate, it is managed mainly by the Senate Parliamentarian on behalf of the
presiding o¢ cer of the Senate. Parliamentarians are nonpartisan o¢ cials that pro-
vide technical assistance and expertise on the legislative procedure of the Congress.
They serve for several years; indeed, there have been only ve parliamentarians in
each house since 1928.45
The objective of the committees is to study bills and consider whether or not
to send them for further action. The committees are divided into sub-committees
that have a narrower jurisdiction in the topics. The initial stage of this study
process consists of public hearings at which committee or sub-committee members
invite witnesses with the purpose of gathering relevant information. Witnesses
are either specialists on the topic or people a¤ected by the matter. They represent
di¤erent views on the topic and can have di¤erent backgrounds, such as government,
academia or business. Committees that manage more technical subjects require
witnesses with more experience or higher education levels.46
I have web-scraped the name and title or occupation of all the witnesses in all the
reported congressional hearings since 1999. I have classied these occupations into
two groups: high and low levels of knowledge requirements. Titles that include PhD,
professor or senior manager are classied as high, whereas all other occupations are
classied as low. Examples of low-knowledge occupations are farm owners, farm
producers, assistant secretaries and average citizens with an interest in the issue.
Ideally, as the lobbying reports provide information on the lobbied bills, I would
like to consider knowledge-intensity measures at the bill level. However, this is not
feasible. First, not all the bills are studied in congressional committees, and some
of these meetings study a set of bills that have a common topic. Second, focusing
on the information at the bill level does not provide straightforward measures for
the frequency variable. Third, as lobbyists can choose the specic bills they lobby
for, the inclusion of a measure at the bill level can bias the estimates due to double
causality. As a consequence, I aggregate the information at the committee-semester
43Kang (2016) is one of the few papers using both SOPR data and information of the bills. She
focuses on only a small subset of bills and ignores the richness of the information contained in the
Congressional Committees. However, she advances the understanding on the lobbying industry
by structurally estimating the returns to lobby when the unit of observation is the policy rather
than the bill.
44Most of the bills go to only one committee. There are 16 standing committees in the Senate
and 20 in the House of Representatives.
45The Senate established this gure since 1937.
46For more information, see Sachs (1999), Sullivan (2007) and Heitshusen (2015).
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level. This ensures that all the bills will receive knowledge-intensity and frequency
measures, and, more importantly, I avoid obvious double causality problems in my
estimations.
In order to capture a comprehensive measure of knowledge requirements, I cre-
ate a di¢ culty index at the committee-semester level using principal components
analysis. The index uses as an input the number of sub-committees and the knowl-
edge intensity of these committees measured by the fraction of witnesses with high-
knowledge occupations over the total number of witnesses. A committee with many
sub-committees will tend to deal with issues that need more specialized study than
will committees with few sub-committees. A committee with a larger fraction of
high-knowledge witnesses will tend to deal with greater knowledge requirements
issues. Proxying knowledge requirements using the di¢ culty index, or simply the
fraction of high-knowledge witnesses, gives the same qualitative results.
A drawback of this methodology is that not all clients lobby for bills. On
average, across semesters, 50% of the clients report advocacy activities for bills.
In order to overcome this problem, I propose an additional measure of knowledge
intensity using two variables based on Al-Ubaydli andMcLaughlins (2015) RegData
2.2. This database uses text analysis and machine learning algorithms to create
regulation intensity measures at the industry-year level based on the Code of Federal
Regulations (henceforth CFR). The CFR is an annual codication of rules made by
executive and federal government agencies.47 RegData classies industries at the
NAICS four-digit code levels for the period 1999 to 2014.48 For each industry-year
combination, I use two variables from this database: 1) the number of words related
to the regulation of the industry;49 and 2) the number of restriction strings related
to the industry. The latter variable counts the number of times that any of the
following ve strings appears among the regulating words: shall, must, may not,
prohibited, and required.
Firm-specic knowledge (i.e., h), which is the source of communication costs
with external service providers, can also be easily interpreted as industry-specic
knowledge. Given the lack of a comprehensive measure at the rm level, I use the
total number of regulating words as a proxy for industry-specic knowledge. The
intuition is that when clients hire external service providers, they explain the regula-
tions in their industry. The larger the number of regulating words, the more costly
it is to explain it to the external service providers and, therefore, the larger the
47These rules come from two main resources: congressional bills that become laws and regu-
lations made by federal Agencies. The code is divided into 50 titles representing broad subject
areas in federal regulations, such as Agriculture, Energy, Banking and Public Health.
48RegData also classies industries at the NAICS three- and two-digit code levels. All the
results presented in this paper are robust to the denition of an industry.
49Proxying regulation with these types of measures is not completely new. Co¤ey et al. (2012)
and Mulligan and Shleifer (2005) proxy the extent of regulation of the whole economy with the
number of pages and size of digital versions of regulations, respectively. The innovation of this
database is to include regulation measures at the industry and not at the economy-wide level.
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communication costs. In the database, external service providers have, on average,
5.9 clients in each semester belonging to 3.4 three-digit code industries. Anecdotal
evidence shows that in a given period, lobbyists conduct lobbying activities for a
given topic for di¤erent industries. Over time, they tend to lobby for di¤erent in-
dustries, but when they have clients from the same industry, they lobby for di¤erent
activities.
I use the fraction of the number of restriction words over the total number of
regulating words to proxy for the di¢ culty of the lobbying activities. Clients be-
longing to industries with a larger fraction of regulating words will face a tougher
regulatory environment. In order to match the RegData information with the lob-
bying reports, I conducted extensive data work to detect the industry of the clients
using ORBIS, COMPUSTAT and other web sources such as the clients webpage.
I also include information at the bill and committee levels using web scraping tech-
niques. I extract data from several web sources such as the Policy Agendas Project
(hereafter PAP) and the Congressional Bills Project (henceforth CBP).
1.3.1.2 Validation of f 0 < 0 and proxy for communication cost
Figure 1.5 shows that more di¢ cult activities tend to occur less frequently. The
LHS part of the gure shows the frequency function of the committee-knowledge
requirementsindex, whereas the RHS part of the gure shows the frequency of the
fraction of restriction words.50 The bottom line from this gure is that one of the
main assumptions of the model has empirical validity. The decreasing pattern of the
gure holds across all the time periods of my database. An important implication
of this graph is that there is an empirical monotonic relationship between frequency
and di¢ culty. Therefore, it is enough to estimate the e¤ect of frequency (di¢ culty)
to know the e¤ect of di¢ culty (frequency).
I conduct validation exercises for the proxy of communication costs using em-
pirical proxies of industry specicity from the displaced workersliterature and the
trade literature.51 Both of these sources provide a non-comprehensive cross-section
of empirical measures for industry specicity. To the best of my knowledge, there
is no available panel dataset on industry specicity with which to conduct this
validation exercise.
50Notice that in my model, each rm faces the same distribution of problems; then, by the
law of large numbers for identically and independent distributed observations, this probability
is reected in the whole economy. Suppose that 100 clients are facing the following distribution
function of problems: 2/3 have easy problems and 1/3 hard problems. If these problems are iid,
after all the rms get their problems, 2/3 of the rms will have easy problems and 1/3 will have
hard problems. Therefore, the density of the problems and the density of the types of clients or
industries facing these problems is the same.
51For the displaced workers literature, see, for instance, Jacobson et al. (1993), Carrington
(1993), Neal (1995), Parent (2010) and Couch and Placzek (2010). For the trade literature, see
Rauch (1999) and Nunn (2007). In Sub-section 1.5.2, I focus on the results from Jacobson et al.
(1993) and Couch and Placzek (2010) for the rst type of literature, whereas I use the data of
Nunn (2007) for the trade literature.
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The displaced workersliterature shows that workers who switch industries fol-
lowing displacement have signicantly larger earnings losses than workers that re-
main in the same industry after displacement. I take this intuition one step further.
If the earning losses from switching industries proxies for industry-specic knowl-
edge, the level of the losses may proxy for the level of specicity. That is, industries
in which workers su¤er more from leaving the industry will be those with higher
levels of industry-specic skills.
The trade literature provides an alternative data source. Nunn (2007) con-
structs a measure of relationship specicity at the industry level using information
on whether the inputs are sold on an organized exchange or are reference priced in
trade publications. An input is relationship-specic if the value of the input in a
buyer-seller relationship is similar inside and outside the relationship. If the input is
sold on an organized exchange, the market is thick (many buyers and sellers), and,
as a consequence, the input is not relationship-specic. A similar intuition applies
for the case in which the input price appears in trade publications. Therefore, an in-
tuitive measure of industry specicity is the value of inputs that are neither bought
and sold on an exchange nor reference priced. In sub-section 1.5.2 in the Appendix,
I show that the total number of regulating words is signicantly correlated with
both the displacement and trade literature measures.
1.3.2 Main predictions
There are three key predictions from my model: Clients use in-house lobbyists to
solve frequent or easy problems or when their industry-specic knowledge is greater.
1.3.2.1 Estimations
I run the following two sets of xed e¤ects estimations:
V Iijnt = j + t + X + "ijnt
frjnt = j + t + X + "jnt
where i indicates a transaction, j a client, n an industry and t a time period,
which can be either a semester or a year. The unit of observation in the rst regres-
sion is a lobbying transaction, whereas it is a client-period in the second regression.
At the transaction level, V Iijnt is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when
the transaction is conducted internally and 0 otherwise. At the client level, I use
frjnt to denote the fraction of internal lobbying transactions that the client has.
I obtain similar results when I replace this variable with the fraction of in-house
lobbyists. I control for both client (j) and time xed e¤ects (t). I include client
dummies to control for mean di¤erences in the dependent variable across clients
and time dummies t to control for the dependent variable growth common to all
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clients. Intuitively, I justify the inclusion of client xed-e¤ects as there may be
some client-level omitted characteristics, such as size, labour union status, geo-
graphical variation or relationship with politicians and the federal government, all
of which can cofound the vertical integration decision.52 Unfortunately, I do not
have comprehensive measures of these variables for my dataset. I use time xed
e¤ects, as there may be some time-varying changes in the dependent variable as
a result of the Financial crisis, changes in market uncertainty, lobbying regulation
among other reasons.53 For most of these exercises, I cluster the standard errors
at the client level. I also report results for alternative specications in which the
client xed e¤ects are replaced by industry xed e¤ects. The idea behind including
industry-xed controls is that there may be inherently important di¤erences across
industries in terms of regulation di¢ culty and knowledge requirements.54 In this
case, I cluster the standard errors at the industry level.
The key independent variable in these estimations,X, represents frequency, di¢ -
culty or industry-specic knowledge. For the frequency variable, I present here the
results on the committee-based knowledge requirement measures. I obtain qual-
itatively similar results when I use the alternative frequency measure. For the
di¢ culty measure, I present both sets of results: the one based on the knowledge
requirements of the committees and the fraction of restraining words over the total
number of regulating words. The variation in the committee based measures is at
the transaction level, whereas it is at the industry-year level for the measures based
on RegData. As a given transaction can have more than one bill, the rst measure
of the di¢ culty index (frequency variable) of the transaction is the weighted average
over all the committeesknowledge requirementsindexes (frequencies).55
1.3.2.2 Some Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.3 shows some examples of the four-digit industries with the largest and
smallest fraction of restraining words over the total number of words as well as
the industries with the most and least total number of regulating words. The left-
hand side of the table shows the industries organized by the level of knowledge
requirements, while the right-hand side shows industries organized according to the
52For examples of the relevance of size of the client, see Section 1.3.3.2 of this chapter; for
union status, see Abraham and Taylor (1996); and on geographical variation, see Chinitz (1961)
and Autor (2003).
53For the e¤ect of the Financial Crisis on integration patterns, see Knudsen and Foss (2014) and
Chapter 2 from this dissertation; for economy-wide related time varying patterns, see Abraham
and Taylor (1996); and for the e¤ect of policy changes, see Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
54See, for instance, Helper (1991) in the intrinsic cross-industry di¤erences on the propensity
to outsource.
55Let bcjt be the total number of bills sent to the sub-committee c being lobbied for client j
at period t. Let fct be the frequency (number of bills) sent to committee c at period t. Then, the
measure for the client at period t is
P
c fct
0@ bcjtX
c
bcjt
1A. Similar calculations apply for the case
of the di¢ culty index.
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total level of regulating words. Both columns use 2014 data. Similar rankings are
obtained for di¤erent time periods.
Table 1.4 shows the mean, standard deviation and total number of observations
for the main variables in my analysis: V I, fr, frequency, two di¢ culty measures
and industry-specic knowledge. The unit of observation used to construct this
table is the client-semester for all the variables except V I, which is constructed at
the transaction level. The number of observations for the frequency and the rst
measure of di¢ culty is smaller than for the other variables, as only a fraction of
clients lobby for bills. For the sake of interpretation, I normalize all the independent
variables by their standard deviation in the following econometric exercises.
1.3.2.3 Frequency
Table 1.5 shows the results when I use the frequency variable proxied by the average
number of introduced bills across all the lobbied bills. This table is organized as
follows: The last two columns control for client-xed e¤ects, and the rst column
controls for industry xed e¤ects. The rst and third columns control for semester
xed-e¤ects and the even columns for industryyear xed-e¤ects. The last set of
xed-e¤ects are intended to detect time variation within an industry. That is,
the level of integration and regulation can evolve di¤erently across industries over
time (see, for instance, the BP case in Section 1.3.4.2). The results are divided
into two sections. The top panel shows the results at the transaction level and
the bottom panel shows the estimations at the client level. In this table, all of
the coe¢ cients of interest are statistically signicant, and their signs are consistent
with the theoretical framework. The results imply that an increase of one standard
deviation in the number of introduced bills is associated with an increase in the
probability of vertical integration by an amount between 1.1 and 1.6 percentage
points. Similarly, an additional standard deviation in the number of introduced
bills is associated with an increase in the fraction of in-house reports between 1.4%
and 1.9%. I consider these e¤ects economically relevant. For instance, in the latter
case, as the mean of the dependent variable is 18%, a one standard deviation increase
in the frequency variable increases the fraction of reports made internally between
7% and 11%.
1.3.2.4 Di¢ culty
Table 1.6 shows the results for the rst di¢ culty measure based on the knowledge
requirements of the committees dealing with the bills for which the clients lobby.
Table 1.7 shows the results when I proxy the level of di¢ culty by the ratio of re-
straining words to the total number of words regulating an industry. As my model
predicts, the greater the di¢ culty, the lower is the level of vertical integration. In
these tables, all of the coe¢ cients are signicant at least at the 10% level. The
results imply that an increase of one standard deviation in the fraction of restrain-
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ing words is associated with a decrease in the probabillity of conducting advocacy
activities with in-house sta¤ by an amount between 2.2 and 2.7 (1.4 and 2.1) per-
centage points. Similarly, an additional standard deviation in the di¢ culty index
(fraction of restraining words) is associated with a decrease between 3.3% and 4%
(1.5% and 3.5%) in the fraction of in-house reports. When the dependent variable
is at the transaction level, this corresponds to a decrease in the probability of about
16 to 20 (10 to 15) percentage points. When the dependent variable is the fraction
of in-house reports, this ratio decreases by about 18% to 22% (8% to 19%).
1.3.2.5 Industry-Specic Knowledge
Table 1.8 shows the results when I proxy the level of industry knowledge with the
number of regulating words of the industry. The table shows that all the coe¢ cients
are statistically signicant and positive, as the theoretical section predicts.56 In
particular, a one standard deviation increase in the total number of words regulating
an industry is associated with 0.4 or 0.8 percentage points in the probability of
vertical integration and 0.3% or 0.8% in the fraction of in-house reports. These
e¤ects are smaller than those calculated for the cases of frequency and di¢ culty.
They represent a decrease in the probability of integration of three to six percentage
points and 2% to 4% on the fraction of internal reports.
1.3.3 Other Predictions
In this section, I focus on three empirical patterns accounted for by my theoretical
section. First, I show that there are both generalists and specialists in internal
and external markets. However, generalist lobbyists tend to be in the internal
market and external service providers tend to be specialists. Second, I present an
alternative way to explain di¤erences in the vertical integration patterns by the size
of the clients. I show that the density function of the problems di¤ers by clients
size. Then, I present some empirical evidence on the matching patterns between
clientssize and level of specialization of the in-house specialists. Third, I show that
the more knowledgeable external service providers earn more and work with more
clients.
1.3.3.1 Generalists and Specialists
In order to analyze the rst prediction, I focus on lobbyist-level data. The SOPR
data allow me to separate the lobbyists into two subgroups based on whether or not
they are in-house lobbyists for the full sample period.57 The categories I use in this
section are as follows: 1) internal lobbyists (56.1%), who have always lobbied as
56This result is consistent with that of de Figueiredo and Kim (2004). Using 150 contacts with
the Federal Communications Commission, the authors show that rms use their own employees
to lobby for issues with a high degree of rm-specic information. The authors acknowledge that
one possible mechanism to explain this pattern is with communication costs.
57In this section, I focus on the lobbyists for whom I was able to get sociodemographic infor-
mation based on lobbyist.info. Further information on this database will be provided below.
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in-house lobbyists; and 2) external lobbyists (43.9%), who are intermediaries that
have never lobbied as in-house lobbyists.58 Using lobbyists issue assignments,
I construct a Herndahl concentration index (hereafter HHI) for lobbyists and,
following Bertrand et al. (2014), categorize them into two possible corner solutions:
generalists and specialists. A lobbyist is a generalist if more than 25% of her
assignments are never on the same issue, whereas she is a specialist if at least 25%
of her assignments are on the same issue.59
Table 1.9 shows the main descriptive statistics of this exercise.60 For the LHS
section, the last row shows the average HHI across both internal and external lob-
byists, respectively. Lobbyists working on a larger number of issues have a lower
value in the index. The table shows that external lobbyists have a larger average
HHI than in-house lobbyists. The rst two rows show the distribution of general-
ists and specialists across markets. Consider the row of generalists: among 15,760
lobbyists classied as generalists, 78% are in-house lobbyists, while 22% are exter-
nal lobbyists. Table 1.9 also shows that almost 60% of the specialists are external
lobbyists. The right-hand side section shows the fraction of in-house and external
lobbyists that are generalists and specialists. For instance, among the sample of
external lobbyists, 79.1% are specialists and 20.9% are generalists.61 This table
shows two broad patterns: generalists tend to work as in-house lobbyists, whereas
external lobbyists tend to be specialists. These patterns are robust to di¤erent
ways to dene generalists and specialists. Figure 1.6, which shows the HHI values
for both internal and external lobbyists, reveals two main patterns. First, among
the lobbyists with HHI larger than 0.5 (or any other cuto¤ above 0.25), there is a
larger percentage of external than internal lobbyists. Second, the fraction of inter-
nal lobbyists with HHI larger than 0.5 (or any other cuto¤ above 0.25) is lower than
58An additional possible categorization across lobbyists is the mixed-type lobbyist, who is an
intermediary that has worked in both markets. There are 25,001, 19,526 and 3,057 internal,
external and mixed-type lobbyists, respectively. For the sake of brevity and concreteness, I focus
in this section on only the rst two types of lobbyists. However, the inclusion of the third type of
lobbyist does not change the main patterns presented in this section. Although external lobbyists
can work for several clients, some of these lobbyists work for a single client. That is, they are
de facto internal lobbyists. Although I recognize this is an interesting topic for further research,
I have neglected this issue in the theoretical application, as it does not seem to be empirically
relevant. For instance, if I restrict the sample to lobbyists working at least ten years, less than
2% of the external lobbyists work for only one client.
59Notice that the denitions of specialists and generalists are not exhaustive. There may be
lobbyists who do not match any of these classications. For instance, a lobbyist working on four
issues in four periods with the following allocation: rst period: 20, 40, 20, 20; second period: 40,
20, 20, 20; third period: 20, 20, 40, 20; and fourth period: 20, 20, 20,40. This lobbyist is not a
specialist because she did not work on a given issue at least 25% of the time in each period. On
the other hand, she is not a generalist because she spent 40% of her time on at least one issue in
one period.
60The raw numbers of lobbyists in the internal market are: 12,293 generalists, 9,115 specialists
and 3,594 that do not match any denition. For the external market, there are 3,467 generalists,
13,335 specialists and 2,724 that do not match any denition.
61For the calculations of the right-hand side of the table, I consider only the lobbyists that were
classied as specialists or generalists. That is, each column adds up to 100.
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the fraction of external lobbyists with HHI larger than 0.5. A broad pattern that
emerges from this gure is that internal lobbyists tend to be more concentrated
among lower values of HHI, whereas external lobbyists have both more dispersion
in the values and a larger fraction of lobbyists with large HHI values. Taking this
evidence together, this suggests that internal lobbyists tend to be generalists, while
external ones tend to be specialists.62
A possible concern from these results is that a lobbyist can erroneously be clas-
sied as a specialist if she has worked only few times. Table 1.10 shows that the
patterns highlighted in this section are robust once I control for the tenure of the
lobbyists.
1.3.3.2 Size of the Clients
In this section, I investigate the relationship between the size of the client and verti-
cal integration status. Although previous studies in the political economy literature
nd that large rms tend to lobby more than small rms, I am not aware of any
empirical study relating size and vertical integration status in the lobbying con-
text.63 Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006) theoretically predict that the most
productive or larger rms outsource. Girma and Gorg (2004) and Jabbour (2013)
nd empirical evidence for this prediction. On the contrary, Antras and Helpman
(2004) assume that xed costs under vertical integration are higher than in the case
of outsourcing, and, therefore, most productive and larger rms vertically integrate.
Supporting this prediction, Abraham and Taylor (1996) and Hortacsu and Syverson
(2007) provide empirical evidence that smaller rms tend to contract out more.
These papers focus on the xed costs either of integration or outsourcing to
explain the relationship between the clients size and integration. Although I ac-
knowledge this mechanism, I propose an alternative channel: the variability in the
integration decision among small and large clients can be due to the di¤erences in
the relative frequency of knowledge-intensity levels of the problems they face. In
this section, I rst show that large clients tend to be more vertically integrated, and
then I provide statistical evidence on di¤erences in the distribution of the type of
problems they face.
Large Clients tend to be more vertically integrated In order to analyze this
question, I focus on client-level data. Using ORBIS and COMPUSTAT databases, I
62As anecdotal evidence supporting the intuition behind the frequency of transactions and
the patterns on generalists and specialists across markets, Drutman (2010, p 49) cites one in-
house lobbyists personal interview about generalists and specialists: Most of us in the o¢ ce are
generalists. On new issues like energy, we didnt know the concerns, so we need specialized talent.
Were a lean shop here, and were not going to hire an energy expert, so we go to the consultant
who can o¤er a percentage of time for issue expertise. One of our consultants knows the Energy
and Commerce Committee very well, so we hire them to explain what the issues are.
63Examples of papers studying clientssize and lobbying status are Ansolabehere et al. (2002),
de Figueiredo and Silverman (2006), Richter et al. (2009), Bombardini and Trebbi (2012) and
Kerr et al. (2014).
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obtain business activity information such as sales and employees for 15,939 clients.
The SOPR data allow me to separate the clients into two subgroups based on
whether or not they exclusively used in-house lobbyists for the full sample period.
The categories I use in this section are as follows: 1) internal clients (8.3%) that have
always lobbied with in-house lobbyists; and 2) external clients (91.7%) that have
never lobbied with in-house lobbyists.64 I use two variables to proxy for the size of
the client: sales and employees. Table 1.11 shows the main descriptive statistics for
these two variables discriminated by internal and external clients. From this table,
it is clear that larger clients tend to vertically integrate, whereas smaller clients
tend to outsource. Figure 1.7 shows the rm size distribution by type of client.65
I proxy size with both the logarithm of sales (left-hand side) and logarithm of
the number of employees. For the sake of space, I do not present other results
conrming these patterns, such as the previous xed e¤ect estimations controlling
by size, mean di¤erences t-test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality of distribution
tests. The bottom line is that internal clients are larger than external clients. This
pattern is robust to the way that I proxy size, as other variables such as gross
revenue and total assets provide the same results.
Density of Problems di¤er by Clientssize. Assume that there are two types
of clients indexed by l = L; S facing problems with the same knowledge-acquiring
cost technology. The internal market surplus for client type l is Fl(z)  cz with rm
boundary given by zl = f
 1
l (c). As the total mass of integrated clients type l isR zl
0
fl (x) dx, there are more integrated clients type L if FL(zL) > FS(z

S).
Lemma 1.12 If zl  Exp(l) for l = L; S, L > S , FL(zL) > FS(zS):
This remark implies that if the density of problems for two sets of clients is
exponential, the set of clients with a larger parameter rate  will have a higher level
of integration in the market.
I apply this result to the data. I dene a large (small) rm in two di¤erent ways.
In the rst case, a rm is large (small) if its sales are above (below) the median
value of the sales for the whole sample of companies. In the second case, a rm is
large (small) if its sales are above (below) the 75th (25th) percentile of the sample
of rms. Similar denitions apply when I proxy size with the number of employees.
For each set of rms, large and small, I calculate the density of problems based on
congressional committeesknowledge measures introduced in Section 1.3.1.1. To
64There are only 355 clients that used both internal and external lobbyists for this period. The
mean value of their sales is $2.026 million and the average number of employees is 362.5. These
percentages are very similar when I take the full sample of clients, so at least from an aggregate
point of view, the matching process of ORBIS and COMPUSTAT with the business information
does not change the weights that each category (internal vs external) of client has.
65Both gures use Kernel Epanechnikov estimation methods. The bandwidth used for the LHS
gure is 0.1591 whereas it is 0.1104 for the RHS gure. The number of employees is normalized
to thousands of units with a maximum value equal to 2.2 million employees. The value of sales is
normalized to millions of units with a maximum value of 420,016 million.
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estimate these densities, I use all the bills that they lobbied for. For each density, I
estimate the parameter rate  by Non-Linear Squares. The main result is that all
of these estimations give the same results: L is statistically and signicantly larger
than S.
So the bottom line is that large and small clients have di¤erent densities of
problems. Large clients have a larger mass among problems with low-knowledge
intensity. Therefore, among the internal clients, a larger fraction consists of large
clients. Given this result and Corollary 1.1, I expect to nd that larger vertically
integrated clients will have a larger fraction of internal specialists than smaller
internal clients will.66 Figure 1.8 is a scatter plot between the HHI of lobbyists
and size of the clients and provides empirical evidence on the previous intuition.
Internal specialists tend to be with the largest clients and the generalists working
internally tend to be hired by smaller internal clients.
1.3.3.3 Earnings, leverage and knowledge
Lemma 1.9 predicts that external service providers with more knowledge have both
greater leverage and a higher level of earnings. In this section, I provide empirical
evidence in support of these predictions. In order to conduct this exercise, I use in-
formation from the lobbyist.info database, which contains information on lobbyists
sociodemographic characteristics, such as work experience in federal governmental
institutions. A lobbyist is a Revolving Door Lobbyist if she worked in federal agen-
cies, the White House or Congress before becoming a lobbyist. Table 1.12 presents
descriptive statistics of lobbyists with federal government experience discriminated
by in-house and external lobbyists.
I proxy the level of earnings with the average earnings per semester over all the
reports for the last year that the lobbyist appears in the database.67 I proxy the
level of knowledge in two di¤erent ways: years of experience as a federal lobbyist
and whether or not the federal lobbyist is a revolving-door advocate. The former
variable takes values between one and 16 years. The leverage is measured by the
average number of clients that the external lobbyist had across all the reports in
the last year of lobbying activity. To facilitate the interpretation of the results, I
consider the quantiles (and not the actual number) of leverage.68
Figure 1.9 shows the main relationships for these variables. The left-hand side
shows the relationship between earnings and experience, while the right-hand side
shows the relationship between experience and leverage. In this gure, dashed lines
66Notice that, from Corollary 1, there are two regions where internal specialists solve problems:
the most and the least frequent problems. The best way to relate this intuition to the following
empirical pattern is to think that it is more common for internal specialists to solve very frequent
problems rather than the least frequent problems.
67I deate the earnings by the CPI with constant prices in 2009.
68The upper and lower bounds of the quantiles are as follow: rst, one client; second, between
one and three clients; third, between three and ve clients; fourth, between ve and eleven clients;
and, nally, the last quintile is for more than eleven clients.
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denote revolving-door lobbyists. The LHS section shows that lobbyists with more
years of experience as federal lobbyists earn more. Furthermore, for the same num-
ber of years of experience as federal lobbyists, revolving-door lobbyists earn more
than non-revolving-door lobbyists. On average, across years of experience, lobby-
ists with previous federal government experience earn $21,300 more than the other
lobbyists. The gure also shows some divergence: as the lobbyists accumulate more
experience, the returns to being a revolving-door lobbyist increase. An alternative
way to read the gure is to ask how many more years of experience a non-revolving-
door lobbyist needs in order to get the same earnings as a revolving-door lobbyist. A
revolving-door lobbyist with nine years of federal lobbying experience earns $85,396,
and a non-revolving-door lobbyist with 11 years of experience earns $85,642. That
means that, on average, the revolving-door experience is worth two years of federal
lobbying experience. However, these returns change with the number of years of
lobbying experience. The RHS section shows that lobbyists with more years of fed-
eral lobbying experience work for more clients. On average, revolving-door lobbyists
require less federal lobbying experience than non-revolving-door lobbyists to work
for the same number of clients. For instance, a revolving-door lobbyist is in the
third quintile when she has 5.5 years of experience, whereas a non-revolving-door
lobbyist requires 8.28 years of experience to be in the same quintile.
Summing up, Figure 1.9 provides evidence of the positive relationship between
the level of earnings and experience, and between experience and leverage. As ex-
perience proxies for knowledge, I take these results as supporting empirical evidence
of Lemma 1.9.
1.3.4 Causal Inference: The BP Oil Spill
My theory predicts that when lobbying activities are more di¢ cult, clients use ex-
ternal service providers. I use the 2010 British Petroleum (BP) Deepwater Horizon
oil Spill as a quasi-experiment to explore the validity of this prediction.
1.3.4.1 Interpretation of the event
On April 20, 2010, high-pressure methane gas from the Deepwater Horizon oil well
rose into the drilling rig, where it ignited and exploded. This explosion led to
the burning and sinking of the Deepwater drilling rig. It was followed by a massive
o¤shore oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico that was considered the largest environmental
disaster in US history.69
By providing anecdotal evidence, I argue in this section that the spill increased
the di¢ culty of lobbying activities not only for BP, but also for other companies
in the oil and gas extracting industry. I summarize this evidence with three set of
69For more information see, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/nov/28/epa-
suspends-bp-oil-spill. Scientists estimated the total amount of released oil was close to 4.9 million
barrels (http://www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/dwh/fosc_dwh_report.pdf).
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examples: the reactions of Congress, the federal Government and (potential) voters.
In the next subsection, I provide empirical evidence that the skill-requirements of
lobbying activities increased disproportionately for the extracting industry.
Congress. The oil industry has a strong and long-standing relationship with
Republican policy makers.70 The pressure for more regulation of the oil and gas
extracting industry was so strong after the event that even Republican congressmen
were proposing bills that would negatively a¤ect the oil industry. For example, in
May 2010, Roy Blunt (R-MO), who was among the top three money recipients
from the industry for the period 2009-2010, introduced the bill H.R. 5356 with the
purpose of increasing the cap on liability for economic damages resulting from an oil
spill.71 The increase in the cap had a clear expected cost to rms at risk of having
oil spills, as they would bear a greater responsibility for damages. Furthermore,
several bills were introduced after the event with the aim of making the oil and gas
extraction business more di¢ cult.72 Some of these bills did not have any precedent.
Federal Government. In June 2010, President Obama created a nonpartisan
national commission to provide a deeper understanding of the BP oil spill. The
commission investigated the causes of the spill and released a nal report in Jan-
uary 2011, concluding that not only could the well blowout have been prevented,
but that it was an example of the failure of risk-prevention practices within the en-
tire extracting industry.73 The commission agreed that deepwater exploration has
intrinsic risks, but that it is the responsibility of both the industry and the regula-
tory agencies to restructure the way that business is being done to improve safety
throughout the industry. Thus, the report blamed both oil extracting rms and
regulators- the former for being irresponsible in its safety practices, as conrmed
by the evidence on 79 well-control accidents between 1996 and 2001, many due to
negligence by oil and gas extracting rms;74 the latter for lagging behind on regu-
lating the real risks associated with deepwater drilling. Therefore, this report had
two main e¤ects: it intensied the stigma associated with oil drilling and increased
the pressure on the government to improve the regulatory oversight of the industry.
In addition, in May 2010, President Obama ordered a delay on the issuing of new
o¤shore drilling leases until it was clear whether tougher regulation was needed,
70For instance, among the political campaign contributions that have come from companies in
the industry, 76% have been given to Republican candidates. The total campaign contributions
for the period 1990 to 2016 were US$182,188,234.
71http://maplight.org/content/oil-spill-response-bills.
72For instance, the bill H.R. 5436 proposed to prohibit issuing permits for any deepwater
drilling in the Gulf of Mexico; the bill H.R. 5222 proposed to suspend exploration and production
activities in the outer continental shelf until the investigation of the BP oil spill concluded. In the
Senate, bills S.3763 and S.3643 both proposed to implement new technology and improve safety
surrounding o¤shore energy production. Bills S.338 of 2011 and S.598 of 2013 proposed to prohibit
royalty incentives for deepwater drilling.
73https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-
OILCOMMISSION.pdf
74Ibid.
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and Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar suspended deepwater o¤shore drilling on
the Outer Continental Shelf for a period of six months.75
Voters. Policy makers care about what voters want, and voters in the US
reacted strongly to the BP oil spill. Barrage, Chyn and Hastings (2014) show that
stations selling BP-branded combustibles manifested an important e¤ect on both
prices and volume of sales. They interpret this nding as a shift in demand away
from BP as a way to punish the companys bad practices. Second, there was an
active response from the people to boycott the oil extracting industry and especially
BP. In the months following the spill, there were dozens of protests. Interviews with
protesters show that the aim of the boycott was not specically aimed to a¤ect BPs
reputation, but also to show public discontent with the operation of the industry
without adequate safeguards.76 Facebook groups such as Boycott BP and online
petitions such as the ones produced by a consumer advocacy group Public citizen
asked policy makers for tougher regulation of the extracting industry. Greenpeaces
spokesman Phil Radford asked publicly to ban all o¤shore oil drilling forever.77
To sum up, the federal Government and voters publicly blamed regulators and
rms in the oil extracting industry. Policy makers reacted by proposing legislation
to increase regulation of the industry. Consequently, the rms in the industry faced
a tougher environment. In the next subsection, I empirically show that these rms
reacted by using external lobbyists more heavily.
1.3.4.2 Empirical Strategy and Results
I argued in the previous subsection that di¤erent channels increased the di¢ culty of
the lobbying activities of the oil and gas extracting industry (and BP in particular)
after the BP oil spill. I interpret this shock in two di¤erent ways: rst, lobbying
activities similar to those that the oil companies were conducting before the oil spill
became more di¢ cult; and second, the oil spill response from di¤erent regulatory
agencies was to propose bills that had never or very rarely been proposed before.
Therefore, my model predicts that either the low frequency or the di¢ culty of the
lobbying activities implies more outsourcing.
There are two natural candidates for the treated observations: BP and other
rms conducting activities similar to BPs. The primary activities of BP are catego-
rized in 2007 NAICS codes 211111 (Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction).
BP agreed to pay £ 18.7 billion for caused damages and, as a consequence, the com-
pany sold o¤ $38 billion in assets from 2010 to 2012.78 This change in the structure
75For more information see Johnston, Nicholas and Nichols, Hans (1 May 2010)."
Obama Says New Oil Leases Must Have More Safeguards." Bloomberg. and
https://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Interior-Issues-Directive-to-Guide-Safe-Six-Month-
Moratorium-on-Deepwater-Drilling.
76Wheaton, Sarah (2 June 2010). "Protesters gather at BP stations." The New York Times.
77Phil Radford (24 May 2010). "[BP]resident Obama: Where Does BP Begin and Obama
End?". The Hu¢ ngton Post.
78For more information see, NY Times Article.
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of the rm can confound its vertical integration decision. As a consequence, I use
as a treated group all the rms conducting lobbying activities that belong to 2007
NAICS codes 211111, excluding BP. As a control group, I include all the rms that
belong to the Oil and Gas industry, excluding the code above. Examples of this
control group are codes 3251 (Basic Chemical Manufacturing), 324191 (Petroleum
Lubricating Oil and Grease Manufacturing) and 324199 (All Other Petroleum and
Coal Products Manufacturing). These exclusions leave me with 52 clients in the
treated group and 218 in the control group. Examples of the treated group are
Chevron, Exxon Mobil, Phillips 66, Shell and Devon. For these estimations, I in-
clude neither code 213111, Drilling Oil and Gas Wells, nor code 213112, Support
Activities for Oil and Gas Operations, as they are strongly linked to the a¤ected
industry. For this exercise, I focus on quarterly reports, which are mandatory since
2008. The period of analysis runs from the rst quarter of 2008 to the second
quarter of 2014.
Figure 1.10 shows the time-series patterns of reports made internally for these
two groups. The graph shows two main patterns. First, the treated and control
groups have similar increasing trends before the oil spill. This is conrmed by
statistical exercises such as leads and lags estimations and t-test results. Figure
1.11 presents the coe¢ cient estimates of the leads and lags exercise. For the control
group, there does not seem to be a change in the increasing trend around the second
quarter of 2010. This increasing pattern is aligned with facts presented in Chapter
2 from this dissertation, in which the fraction of internal reports began to increase
after 2007 for all of the industries. Second, there is a signicant drop in the fraction
of internal reports for the treated group in the same quarter of the BP oil spill. The
fraction evolves with a at trend after that, and it does not show any tendency of
going back to the levels prior to the spill.
The knowledge-requirement variables used in the previous section support the
story in which the oil and gas extracting industry companies, and not the proposed
control group, received a shock to the di¢ culty of lobbying activities. Figure 1.12
provides empirical validation of this. The LHS section shows the time-series patterns
of the fraction of high-knowledge witnesses (over the total of witnesses) for the
treated and control groups. The RHS section shows the yearly series on the ratio
of restraining words to the total number of regulating words for these two groups.
Both parts of Figure 1.12 show the same two broad patterns. First, as an additional
empirical conrmation of the validity of the control group, the time series for this
group do not provide any suggestion of an empirical shift around 2010. Second, the
di¢ culty of the lobbying activities for the treated group increased around the BP oil
spill. The fraction of high-knowledge witnesses being interviewed in the committees
dealing with bills lobbied by oil and gas extracting companies started increasing in
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the rst semester of 2010. This series reaches its peak in the rst semester of
2012 and then starts decreasing again. Qualitatively similar results emerge when
I consider the di¢ culty index instead of the fraction of high-knowledge witnesses.
When I measure di¢ culty with the ratio of restraining words, it is clear that since
1999, the ratio of restraining words had been decreasing, but in 2010, the fraction
started increasing.
I now estimate the e¤ect of the BP oil spill on the fraction of internal reports.
Clearly, one can use the spill as an instrumental variable to the knowledge measures
and then estimate the e¤ect of an exogenous change in these measures on vertical
integration measures. Results not shown here provide empirical validity of the
e¤ect on the BP oil spill to the integration measures through knowledge-intensity
proxies. In this section, I present results on the direct e¤ect of the spill on the
fraction of integration patterns because I am more interested in testing the validity
of my model than in measuring the e¤ect of knowledge measures on integration
patterns. In addition, the knowledge measures do not provide enough quarter-level
observations, implying that conducting an IV-Dif-Dif estimation would need to
aggregate the data at such a level that the oil spill timing would be contaminated,
and the richness of the integration patterns at the quarter level would be lost.
I regress vertical integration measures on client and quarter xed e¤ects, and an
interaction of the post-spill period with an indicator for whether the client belongs
to the same sub-industry as BP:
vit = i + t +  (Ti  Pt) + "it
Here, vit is a measure of vertical integration made by the i-th client at period
t. I consider two measures of vertical integration: fraction of in-house reports
and fraction of lobbyists working in the internal market. i (t) represent client-
level (quarter-level) xed e¤ects. I focus on two groups: treated and non-treated.
The variable Ti takes the value of 1 if client i belongs to the same sub-industry
as BP (NAICS 211111) and 0 otherwise. The variable Pt takes a value of 1 for
all the quarters since the second quarter of 2010 until the end of the sample and
0 for periods before the oil spill. Table 1.13 shows the main results from these
exercises. To control for possible autocorrelation at the client-level, I estimate all
the regressions, clustering the standard errors at the client level. The results show
that clients belonging to the same sub-industry as BP decreased the use of in-house
lobbyists, compared to a similar group of rms that was not a¤ected by the oil spill.
This is shown by the negative and signicant coe¢ cient measuring the interaction
term. The decrease in the fraction of internal reports is substantial. Given that
the treated group made, on average, 19% of their reports internally before the
spill, the point estimate represents a 26.3% decline in the fraction of reports made
internally. Regarding the fraction of internal lobbyists, the average for the treated
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group before the spill was 24.7%. This represents a decrease of about 21% in the
fraction of in-house lobbyists for the clients in the oil and gas extracting industry.
1.3.4.3 Robustness Checks
The oil spill may have increased the number of problems faced by the treated group.
Given the in-house sta¤s time constraint, an increase in the number of problems
will mechanically increase the need for external service providers. Thus, the use
of external service providers will be explained by the time constraint of in-house
sta¤ and not by a change in di¢ culty. A way to test the validity of this story is
to see whether there were changes in the absolute number of in-house lobbyists.
A decrease in the use of in-house lobbyists would be inconsistent with the time
constraint explanation. Table 1.14 provides evidence that clients in the treated
group decrease the use of internal sta¤ and increase the use of external lobbyists.
An additional way to control for the change in the number of problems that the
clients faced is to run the same econometric specications as the baseline estimation
but including either the total number of reports or the total expenditures of the
client as an additional control variable. Table 1.15 presents coe¢ cient estimates
once one includes the total number of reports as an additional explanatory variable.
The main results presented in the baseline estimations still hold.
Given that the decrease in the fraction of in-house reports is due to a decrease
in the in-house sta¤ and an increase in the use of external sta¤, there is a question
one can ask about this pattern. Is the decrease in the use of in-house lobbyists
due to a demand or supply shift? For instance, a demand side example is that
given that the problems are harder, the a¤ected rms decided not to use in-house
lobbyists, as these advocates cannot handle di¢ cult problems. A possible supply
side story is that there was a stigma associated with working as an in-house lobbyist
for the a¤ected rms and therefore in-house lobbyists quit. These two channels,
supply, and demand can explain the decrease in the use of in-house lobbyists but,
importantly, they have di¤erent e¤ects on the equilibrium prices. If the demand
e¤ect dominates, the decrease in the quantity is accompanied by a corresponding
decrease in the equilibrium payment, while the shift in the supply will increase the
equilibrium payment. In results not presented here, I show that the equilibrium
payment in the internal market decreased, supporting the idea that the change is
explained by demand and not supply channels.
A second concern is that there may have been negative spillovers to other rms
in the oil and gas industry. Although Figures 1.10 and 1.12 do not seem to show any
change for the control group around the event, in Table 1.16, I present additional
econometric estimations using di¤erent control groups and I show that the main
results presented in this section hold.79 A third concern is that the variation in the
79The control group industries I use are Retail Sales, Real Estate and Casino and Gambling.
These groups were selected according to the pre-oil spill similarity of the trends of the fraction of
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interaction variable is not at the client but the industry level. To control for this
type of autocorrelation, I show that the main results are robust when I two-way
cluster the standard errors (industryquarter and client) or, as in Barrage et al.
(2014), I aggregate the data at the client-period level (before and after). Table 1.17
and 1.18, show that the results of these alternative two exercises are qualitatively
similar to the baseline estimation.
A nal concern is that the empirical patterns may be consistent with a change in
the stakes at play. For instance, clients may respond by outsourcing the service when
they face bills that can a¤ect them more heavily -as the most knowledgeable lobbyists
are in the external market-. In results not presented here, I provide anecdotal
evidence that this is not the case. I show some examples in which bills that could
enormously a¤ect the clients were studied in congressional hearings with a small
(or null) fraction of high-knowledge witnesses and, consistent with my theory were
lobbied using in-house lobbyists. I also provide evidence of bills in which the stakes
were low and were studied with a large fraction of high-knowledge witnesses and
lobbied with external lobbyists.
1.4 Final Discussion
This section is divided into two parts. In Section 1.4.1, I give preliminary evidence
on the external validity of my results for other PBS industries. In Section 1.4.2, I
briey summarize this chapter and propose ways to extend it.
1.4.1 Connection with other PBS Industries
One of the main weaknesses of using lobbying data to make inferences about the
behavior of PBS industries is that the advocacy industry may be very di¤erent from
all the others. Although I acknowledge that each industry has its own specicities,
I argue in this section that there are some broad similar patterns between the
lobbying industry and other PBS industries. As a consequence, some of the main
results from the lobbying data can be applied to such industries.
In order to do that, I use data from the Occupational Employment Statistics
(henceforth OES) program.80This program from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
produces employment and wage estimates annually for over 800 occupations in
the United States, sampling over 200,000 non-farm business establishments every
semester.81 In this section, I focus on national occupational estimates for specic
industries for the period 2002 to 2014.82
internal reports.
80Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Employment Statistics,
[date accessed: 15 November 2015] www.bls.gov/oes/.
81More detailed information can be found at http://www.bls.gov/oes/oes_ques.htm.
82In 2002, the OES survey switched from the SIC industry classication system to the NAICS
system. As a result, there have been changes in industry denitions. As the web page says: "For
example, under SIC the industry grocery storesincluded their retail establishments, warehouses,
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1.4.1.1 Data
An occupation is dened according to the O¢ ce of Management and Budget (hence-
forth OMB) Standard Occupational Classication (henceforth SOC) system while
an industry is dened with the four-digit NAICS classication. I focus on ve
di¤erent occupations: lawyers, managers, IT personnel, accountants and lobby-
ists. Table 1.19 summarizes the input used for this exercise.83 As Abraham (1988)
and Dube and Kaplan (2010), I dene a service provider as external if the service
provider works in the NAICS industry primarily concerned with that occupation.
For instance, NAICS 5415 corresponds to rms that specialize in computer services.
Therefore, the fraction of IT workers (i.e. code 15-10) on the NAICS industry 5415
will be the fraction of IT personnel working in the external market. On the other
hand, the rest of the computer specialists (working in all the other industries) will
be the fraction of in-house IT personnel. It is important to note that the vertical
integration share of lobbyists may not exactly match the empirical patterns using
the lobbying reports database, as the only available way to identify lobbyists using
the SOC is to use four-digits NAICS codes (5418), which, unfortunately, includes
other occupations, such as advertising services.
1.4.1.2 Patterns
I focus here on three empirical patterns: time series patterns of vertical integration;
wage di¤erences between internal and external service providers; and the fraction
of generalists and specialists working in-house and externally.
Time-Series Patterns Figure 1.13 shows the time series of vertical integration
and total employment patterns by occupation. The solid line shows the fraction of
employees working in-house. The dashed line shows the total number of employees
transportation facilities, and administrative headquarters. Under NAICS, the four establishment
types would be reported in separate industries. Only the retail establishments would be included
in the NAICS industry for grocery stores. " (Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department
of Labor, Occupational Employment Statistics.) The year 2002 also coincides with other two
relevant changes in the survey: reference months for the OES survey and mean wage estimation
methodology. The reference months for the OES survey were changed from October, November,
and December to May and November in order to reduce seasonal inuences. Second, the method
of calculating mean wages was changed for occupations with any workers earning above $70 per
hour in order to remove a downward bias in mean wage estimates. In order to avoid problems of
mis-classication and the time-series comparisons, I focus my analysis on the period 2002 to 2014.
There was an additional change in the denitions of occupations in 2010. I take into account that
the occupationsdenitions before and after this change were not a¤ected.
83The titles for the occupational codes are: Lawyers: 23: Legal Occupations and I exclude
23-1023: Judges, Magistrate Judges and Magistrates. Managers: 11: Management Occupa-
tions. IT Personnel: 15-10 Computer Programmers and System Analysts before 2010 and
15-11: Computer Occupations after 2010. Accountants: 13-2011: Accountants and Auditors.
Lobbyists 27-3031: Public Relations Specialists. The titles of the NAICS codes are as follows.
For lawyers 5411: Legal Services. Managers: 5511: Management of Companies and Enterprises
IT Personnel: 5415 : Computer Systems Design and Related Services. Accountants 5412:
Accounting, Tax Preparation, Bookkeeping, and Payroll Services. Lobbyists: 541820: Public
Relations Agencies.
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in both the internal and external markets.84 Three patterns emerge from this gure.
First, there is a broad decreasing trend in the fraction of in-house employees and
an increasing trend in the total number of employees across all ve occupations.
As total employment proxies for market size, this pattern can be easily accounted
by Stiglers (1951) intuition. Note that for all the occupations except the lobbying
industry, there is a decrease in the employment level around 2010, but then there
is a recovery afterwards. Second, Figure 1.13 does not show any change in the
integration levels around 2008 for all the occupations, excluding lobbyists. Chapter
2 provides a throughout discussion of the e¤ect of the Financial Crisis on integration
patterns. Third, around 2007, the lobbying market had two di¤erences with respect
to the other four occupations. On the one hand, in 2008, the total number of
lobbyists started decreasing. This is in sharp contrast with other occupations as
they display a broadly increasing trend for the studied period. On the other hand,
there is an increase in the fraction of in-house lobbyists after 2008 that does not
occur in the other occupations. Chapter 2 proposes an explanation on the lobbying
time series patterns.
Wages One of the main predictions from my theoretical section is that external
service providers acquire more knowledge and, as consequence, have higher earnings.
In this section, I test whether external PBS providers have higher earnings levels.
Table 1.20 shows the mean and ve di¤erent percentile values for hourly wage by
occupation across all years. For each occupation, I calculate separately the wage
statistics for the internal and external market service providers.85 In this table, the
di¤erences in wages across internal and external service providers are only t-test
statistically signicant for mean and percentiles values of 50, 75 and 90. The main
message from this table is that the wages of external providers are higher than the
wages of in-house employees. This is especially true for medium to top earners. I
interpret this exercise as suggestive evidence that external providers acquire more
knowledge than internal providers do. However, these results should be interpreted
with caution, as I do not have data to control for compensating or demand-side
rent di¤erentials. In results not presented here, I show that we can obtain the same
patterns when I consider annual instead of hourly earnings.86
84In units of one million employees.
85I deate wages by the CPI with constant prices in 2009. To construct these values, I weight
industries by levels of employment.
86These patterns are in sharp contrast with the ndings for low-skill occupations proposed by
Abraham and Taylor (1996), Dube and Kaplan (2010) and Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2015).
For instance, Dube and Kaplan (2010) nds that for the case of janitors and security guards,
the wages in the external market are lower than in the internal market. They conclude that
this di¤erence is not due to compensating or unobserved skills di¤erentials, but rent di¤erentials.
That is, low-rent industriesrms are more likely to outsource. My interpretation is that, given
that these occupations are low-skill in nature, there are no signicant di¤erences in issue-specic
knowledge across in-house and external service providers. Therefore, saving wage costs is the
rst-order concern in the integration decision.
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Generalists and Specialists In this section, I focus on specic occupations in
which I can detect patterns between generalists and specialists. I use the description
of the occupation based on the 2000 occupational classication system. I classify a
sub-occupation as a generalist if the description of the occupation includes several
and diverse tasks.87 For instance, code 11-1021: General and Operation Managers
describes the activities as:
Plan, direct, or coordinate the operations of companies or public and
private sector organizations. Duties and responsibilities include formu-
lating policies, managing daily operations, and planning the use of ma-
terials and human resources, but are too diverse and general in nature
to be classied in any one functional area of management or administra-
tion, such as personnel, purchasing, or administrative services. Include
owners and managers who head small business establishments whose
duties are primarily managerial. 88
On the other hand, an example of an occupation that can be categorized as a
specialist is 11-3042: Training and Development Managers, which has the following
description:
"Plan, direct, or coordinate the training and development activities and
sta¤ of an organization."89
I focus only on Managers and IT personnel as the other occupations did not
have a clear way to identify the level of specialization of their sub-occupations.
The chosen sub-occupations are summarized in Table 1.21.90 Table 1.22 shows the
percentages of generalists and specialists by level of vertical integration and occu-
pation. The main message from this table is that the great majority of generalists
are in the internal market and that there are specialists in both markets. Table 1.23
shows the percentages of internal and external employees by level of specialization
and occupation. This table shows that the majority of internal employees are gen-
eralists, whereas the majority of external service providers are specialists, just as in
Table 1.9. I take this piece of evidence as a rst step towards the development of a
comprehensive vertical integration theory of knowledge workers.
87I include sub-occupations where the list of tasks are di¢ cult to categorize in an unied
job activity. For instance, code (15-1071), "Network and Computer Systems Administrators,"
describes activities as: "Install, congure, and support an organizations local area network (LAN),
wide area network (WAN), and Internet system or a segment of a network system. Maintain
network hardware and software. Monitor network to ensure network availability to all system
users and perform necessary maintenance to support network availability. May supervise other
network support and client server specialists and plan, coordinate, and implement network security
measures." Exclude "Computer Support Specialists" (15-1041).
88http://www.bls.gov/soc/2000/soc_a1c1.htm.
89http://www.bls.gov/soc/2000/soc_a3e2.htm.
90For the complete list of occupations, see BLS web page.
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1.4.2 Concluding Remarks
The aim of this chapter has been to explore the way in which a non-incentive-
based theory advances our understanding of the integration decision of knowledge
workers. The central point relates to the fact that the acquisition of knowledge is
independent of its rate of use, and, therefore, exploiting these increasing returns re-
quires conducting frequent activities in-house and infrequent tasks for several clients
in the external market. When easy activities are more frequent, external sta¤ ac-
quires higher levels of knowledge than their in-house counterparts. Finally, as clients
pay communication costs in the external market due to rm-specic knowledge, the
economy saves communication costs if the clients with more rm-specic knowledge
conduct their activities in-house.
Using bill- and industry-level measures, I conrm the models main prediction
using xed-e¤ect estimations. To tackle causality, I use the BP spill as a quasi-
experiment that increased the di¢ culty of lobbying activities for the oil and gas
extracting companies. As more-di¢ cult activities are less frequent, only external
service providers can solve harder problems. As a consequence, the oil spill increased
the outsourcing of lobbying services for the a¤ected companies.
Abstracting from the current application, the analysis underscores the potential
of non-incentive integration theories to explain how rms use knowledge workers.
My ndings can be extended in several directions. First, by interacting the ideas
developed in this chapter with the existing literature on organizational and labor
economics, our understanding of integration with knowledge workers will be richer.
For instance, it seems natural to add search and matching frictions, dynamic prob-
lems and moral hazard issues to my setting. How does knowledge across markets
di¤er when there are matching frictions? What is the optimal organization of the
economy when the productivity of lobbying activities varies across workers, and
these returns determine the di¢ culty of the problems faced in the future? What
does the organization of the economy look like when service providers can haggle,
reduce e¤ort, and pretend to know more than they do, but it is also in their interest
to exploit the increasing returns from knowledge acquisition?
Second, in this chapter, I have focused on understanding the causes rather than
the consequences of vertical integration.91 I believe that this has to be the rst
step in properly assessing the consequences. Two interesting questions should be
explored in future research: 1) The market joins interests for a number of clients.
What are the implications for the economy when the clientsinterests are not totally
aligned? How does the knowledge economy solve conicts of interest among clients?
2) What are the welfare e¤ects of rms integrating with external service providers
that serve a representative group of the population?
91For recent papers on the consequences of the vertical integration see for example Hortacsu
and Syverson (2007), Atalay et al. (2014) and Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2015).
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1.5 Appendix
1.5.1 Discussion of the Model and Related Literature
The integration decision literature has focused on the problem of incentives. In
this chapter, I focus on the integration decision with knowledge-intensive workers.
These workers di¤er from other types of workers because in the production process
physical assets are irrelevant and knowledge is the key input. As a consequence, I
take the natural approach of leaving aside the problem of the incentives and I focus
on the use and communication of knowledge. This is not to say that the incentive
problem is not important. I do believe we have gained great insights from the
literature but I argue in this chapter that are strong forces with empirical support
not related to incentives that can increase our understanding on the integration
decision.
In this section I provide an overview of the relationship between the existing
literature and this chapter. I will explain under which scenarios some of the existing
incentives-based integration theories are not appropriate in the knowledge-workers
context and to what extent my results contrast or conrm previous theoretical
predictions. As the Rent-seeking and Adaptation theories study similar forces I
comment on both theories jointly under the Transaction Cost Models (henceforth
TCE) Here I briey discuss TCE, Property Rights and Multitasking Models.
Transaction Cost Models (TCE) The main insights from this literature come
from Coase (1937), Williamson (1971, 1975, 1979 and 1985).92 The main predictions
of these theories are that there is more vertical integration when the transactions
involve more specic investments or when the transactions are more complex or
frequent.93
Hold-Up. Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), Monteverde and Teece (1982),
Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) and Joskow (1988) hypothesized that an increase
in rm-specic investments would increase the likelihood of vertical integration,
as the hold-up costs are higher. The main idea is that parties in a transaction
make investments that have greater value inside than outside the relationship. This
specicity implies that the parties are locked in ex-post. A possible solution to
this lock in is writing contracts. However, in an incomplete contract world the
parties have incentives to engage in opportunistic behavior ex-post, which in turn
creates a hold-up problem. The literature predicts that the hold-up issue is solved
or mitigated by bringing the assets that produce the specic investments in-house.
As in Klein (1988), it is not clear how the opportunistic behavior is mitigated when
we think in human assets. Furthermore, in a context where there is client-specic
92For a recent survey, see Tadelis and Williamson (2012).
93Although, TCE comments on the e¤ects of the uncertainty on the integration decision, I have
neglected it. A possible extension of this paper may consider the inclusion of it.
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knowledge and agents di¤er among internal and external markets by their degree
of this knowledge, the hold-up problem is intensied inside the rm as workers that
have received rm-specic knowledge can attempt to hold their employers up and
vice versa. My model predicts that the larger the rm-specic knowledge the more
likely it is that integration will occur. This is not because clients avoid the hold-up
problem as in TCE but because clients save communication costs with external
providers.
Complexity. Monteverde and Teece (1982), Masten (1984) and Tadelis (2002)
argue both theoretically and empirically that the probability of vertical integration
increases with the complexity of the transactions. The complexity of the transaction
can increase the switching costs for the buyer and as ex-post adaptation can be
more costly, the buyer will be better o¤ by conducting the transaction internally. If
I interpret complexity of the transaction as the di¢ culty of the problem, my model
predicts exactly the opposite to this literature; the more complex the transactions
the more likely they are to be externally outsourced. Intuitively, this occurs in my
framework because only external service providers can solve harder problems. While
implied by the assumption of a decreasing density function, the model I propose
conveys a simple insight: it is the relationship between frequency and complexity
and not the degree of complexity that should matter to understand the integration
decision.
Frequency. Williamson has used the term frequency in three di¤erent contexts.94
First, Williamson (1991) talks about the frequency of disturbances in the environ-
ment concluding that the interaction between asset specicity and frequency will
determine the optimal organization form. Second, Williamson (1979) studies the
issue of the frequency of the transaction and its relationship with the type of gov-
ernance that the agents optimally choose. His main conclusion is that the e¤ect of
frequency on integration is ambiguous and it depends on the specicity of the in-
vestments of the suppliers.95 Third, Williamson (1985) talks about the frequency of
trade among many trading partners. The key idea is that the cost of a hierarchical
structure will be easier to recover when the frequency of the transactions is larger.
94The relational contracts literature (Baker et al. (1994, 2002)) has used the term to refer
to the frequency of trade between specic trading patterns. The theory predicts that repeated
interaction can mitigate opportunism, and therefore the incentive to maintain reputation in the
external market will make clients more prone to outsource.
95In sum, if the investments are not specic the market should prevail but if the investments
are idiosyncratic the integration is preferred. There is a natural di¢ culty to match his ideas with
my paper as it is di¢ cult to dene the specicity of the knowledge investment of the supplier. If
we understand specicity as the type of investments in which the suppliers knowledge loses value
outside the relationship, the key factor to study is to which client the supplier goes once she leaves
the initial labour relationship. If she goes to a client with more di¢ cult problems, there is no
loss in the value of the original knowledge investment. However, if she goes to a client with easier
problems, there is a loss in the value of the investment proportional to the di¤erence between
the di¢ culties of the problems faced for both clients. Given this indeterminacy, the knowledge
investments are not just specic or not, but they are one or the other, conditional to the new
employer.
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Although this chapter has intentionally neglected the issue of repeated inter-
action and uncertainty, it is aligned with the same insight for the third type of
frequency and as Williamson (1985), the larger the frequency the more likely to
bring someone in-house. This chapter complements his insight by providing both
theoretical and empirical support to this idea. Furthermore, he talks separately
about the issue of frequency and complexity of the transaction.
Strikingly, the issue of the frequency has not received much attention. For in-
stance, two of the most comprehensive and recent literature reviews of the subject,
Lafontaine and Slade (2007) and Bresnahan and Levin (2012) completely neglected
the subject. On the other hand, Tadelis and Williamson (2012) mentioned briey
this issue in a footnote to argue that the relationship between frequency and inte-
gration is ambivalent.96
Property Rights Models Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990)
and Hart (1995) focus on neither contractible nor alienable investments. The key
idea in this literature is how the allocation of decision rights to the use of the assets
as contingencies appear, can modify the ex-ante investment incentives. Ownership
matters because it a¤ects the disagreement point, which in turn a¤ects incentives
through the ex-post bargaining. While this literature emphasizes the ownership of
non-human assetsas a tool to exercise power in an incomplete contracts world, it
does not have clear implications when this type of assets are completely inexistent
or irrelevant as in the case of PBS industries (see for instance Dube and Kaplan
(2007) and Bresnahan and Levin (2012)). Clearly, the di¤erence is that the law
does not provide control rights over human beings: Buying a machine or hiring
someone in-house is totally di¤erent as the employee can always quit.
Multitasking Models One of the key predictions of Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1991) is that when there are two tasks that di¤er by the cost of measuring perfor-
mance, rms bring in-house projects in which the harder to measure task is more
important. This prediction is empirically conrmed by Azoulay (2004).
As my empirical application uses lobbyists as knowledge workers, it is useful to
discuss two of the main tasks performed by a lobbyist: Investigating the political
environment and communicating specialized knowledge to policy makers. Arguably,
the second task is harder to measure not only because clients have a hard time
assessing the actual knowledge of the lobbyist, but especially because it is hard to
conrm the exact message that the lobbyist transmits to the policy maker.97
The multitasking literature predicts that the in-house activities should be more
about transmitting information to the policy maker than investigating the political
96They argue that when there is repeated interaction, integration makes sense as the cost of
creating a specialized infrastructure can be recovered. However, in a context where there are
reputation e¤ects, which I have neglected, market contracting can be the best solution.
97Notice for instance, that the lobbying reports neither provide information on the contacted
policy makers nor the specic message transmitted.
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environment. However, anecdotal evidence strongly opposes this prediction. Ex-
ternal lobbyists tend to interact with policy makers whereas in-house sta¤ tend to
investigate the political environment.
A way to conciliate this literature with my approach is that although clients
prefer to bring in-house activities that are harder-to measure, these activities tend
to be more knowledge intensive. As the market allows service providers to acquire
larger levels of knowledge, it is the organization of the market and not the clients
incentives that determine the integration decision.
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1.5.2 Validation Exercises
The literature on work displacement has shown strong evidence on the existence
of industry-specic skills.98 These papers show that workers that switch industries
following displacement have signicantly larger earnings losses than workers that
remain in the same industry after displacement. Parent (2010) show evidence of
both rm and industry specic skills using the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth and the Panel study of Income dynamics concluding that the industry instead
of the rm-specic skills are more important to explain the wage prole in terms of
human capital.
One can take this intuition one step further. If the earning losses from switching
industries proxies for industry-specic knowledge, the level of the losses may proxy
for the level of specicity. That is, industries in which workers su¤er more from
leaving the industry, will be industries with larger level of industry-specic skills.
Using this intuition I conduct two exercises. I rst use estimates of the wage
losses by industry of the workers calculated in other papers and I compare to my
RegData measures using the 2-digit code classication. Second, I use the displace-
ment workers methodology to estimate earning losses for in-house lobbyists by in-
dustry and I compare them with the RegData.
I rst use the results from Couch and Placzek (2010). Table 1.A.1 shows the
estimated results from Section G from their appendix and average number of regu-
lating words by industry. The second and third column represent the actual values
of the coe¢ cients and average number of words, respectively whereas the last two
columns give the relative ranking across variables. To improve the accuracy in the
comparison of these two results I have used the same time-span that Couch and
Placzek (2010) has used: 1993 to 2004.
The bottom line from this table is that there is not a perfect alignment between
these two measures but there are some similarities. The correlation across variables
is -24% and not signicant. The Spearman correlation for the rankings is 26%
and not signicant. The lack of signicance can be due to the weak relationship
or the few number of observations. However, I nd remarkable the similarity for
the rankings. For instance, Manufacturing, Financial/Real Estate and Education
Health have the same ranking for both measures. Similarly, the all other industries
category rank very closely (i.e. 4th and 5th). I obtains similar results when I
compare RegData to Jacobson et al. (2003)s table 2 coe¢ cients .
A problem with these comparisons is that these results are not controlling for
the industry that the displaced worker goes. For instance, a large value in these
coe¢ cients can be explained by either large values of industry-specicity or by a
large fraction of workers going to industries that do not belong to the same or
98See for example, Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993), Carrington (1993), Neal (1995)
Parent (2010) and Couch and Placzek (2010).
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similar sector than the industry in which the worker was displaced from.
Fortunately, appendix H controls by receiver industry, although only for man-
ufacturing and non-manufacturing workers. They estimate that the earning losses
for manufacturing workers once they are re-employed in non-manufacturing in-
dustries is about 3180.75 after three years. This number is only 1377.26 for the
case of workers that are displaced from non-manufacturing industries. Similar re-
sults are obtained from Table 3 of Jacobson et al (1993). I interpret this result
as manufacturing industries having a larger level of industry-specic skills than
other industries. The average number of words for manufacturing industries in
RegData is 9.099.640 whereas is only 3.380.321 for other industries. The bottom
line is that manufacturing industries have not only more regulating words than
non-manufacturing industries but the fraction for both measures between manufac-
turing and non-manufacturing is about 40%. I take this result as a simple step to
externally validate the measures I use in this chapter.99
An alternative data source come from the International Economics literature.
Nunn (2007) constructs measure of relationship-specicity at the industry level
using information on whether the inputs are sold on an organized exchange or are
reference priced in trade publications. An input is relationship-specic if the value of
the input in a buyer-seller relationship is similar inside and outside the relationship.
If the input is sold on an organized exchange, the market is thick (many buyers
and sellers), and as a consequence the input is not relationship-specic. A similar
intuition applies for the case where the input price appears in trade publications.
Therefore, an intuitive measure of industry-specicity is the value of inputs that
are neither bought and sold on an exchange nor reference priced.
Table 1.A.2 shows the correlations of this exercise. For better comparability,
with Nunns data , I have used RegData at the 4-digit levels for the year 1997.
Similar results emerge when I use alternative years. Nunns data is originally pro-
vided at the 6-digit level. To convert it at the 4-digit level I have simply aggregated
all the 6-digit codes by taking their average. Alternative aggregations give similar
results. The data considers two di¤erent classications coming from Rauch (1999):
conservative and Liberal. The conservative measure tries to minimize the number
of 3 and 4 digit commodities that are classied as either organized exchange or ref-
erence priced. The liberal measure maximizes these commodities.(for more details,
please see Rauch (1999). The contribution of Rauch is to provide these measures
by input whereas Nunn provides these measures at the industry level using I/O
tables). The bottom line from this exercise is that there is a positive and signicant
correlation between Nunn measures and the regulating words.
99In order to calculate the average number of words per industry I have taken average of total
number of words for two-digit industries across all years. The classication used in the table
is as follows: Manufacturing: NAICS 11, 21 and 23, Trade: 42, Financial/Real Estate: 52, 53,
Prof./Business Services: 51, 54, 55, 56 Edu./Health Services: 61, 62 and All Other Industries: 71.
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1.5.3 Tables
Function
Parameter z z n V I
h 0 (-) (-) (+)
c (-) (-) (-) (-)
 (?) (?) (+) (?)
Table 1.1: Summary of the Comparative Statics Exercise.
Note: The rows dene the parameters to change whereas the columns dene the equilibrium object that is subject
to the change of the parameter. For instance, the (1,1) element in the matrix denotes the sign of the
@z
@h
.
zB  zB zB < zB  zB zB > zB
zA  zA VI,VI VI,EC VI,NA
zA < zA  zA EC,VI EC,EC EC, NA
zA > z

A NA,VI NA, EC NA,NA
Table 1.2: Predictions from the Model with Two Issues.
Note: VI, EC and NA indicate Vertical Integration, External Contracting and No Activity, respectively. The rst
(second) coordinate in each cell predicts the action for topic A (B ). According to the table there are six types of
clients in the problem.
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Di¢ culty 2: Fraction restraining Words Communication Cost: Regulating Words
NAICS Least % NAICS Least K
1121 Cattle Ranc. and Farming 0.41 1153 Support Activities for For. 1
2372 Land Subdivision 0.6 3141 Textile Furnishings Mills 1
2382 Building Equip. Cont. 0.64 4236 Elect. and Elec. G. Mer. Who. 1.2
5322 Cons. Goods Re. 0.66 3313 Alum. & Alum. Prod. & Proc. 1.8
1133 Logging 0.67 3111 Animal Food Manuf. 4.5
NAICS Most % NAICS Most K
3351 Electric Ligh. Equip. Manuf. 1.53 3361 Motor Vehicle Manuf. 1394
5171 Wired Telecomm. Carriers 1.55 5221 Depository Credit Inter. 1518.4
4471 Gasoline Stations 1.56 5222 Nondepository Credit Int. 1557.9
4881 Supp. Act. for Air Transport 1.61 2211 Elec. Pow. Gen., Trans. & Distr. 1675.4
6219 Other Amb. Health Care Serv. 1.71 3241 Petr. & Coal Products Manuf. 2547.9
Table 1.3: Restraining and Regulating Words Across Industries.
Note: LHS: Most (bottom panel) and least (top panel) four-digit industries by the fraction of restraining words
over the total number of words . RHS: Most (bottom panel) and least (top panel) four-digit industries by the
total number of words. Data for 2014. The column % reports the fraction of restraining words over the total
number of regulating words. The column K reports the total number of regulating words in thousand units.
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Mean Standard Dev Obs
V I 0.135 Total 0.342 409515
fr 0.180 Total 0.367 176143
Between 0.260
Within 0.076
Frequency 359.380 Total 398.675 36477
Between 268.297
Within 279.541
Di¢ culty 1 24.65 Total 29.17 36477
(Committees) Between 17.66
Within 18.91
Di¢ culty 2 0.1344 Total 0.0934 176143
(Restraining W.) Between 0.0930
Within 0.0906
Industry K. 3668.272 Total 7365.37 176143
(/100) Between 7817.72
Within 730.372
Table 1.4: Descriptive Statistics.
Note: The table shows the mean, standard deviation and total number of observations for the main variables: V
I, fr, frequency, two di¢ culty measures and industry-specic knowledge. The unit of observation used to construct
this table is the client-semester for all the variables except V I, which is constructed at the transaction level. The
number of observations for the frequency and the rst measure of di¢ culty is smaller than for the other variables,
as only a fraction of clients lobby for bills.
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Transaction Level Dependent Var: V I
Frequency 0.0155*** 0.0160*** 0.0162*** 0.0112*
St. Err. (0.0032) (0.0028) (0.0032) (0.0057)
Obs 54472
Adj R2 0.462 0.398 0.562 0.852
Client Level Dependent Var: fr
Frequency 0.0182*** 0.0189*** 0.0192*** 0.0144**
St. Err. (0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0066)
Obs 36,467
Adj R2 0.680 0.650 0.680 0.979
Fixed E¤ects
Client X X
Industry X
Semester X X
Industry*Year X X
Table 1.5: Frequency and Vertical Integration.
Note: An observation is a lobbying transaction (Top Panel) or a client-semester combination (Bottom Panel).
The table shows the coe¢ cients for the (rst proxy ) frequency variable. (*) means signicance at 10%, whereas
(**) and (***) stand for signicance at 5% and 1%, respectively. Obs is the number of observations used in
order to run the regression. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level in the rst two columns and the
client level in the last two.
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Transaction Level Dependent Var: V I
Di¢ culty 1 -0.0236*** -0.0259*** -0.0271** -0.0224*
St. Err. (0.0043) (0.0053) (0.0121) (0.0284)
Obs 54472
Adj R2 0.462 0.498 0.662 0.846
Client Level Dependent Var: fr
Di¢ culty 1 -0.0362*** -0.0405*** -0.0377** -0.0330*
St. Err. (0.0075) (0.0083) (0.0186) (0.0371)
Obs 36,467
Adj R2 0.678 0.691 0.743 0.945
Fixed E¤ects
Client X X
Industry X
Semester X X
Industry*Year X X
Table 1.6: First Measure of Di¢ culty and Vertical Integration.
Note: An observation is a lobbying transaction (Top Panel) or a client-semester combination (Bottom Panel).
The table shows the coe¢ cients for the rst measure of di¢ culty (based on congressional committees). (*) means
signicance at 10%, whereas (**) and (***) stand for signicance at 5% and 1%, respectively. Obs is the number
of observations used to run the regression. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level in the rst two
columns and the client level in the last two.
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Transaction Level Dependent Var: V I
Di¢ culty 2 -0.0215** -0.0215** -0.0142* -0.0142*
St. Err. (0.0106) (0.0109) (0.0082) (0.0084)
Obs 297,916
Adj R2 0.659 0.659 0.759 0.759
Client Level Dependent Var: fr
Di¢ culty 2 -0.0358** -0.0358** -0.0158** -0.0158**
St. Err. (0.0179) (0.0177) (0.0070) (0.0071)
Obs 176,143
Adj R2 0.501 0.501 0.946 0.956
Fixed E¤ects
Client X X
Industry X X
Semester X X
Year X X
Table 1.7: Second Measure of Di¢ culty and Vertical Integration.
Note: An observation is a lobbying transaction (Top Panel) or a client-semester combination (Bottom Panel).
The table shows the coe¢ cients for the second measure of the di¢ culty (based on RegData 2.2.). (*) means
signicance at 10%, whereas (**) and (***) stand for signicance at 5% and 1%, respectively. Obs is the number
of observations used in order to run the regression. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level in the rst
two columns and the client level in the last two.
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Transaction Level Dependent Var: V I
Industry K. 0.0083*** 0.0083*** 0.0045* 0.0046*
St. Err. (0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0029)
Obs 297,916
Adj R2 0.660 0.660 0.769 0.769
Client Level Dependent Var: fr
Industry K. 0.0086** 0.0086** 0.0037* 0.0037*
St. Err. (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0021) (0.0023)
Obs 176,143
Adj R2 0.501 0.501 0.956 0.956
Fixed E¤ects
Client X X
Industry X X
Semester X X
Year X X
Table 1.8: Industry-knowledge and Vertical Integration.
Note: An observation is a lobbying transaction (Top Panel) or a client-semester combination (Bottom Panel).
The table shows the coe¢ cients for the industry-knowledge variable (based on RegData 2.2.). (*) means
signicance at 10%, whereas (**) and (***) stand for signicance at 5% and 1%, respectively. Obs is the number
of observations used in order to run the regression. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level in the rst
two columns and the client level in the last two.
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In-House External Total In-House External
Generalist (%) 78 22 15760 57.4 20.9
Specialist (%) 40.6 59.4 22450 42.6 79.1
HHI 0.31 0.50
Table 1.9: Generalists and Specialists Across Markets.
Note: LHS: Fraction of generalists and specialists across markets. The percentages shown in the generalist
(specialist) category are calculated as a fraction of the total number of generalists (specialist). RHS: Fraction of
in-house and external sta¤ across classications of generalists and specialists. The percentages shown in the
in-house (external) category are calculated as the fraction of the total number of in-house (external) lobbyists.
Last row: Herndahl index by market. An observation is a lobbyist.
External+Specialists
% /Specialists /External
All periods 59.4 79.1
5 years 59.1 67.5
7.5 years 63.6 65.5
10 years 68.5 64.6
12.5 years 69.4 60.8
15 years 83.8 52.9
Table 1.10: Fraction of External Specialists Over Di¤erent Denominators.
Note: An observation is a lobbyist. The second column show the percentage of external lobbyists that are
classied as specialists over the total number of specialists. The last column show the percentage of the specialist
external lobbyists over the total of external lobbyists. The rst row shows the percentages for all the lobbyists in
the sample. The next rows only consider lobbyists that have lobbied a given number of years. For instance, the
third row gives the percentages for the case we restrict our sample to lobbyists that have worked in the industry
at least 5 years. The table shows that the patterns between vertical integration and specialization remain once I
control for the number of periods the lobbyists appear. For instance, for any sample of lobbyists at least 60% of
the specialists are external lobbyists. On the other hand, the majority of the external lobbyists are specialists for
any sub-sample of advocates.
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Internal C. External C.
Sales Mean 2.184 0.395
(Million Units) Std. Dev 30.823 6.228
Employees Mean 470.699 151.048
(Thousands Units) Std. Dev 5860.7 2181.793
Obs 1,286 14,298
Table 1.11: Size Statistics by Type of Client.
Note: The rst pair of rows provide the mean and standard deviation values for the sales of the clients. This
variable is measured in US Million units. The second pair of rows provide the mean and standard deviation values
for the number of employees of the clients. This variable is measured in Thousand units. The last two columns
provide the descriptive statistics for the total value of Sales and the total number of employees by type of client.
A client is internal is she has always lobbied with in-house lobbyists. A client is external if she has never lobbied
with in-house lobbyists. An observation is a client.
In-House External Mixed Total
Honorable 9.09 80 10.91 165
Senate 15.72 64.45 19.83 1412
House 11.7 69.15 19.15 94
White House 10.93 68.17 20.90 311
Aide 17.15 61.41 21.44 1,516
Clerk 6.57 85.86 7.58 198
Counsel 10.91 71.97 17.12 1,063
Experience 31.84 48.67 19.48 12,894
Table 1.12. Distribution of Revolving-door Lobbyists by Integration Decision and Type
of Job Occupied.
Note: An observation is a lobbyist. The rst column has the job/o¢ ce title previously occupied. Columns 2 to 4
have the distribution of the types of lobbyists for each o¢ ce title, and the fth column has the total number of
lobbyists with that job experience. Take for example, the rst row. A lobbyist is categorized as honorable (the
title for former members of Congress) if she was either a Senator or a Representative before being a lobbyist. In
my sample, there are 165 ex-Congressmen lobbyists. Among them, 80% work as external lobbyists, while only 9%
of them work as in-house lobbyists. Senate (House) represents past work in the Senate but not as Senator (House
Representative). Experience is a dummy equal to 1 if the lobbyist occupied any public o¢ ce (included the listed
in the table). The values reported for this variable correspond to the percentage of lobbyists with experience in a
given category of lobbyists.
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Fraction of Internal Reports Fraction of Internal Lobbyists
Ti  Pt -0.050** -0.050** -0.049*** -0.050*** -0.059** -0.060** -0.053*** -0.053***
0.024 0.024 0.007 0.007 0.028 0.028 0.009 0.009
Ti 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.069*** 0.070***
0.020 0.020 0.023 0.023
Pt 0.03** 0.015*** 0.026* 0.07
0.01 0.003 0.013 0.001
Obs 3731 3198
R2 0.06 0.07 0.92 0.93 0.03 0.05 0.90 0.91
QFE N Y N Y N Y N Y
CFE N N Y Y N N Y Y
Table 1.13: Results of the BP oil Spill Dif-Dif Estimation.
Note: The LHS provides the point estimates when the dependent variable is the fraction of reports made
internally. The RHS provides the point estimates when the dependent variable is the fraction of lobbyists working
in-house. (*) means signicance at 10%, whereas (**) and (***) stand for signicance at 5% and 1%,
respectively. Obs is the number of observations used to run the regression. Standard errors are clustered at the
client level. Q.F E. denotes quarter-xed e¤ects controls and CFE denotes client-xed e¤ects. An observation is a
client-quarter combination.
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Number of Internal Lobbyists Number of External Lobbyists
TiP t -0.174** -0.188** -0.169** -0.1925** 0.360** 1.405** 0.382** 1.448**
0.072 0.078 0.069 0.079 0.145 0.679 0.159 0.681
Ti -0.409*** -0.404*** 2.516** 2.517**
0.148 0.148 1.223 1.229
Pt -0.0231 -0.0950 -0.132 -0.394
0.0837 0.122 0.217 0.240
obs 3,729
R2 0.361 0.841 0.363 0.843 0.055 0.826 0.058 0.829
QFE N N Y Y N N Y Y
CFE N Y N Y N Y N Y
Table 1.14: Evidence on the Absolute Change on the Number of Lobbyists.
Note: The dependent variable is the total number of internal lobbyists in the LHS and total number of external
lobbyists in the right hand side. (*) means signicance at 10%, whereas (**) and (***) stand for signicance at
5% and 1%, respectively. Obs is the number of observations used to run the regression. Standard errors are
clustered at the client level. Q.F E. denotes quarter-xed e¤ects controls and CFE denotes client-xed e¤ects. An
observation is a client-quarter combination.
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Fraction Internal Reports Fraction Internal Lobbyists
TiP t -0.052*** -0.035*** -0.052*** -0.036*** -0.062*** -0.035*** -0.063** -0.036***
(0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.007) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.009)
Ti 0.069 0.069 0.048 0.048
(0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.020)
Pt 0.030*** 0.013*** 0.027*** 0.005
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.005)
Reports 0.010 -0.047*** 0.011 -0.047*** 0.023 -0.057*** 0.023 -0.058***
(0.014) (0.002) (0.014) (0.002) (0.019) (0.003) (0.019) (0.003)
obs 3,729 3,196
R2 0.008 0.934 0.009 0.935 0.013 0.917 0.015 0.918
CFE N Y N Y N Y N Y
QFE N N Y Y N N Y Y
Table 1.15: BP Estimations Including Controls for Changes in the Demand.
Note: The dependent variable is the total number of internal lobbyists in the LHS and total number of external
lobbyists in the right hand side. (*) means signicance at 10%, whereas (**) and (***) stand for signicance at
5% and 1%, respectively. Obs is the number of observations used to run the regression. Standard errors are
clustered at the client level. Q.F E. denotes quarter-xed e¤ects controls and CFE denotes client-xed e¤ects. An
observation is a client-quarter combination.
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Fraction of Internal Reports
TiP t -0.0575** -0.0555*** -0.0352* -0.0271*** -0.0257** -0.0350***
0.0282 0.00767 0.0192 0.00567 0.0109 0.00447
Ti 0.0377 0.113*** 0.185***
0.0237 0.0161 0.00916
Pt 0.0375** 0.0152** 0.00567
0.0154 0.00688 0.00480
obs 2850 6113 4298
R2 0.002 0.944 0.027 0.937 0.218 0.897
QFE N Y N Y N Y
CFE N Y N Y N Y
Control Retail Sales Real Estate Casino
Table 1.16: BP Estimations with Di¤erent Control Groups.
Note: The dependent variable is the fraction of reports made internally. (*) means signicance at 10%, whereas
(**) and (***) stand for signicance at 5% and 1%, respectively. Obs is the number of observations used to run
the regression. Standard errors are clustered at the client level. Q.F E. denotes quarter-xed e¤ects controls and
CFE denotes client-xed e¤ects. An observation is a client-quarter combination.
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Fraction Internal Reports Fraction Internal Lobbyists
TiP t -0.052** -0.049*** -0.052** -0.051*** -0.061** -0.062** -0.053*** -0.054***
(0.024) (0.011) (0.024) (0.011) (0.028) (0.028) (0.013) (0.013)
Ti 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.072*** 0.072***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.024)
Pt 0.030*** 0.015*** 0.026* 0.008
(0.012) (0.004) (0.014) (0.005)
obs 3,729 3196
R2 0.006 0.926 0.007 0.927 0.003 0.907 0.005 0.908
QFE N N Y Y N N Y Y
CFE N Y N Y N Y N Y
Table 1.17: BP Estimations Using Two-way Clustering.
Note: Two-way clustering is as follows: First at the industry-quarter level to solve the problem of autocorrelation
within a group and then at the client level to solve for the problem of autocorrelation at the client level. The LHS
provides the point estimates when the dependent variable is the fraction of reports made internally. The RHS
provides the point estimates when the dependent variable is the fraction of lobbyists working in-house. (*) means
signicance at 10%, whereas (**) and (***) stand for signicance at 5% and 1%, respectively. Obs is the number
of observations used to run the regression. Standard errors are clustered at the client level. Q.F E. denotes
quarter-xed e¤ects controls and CFE denotes client-xed e¤ects. An observation is a client-quarter combination.
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Fraction of Internal Reports Fraction of Internal Lobbyists
TiP t -0.0501** -0.0350*** -0.0614** -0.0354***
(0.0239) (0.00721) (0.0279) (0.0093)
Ti 0.0668*** 0.0458*
(0.020) (0.0236)
Pt 0.0300** 0.0125*** 0.0264* 0.00474
(0.0109) (0.00365) 0.0137 (0.00478)
Obs 407 389
R2 0.010 0.973 0.007 0.977
QFE N Y N Y
CFE N N N N
Table 1.18: BP Estimations Collapsing Dependent Variables.
Note: These estimations, follow the procedure of Barrage et al. (2014). I collapse the dependent variables into
averages within two time periods pre and post-spill period. The LHS provides the point estimates when the
dependent variable is the fraction of reports made internally. The RHS provides the point estimates when the
dependent variable is the fraction of lobbyists working in-house. (*) means signicance at 10%, whereas (**) and
(***) stand for signicance at 5% and 1%, respectively. Obs is the number of observations used to run the
regression. Standard errors are clustered at the client level. Q.F E. denotes quarter-xed e¤ects controls and CFE
denotes client-xed e¤ects. An observation is a client-quarter combination.
Occupation Occupational Code NAICS
Lawyers 23 (excluding 23-1023) 5411
Managers 11 5511
IT Personnel 15-10100 5415
Accountants 13-2011 5412
Lobbyists 27-3031 5418101
Table 1.19: Matching Between Occupation and NAICS Codes.
Note: An occupation is dened according to the O¢ ce of Management and Budget (OMB) Standard
Occupational Classication (SOC) system while an industry is dened with the four-digit NAICS classication.
Each row represents a particular occupation, and I dene each according to the occupational codes described in
the second column. The last column provides the NAICS codes representing rms whose primary business
segment is in that occupation. A service provider is external if the service provider works in the NAICS industry
primarily concerned with that occupation.
10015-11 after 2010. The denition for this occupation only change the occupational code but
not the description of activities.
101Ideally I would like to use the code 541820. However, the survey only contains 4-digit NAICS
code industries.
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Hourly Wage
Occupation In House Mean Percentiles
(10) (25) (50) (75) (90)
Lawyers 1 40.11 17.22 23.12 34.94 51.29 63.87
0 47.33 15.71 21.59 35.20 65.27 80102
Managers 1 47.83 24.16 31.88 42.09 53.63 60.66
0 58.86 29.54 39.61 51.17 67.24 73.81
IT P. 1 35.07 21.29 26.76 33.95 42.40 51.27
0 38.25 21.19 27.60 36.27 46.69 58.53
Accountants 1 30.53 18.22 22.29 28.28 36.30 46.19
0 34.66 17.61 22.23 29.15 40.31 58.56
Lobbyists 1 26.91 14.60 18.60 24.49 32.76 42.81
0 32.60 15.40 19.14 26.70 38.55 56.82
Table 1.20: Wages Di¤erences by Type of Market.
Note: The table shows the mean and ve di¤erent percentile values for hourly wage by occupation across all years.
For each occupation, I calculate separately the wage statistics for the internal and external market service
providers. The di¤erences in wages across internal and external service providers are only t-test statistically
signicant for mean and percentiles values of 50, 75 and 90. Wages are deated by the CPI with constant prices
in 2009. Industries are weighted by levels of employment.
Generalists Specialists
Managers (11-) 1021, 3011, 9011, 9012, 9013 2011,2031,3021,3031,3041,3042,
3051, 3061, 3071, 3111, 3131, 9161
IT P (15-) 1032, 1061, 1071, 1081, 1133, 1011, 1021, 1031, 1111, 1122,
1141, 1142 1131, 1132, 1134
Table 1.21: Matching Occupational Codes and Type of Provider.
Note: The table shows the sub-occupations of Managers and I.T. Personnel that were classied as generalists and
specialists according to the description of the sub-occupation.
102The survey excludes the exact value of hourly wages when the value is equal to or greater
than $80.00 per hour or $166,400 per year. This necessarily implies that external lawyers earn
more per hour than internal lawyers.
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Internal External Total
Generalists Managers 0.961 0.039 2036201
IT 0.783 0.217 866898
Specialists Managers 0.914 0.086 1234908
IT 0.666 0.334 900321
Table 1.22: Fraction of Generalists and Specialists Across Markets for Management and
IT.
Note: The table shows the generalists and specialists by level of vertical integration and occupation. Total is a
row. To construct this table, I proceed as follows: First, I compute the yearly total number of employees for each
combination of generalist and specialist in each of the markets (internal and external). Then, I average the total
employment for each combination across years and compute the proportions shown in the tables.
Internal External
Generalists Managers 0.634 0.424
IT 0.531 0.385
Specialists Managers 0.366 0.576
IT 0.469 0.615
Total Managers 3085713 185396
IT 1278028 489190
Table 1.23: Fraction of Internal and External Service Providers by the Level of
Specialization.
Note: Table 20 shows the percentages of internal and external employees by level of specialization and
occupation.Total is a column. To construct this table, I proceed as follows: First, I compute the yearly total
number of employees for each combination of generalist and specialist in each of the markets (internal and
external). Then, I average the total employment for each combination across years and compute the proportions
shown in the tables.
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1.5.4 Proofs
Lemma 1.1 The knowledge of external providers is larger than the knowledge of
internal providers (i.e. z < z) and both knowledge levels are decreasing in c
(i.e. @z

@c
; @z

@c
< 0). The larger the rm-specic component, the lower the knowledge
acquired by the external providers (i.e.@z

@h
< 0).
Proof. Follows from the text.
Lemma 1.2 There are two cuto¤s of knowledge levels z, z. Clients with su¢ -
ciently high frequency problems (i.e. z  z) go to the internal market, clients with
intermediate levels of di¢ culty (i.e. z < z  z) hire external service providers.
Finally, clients that face very infrequent problems do not hire any service provider
(i.e. z > z).
Proof. There are two cut-o¤ levels of knowledge in the economy, z, z. The
optimal organization of the economy requires that clients with problems z < z
go to the internal market whereas clients with z < z < z use external service
providers. To see why, assume there are two clients with problems z0  z and
z < z00  z. Notice that the total net production for these two clients under
this arrangement is 2  c z + z
n

. Now, lets consider switching these rms across
markets. The rm with problem z0 will get 1   c z
n
whereas the other rm will
get  cz, as the in-house service provider cannot solve the problem with di¢ culty
z00. As neither other clients nor service providers modify their payo¤s under any of
these two arrangements, this concludes the proof. Notice that if the production is
proportional to the di¢ culty of the problem instead of being normalized to 1 for
the solved problems I get the same result as z0+z00 c z + z
n

> z0 c z + z
n

.
Lemma 1.3 The expected surplus in the external market is maximized when clients
with high rm-specic knowledge levels are allocated to the internal market. The ex-
post surplus in the external market with clients with a higher rm-specic knowledge
can be larger or lower than the ex-post surplus with clients with a lower rm-specic
knowledge.
Proof. Assume there are n  1 clients with rm-specic knowledge h and one rm
with rm-specic knowledge bh. The surplus for these n rms is n [F (z)  F (z)] cz
with time constraint equals to 1 = (1  F (z)) 
h
(n  1)  h+ bhi. Rearranging this
constraint I get 1
n
= (1 F (z
))h
(1 F (z))h+1 (1 F (z))bh . Notice that the joint surplus is  =
[F (z)  F (z)]   c
n
z = [F (z)  F (z)]   (1 F (z))hcz
(1 F (z))h+1 (1 F (z))bh . Using the envelope
theorem I notice that @
@bh < 0. Notice, that the surplus in the internal market
does not depend on the rm-specic knowledge of the clients, therefore allocating
clients with high rm-specic knowledge saves communication costs in the external
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market. Assume there are two clients with z; z0 < z and the client with problem z
has rm-specic knowledge h whereas the other client has rm-specic knowledge
h0. If only one client can go to the internal market, given the result above it
has to be the one with lower rm-specic knowledge. In alternative cases (either
z < z < z0, z0 < z < z or z < z; z0) the surplus is maximized by sending clients
with low rm-specic knowledge to the external market. For the second part of
the result, notice that the ex-post surplus of ni clients in the external market is
ni   czi . As the internal market is independent of the rm-specic knowledge,
the previous term is equal to 1
hi ((1 F (z)))   cf 1 (chi (1  F (z))). As I increase hi
the number of rms being served in the external market decreases but the issue-
specic knowledge reached by the external service providers decreases, making less
costly to hire service providers. As service providers payo¤ do not change with
the rm-specic knowledge this concludes the proof.
Theorem 1.1 The fraction of vertically integrated clients increases with the rm-
specic knowledge h and can increase or decrease with the cost of acquiring issue-
specic knowledge.
Proof. Follows from taking derivatives from the fraction shown in the text.
Lemma 1.4 The optimal time allocation for this problem is characterized by a
corner solution. The provider should give all their time to the activity more likely
to face. That is, if it is more likely to appear problems type i, the provider should
not provide any time to activity j 6= i.
Proof. Notice that these probabilities are exogenous to the client, so tA is given.
The allocation will depend on the relative probability of facing one problem. Notice
that if czA = 0 6= czB, tA = 1 and if czB = 0 6= czA the fraction spend on issue A is
tA = 0. Finally, notice that as tA should be lower than 1, which implies that
FA(czA)  0, which only holds when czA = 0.
Proposition 1.1 There is a range of  such that tA 2 (0; 1). For this range of
values of , generalists never exist for czA = czB = 0.
Proof. As tA is a fraction of the time spend on issue A, tA 2 [0; 1]. The conditions
to get tA  0 are : 1.   11 FB(czB) and FB(czB) > FA(czA) or 2.   11 FB(czB) and
FB(czB) < FA(czA). Notice that if czB = 0, the rst condition implies 0 > FA(czA)
which is not possible. For the second condition,   1 and 0 < FA(czA) which
only occurs when czA > 0. The condition to get tA  1 is:   11 FA(czA) . Then,
condition 1 for tA  0 and condition for tA  1 imply: 11 FA(czA)    11 FB(czB) and
FB(czB) > FA(czA) whereas condition 2 for tA  0 combined with the condition for
tA  1 imply:   11 FA(czA)  11 FB(czB) :
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Proposition 1.2 There are at most two cuto¤s (excluding the rm boundary) in
the internal market for each issue. For issue j, the relevant cuto¤s are z=j and z

i .
Clients with zj  z=j hire two specialists, clients with zi  zj  z=j hire a generalist
and clients with zj  zi hire one specialist.
Proof. It follows from the text.
Corollary 1.1 If (z=A ; z
=
B) = (z

A; z

B) there is only one cut-o¤. In this case, the in-
ternal market only contains specialists. If (z=A ; z
=
B) < (z

A; z

B) clients with (z
=
A ; z
=
B) 
(zA; zB) will hire two specialists and clients with (z=A ; z
=
B)  (zA; zB)  (zgA; zgB) will
hire one generalist.
Proof. It follows from the text.
Lemma 1.5 Generalists external service providers can only exist for the combina-
tions of ngAhA and n
g
BhB such that ezA 2 QA 1  1ngAhA ; QA 1  ngBhBngAhA andezB 2 zBI ; QB 1  ngAhAngBhB (1  FA (ezA)) or ezB 2 QB 1  1ngBhB ; 1 where Qi
is the quantile function of the market i-th.
Proof. It follows from the text.
Lemma 1.6 If tEA = 1 then the knowledge of the generalists is the same as the
specialists in the external market zgA = z

i . Let n
s
A be the leverage in the external
market A with knowledge zi . Then, sign(t
E
A   n
s
A
ngA
) = sign(zgA   zi ):
Proof. It follows from the text.
Lemma 1.7 For a given issue, external providers always acquire more knowledge
than any type of internal providers.
Proof. It follows from the text.
Lemma 1.8 The level of vertical integration in the industry is decreasing in the
rm-specic levels hi and hj.
Proof. It follows from the text.
Lemma 1.9 For any two layers in the external market, i and j, with i < j, zj >
zi and nj > ni.
Proof. It follows from the text.
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Lemma 1.10 If z  Exp(), ni =
 

ch
i
and zi =   ln
h
1
hni+1
i  
1


. In this
case, the di¤erence of knowledge between any two layers i and i  1 is given by the
constant zi   zi 1 = 1 ln( ch), the total number of required layers to cover all the
external market area is given by the ceiling function of 1 z

zi zi 1 ,
l
1 z
zi zi 1
m
=
+ln( c

)
ln( 
ch
)
. The di¤erence in the leverage of the external providers is given by ni   ni 1 = 

ch
i 1   
ch
  1, which is increasing in i. Finally, the cost that each client pays in
the external market decreases at an increasing rate as I increase the leverage. That
is, c
ni
  c
ni+1
=
 

ch
  1 =   
ch
i+1
, which is decreasing in i:
Proof. It follows from the text.
Remark 1.1 After two periods, the fraction of clients using exclusively in-house
sta¤ is larger than the fraction of clients using exclusively external providers if
c > f
 
Q
 
1
2

, where Q represents the Quantile function.
Proof. It follows from the text.
Lemma 1.11 If Fj(zj )  Fi(zi ), it is more common to nd clients with in-house
providers in issue i hiring external service providers for issue i.
Proof. The probability of seeing client with both internal and external providers
in the same issues is Fi(zi )   (Fi(zi ))2 and the probability of seeing a client with
in-house provider in issue i and external provider in issue j is Fi(zi ) Fi(zi )Fj(zj ).
As a consequence, it is more likely to see clients with internal and external providers
for the same issue if Fi(zi )  (Fi(zi ))2  Fi(zi )  Fi(zi )Fj(zj ). This is reduced to
Fj(z

j )  Fi(zi ). In the case, that zi  Exp(i), this condition is equal to cicj  ij .
Lemma 1.12 If zl  Exp(l) for l = L; S, L > S , FL(zL) > FS(zS).
Proof. It follows directly from applying the exponential function to the inequality.
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1.5.5 Tables of the Appendix
Sector Coef Mean Rancoef Rancmean
Trade -3090.05 10130761 5 1
Manufacturing -10028.9 7929012 2 2
Financial/Real Estate -9735.77 5557105 3 3
Prof. Business -12306.1 3601957 1 4
All Other -6976.43 1055569 4 5
Edu-Health 2600.68 987600.3 6 6
Table 1.A.1: Results from the Displacement WorkersLiterature.
Note: The table shows the estimated results from Section G of Couch and Placzek (2010) and average number of
regulating words by industry. The second and fourth column represent the actual values of the coe¢ cients and
average number of words, respectively whereas the third and fth column gives the relative ranking across
variables. To improve the accuracy in the comparison of these two results I have used the same time-span that
Couch and Placzek (2010) has used: 1993 to 2004.
Lib Di¤ Cons di¤
Coe¤ 0.3516** 0.3567**
SE 0.0282 0.0258
Obs 39 39
Table 1.A.2: Results from the International EconomicsLiterature.
Note: The table shows the correlations between the number of regulating words and the value of inputs that are
neither bought and sold on an exchange nor reference priced. For better comparability, with Nunns data , I have
used RegData at the 4-digit levels for the year 1997. Similar results emerge when I use other years. Nunns data
is originally provided at the 6-digit level. To convert it at the 4-digit level I have simply aggregated all the 6-digit
codes by taking the average. Alternative aggregations give me similar results.
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1.5.6 Figures
Figure 1.1: Solution with One Issue. Note: The left shaded (green) area represents the activities for
which the marginal benet of conducting the activities in-house is larger than or equal to the marginal cost. The rst
cut-o¤ represents the rm-boundary, whereas the second cut-o¤ denotes the market boundary. The intermediate
(white) area represents the activities in which clients outsource the service, whereas the right hand (black) area
denotes clients that do not use service providers.
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Figure 1.2: Solution with Two Issues and Generalists in the Internal Market. Note: The
dark (black) area represents the levels of knowledge that internal generalists acquire.
Figure 1.3: Solution with Two Issues. Note: This gure shows 5 out the 6 possibilities discussed in
table 2. The case where rms use in-house sta¤ for some issue and leave the problem unsolved for the other issue
can be easily included for a low enough cost of acquiring knowledge in issue B.
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Figure 1.4: Solution to the Problem with Multiple Layers in the External Market: The
Level of Specialization of the External Providers is Limited by the Extent of the Market.
Note: The gure represents the case with three layers in the external market. The rst cut-o¤ represents the rm
boundary. Each cut-o¤ in the external market denotes a di¤erent layer, implying a di¤erent level of knowledge and
leverage.
Figure 1.5: Knowledge Proxied by Congressionals and Regulating Words Measures.
Note: LHS: Frequency function of the committee-knowledge requirements index. The x-axis shows the deciles
of the index and the y-axis shows the normalized (fraction over the total) number of bills for each decile. RHS.
Frequency function for the fraction of the number of restraining words over the total number of regulating words.
The x-axis shows the percentiles of this fraction and the y-axis shows the normalized (fraction over the total)
number of rms for each percentile. Similar results emerge when the y-axis is measured in terms of total number
of employees or industries. Data for 2006 in both gures. Similar results emerge for di¤erent time periods.
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Figure 1.6: Patterns of HHI Across Markets. Note: The value 1 corresponds to internal lobbyists
and 0 corresponds to external advocates. The line shows the linear prediction of the HHI on the dummy of internal
lobbyists. The tted regression isHHI i= 0:22  0:07 Di+" whereDi= 1 if lobbyist i is in-house and
0 otherwise. The standard errors are 0.003 and 0.0067 for the constant and slope, respectively. I restrict this
analysis to lobbyists that advocate for at least 10 years. Di¤erent time restrictions give the same patterns. In this
gure, an observation is a lobbyist.
Figure 1.7: Relationship Between Firm Size and Status of Integration. Note: LHS: Firm size
distribution by type of vertical integration relationship when the size is proxied by the log of the sales of the client.
RHS: Firm size distribution by type of vertical integration relationship when the size is proxied by the log of the
number of employees of the client.
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Figure 1.8: Relationship Between Firm Size of Internal Clients and HHI. Note: LHS: Scatter
plot of the Herndahl index and the log of the sales of internal clients. RHS: Scatter plot of the Herndahl index
and the log of the number of employees of internal clients. I restrict this gure to the sample of lobbyists with at
least 5 years of lobbying activity. Similar patterns emerge for alternative time spans. An observation is a lobbyist.
Figure 1.9: Earnings, Experience and Leverage. Note: LHS: Relationship between earnings (y-axis)
and experience, as proxied by the number of years as a Federal Lobbyist (x-axis). RHS: Relationship between
experience and number of clients. The x-axis reports the quantiles of the distribution of the number of clients. The
choice of axis in these gures aim to follow closely my theoretical framework. On the left hand side, I represent the
earnings as a function of the years of experience, that is earnings=cz. On the right hand side table, I denote the
relationship between experience and leverage.
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Figure 1.10: BP Oil Spill and Fraction of Internal Reports for Firms in the Oil Industry.
Note. The treated group includes all the rms conducting lobbying activities that belong to 2007 NAICS codes
211111, excluding BP. The control group includes all the rms that belong to the Oil and Gas industry, excluding
the codes above. An observation is a group- quarter.
(Vertical lines mark two standard errors)
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Figure 1.11: Leads and Lags BP Oil Spill Exercise. Note: This gure shows the coe¢ cients of the
interaction terms with three leads and three lags. As in the text, the estimation control by quarter and client xed
e¤ects. Standard errors are clustered at the client level. The main take away from this gure is that the leads are
very close to 0. That is, there is no evidence for anticipatory e¤ects. This provides further evidence to the gure
on the fraction of vertical integration reports for treated and control groups on the common trends assumption.
The coe¢ cients of the lags show that the e¤ect tends to be attenuated over time. However, after three quarters
the e¤ect remains negative and signicant.
96
Figure 1.12: E¤ect of the BP Oil Spill on Knowledge Measures. Note: The LHS gure shows the
knowledge measure proxied by the fraction of witnesses. To construct this measure, for each semester I considered
all the bills that each of these rms were lobbying. To get a group-level measure, I have taken the weighted average
(by number of bills being lobbied) of the fraction of high-knowledge witnesses across all the clients of the group.
The vertical lines represent the second semester of 2007 and the rst semester of 2010. The RHS gure shows the
knowledge measure proxied by the Regulation words variable. The vertical lines represent years 2008 and 2010. An
observation in both gures is a group-semester combination. Dashed lines represent the control group.
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Figure 1.13: Time Series on Total Employment and Fraction of Integrated Clients for
Five Knowledge-Intensive Occupations. Note. An observation is a year.
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Chapter 2
Technological Change and the
Boundaries of the Firm:The Case
of Lobbyists103
Abstract
This chapter studies the main e¤ects of technological change in verti-
cal integration with knowledge workers. Theoretically, I study two di¤erent
channels in which technology can modify integration patterns. I show that
technologies that decrease the cost of acquiring issue-specic skills increase
both the level of vertical integration and the leverage of external providers,
however, decrease the earnings inequality of the economy. On the other hand,
technologies that decrease the cost of communicating rm-specic knowledge,
decrease the integration in the economy but increase both the span of exter-
nal providers and earnings inequality. I conrm the empirical validity of the
prediction of the cost of acquiring skills using data from a knowledge-intensive
industry: US Federal Lobbying. To do that, I use the most important policy
change in the lobbying industry: The 2007 Open Government Act. I use
structural techniques to back out unknown parameters and I show that the
introduction of the Act, decreased the cost of acquiring issue-specic skills.
Conrming the validity of the theoretical predictions, I show that the Act
increased signicantly both the use of in-house lobbyists and the number of
clients that external lobbyists work for, as well as decreasing sharply the
earnings inequality of the economy.
103I am deeply indebted for the precise and insightful comments made by Jordi Blanes i Vidal,
Luis Garicano, Gilat Levy, Jim Snyder, Jr., John Sutton, Catherine Thomas and Glen Weyl. This
chapter is an extended version of the second part of my job market paper. I acknowledge the
comments and suggestions made by participants at Work in Progress seminars at LSE, UChicago
and Stanford University, 14th IIOC, 2016 TADC, 15th IOEA, 20th Annual Conference of the
SIOE.
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2.1 Introduction
Despite great and long standing interest in the main determinants of vertical in-
tegration, there is no consensus on the reasons for vertical integration in general,
and the relationship between technological change and the integration decision, in
particular. What are the main consequences of technological change in vertical in-
tegration? Would rms be more keen to hire someone in-house or to outsource the
service after facing a technological shock? This chapter uses the theoretical model
developed in Chapter 1 to, in the light of the theoretical predictions, understand
the main e¤ects of technological change on vertical integration.
In Chapter 1, I develop a model that focuses on the acquisition and commu-
nication of skills. Focusing on these two channels allows me to di¤erentiate the
e¤ects of two types of technologies: skill acquisition and rm-specic communica-
tion. Technologies that decrease the cost of acquiring skills will empower in-house
workers whereas technologies that facilitate the communication of rm-specic skills
will stimulate outsourcing. Intuitively, the rst type of technology makes learning
cheaper and decreases the need of rms to rely on external service providers, as
in-house sta¤ can solve harder problems. On the other hand, cheaper rm-specic
communication technologies decreases the comparative value of in-house sta¤ and,
therefore, promotes outsourcing.
Technological change has huge impacts in the knowledge economy. For instance,
a decrease in the cost of acquiring skills will increase the leverage of external service
providers. This comes from the fact that the skills acquired for both in-house and
external sta¤ have changed. As a consequence, rms with in-house sta¤ are less
likely to ask for help in the external market, so the time constraint of external sta¤
is relaxed. As consultants have also become smarter they can solve a larger set
of problems, and therefore they will work for a larger number of clients. On the
other hand, a decrease in the cost of trasmitting rm-specic skills relaxes the time
constraint of external sta¤, as they would need less time learning the rm-specic
component. Therefore, they can solve problems for a larger set of clients. So, the
leverage of external sta¤ is both decreasing in the costs of acquiring issue-specic
skills and transmitting rm-specic knowledge.
I argue in this chapter that technology not only has a strong e¤ect on the
integration decision but also on important features in the economy, such as earnings
inequality. A simple way to measure this variable is with the ratio of the earnings
of external sta¤ over in-house providers. As earnings are proportional to the issue-
specic skills acquired, as I have shown in Chapter 1, a technological shock that
changes the skills acquired also modies earnings in the economy. Concretely, I show
that a decrease in the cost of acquiring issue-specic skills decreases the earnings
inequality measure, whereas a decrease in the rm-specic transmission cost has
the opposite e¤ect. This result is very intuitive. A decrease in the acquisition
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cost empowers in-house sta¤, which increases their earnings proportionally more
than the increase in the earnings of external sta¤. This empowerment is translated,
then, into a decrease in the earnings inequality measure. A decrease in the cost of
communicating rm-specic skills has the opposite e¤ect. A decrease of this type,
empowers external consultants, which make them earn more. Therefore, earnings
inequality increases.
Empirical exogenous evidence on these e¤ects is inexistent. To contribute to
this debate, I focus on a policy change that decreased the cost of acquiring skills for
US federal lobbyists. Empirically, I exploit the most important lobbying regulatory
change in the last 20 years, the Open Government Act (henceforth OGA) of 2007, as
a quasi-experiment that improved the technological access to advocacy information.
I show that, consistent with the intuition above, the technological shock decreased
the cost of acquiring issue-specic skills.
Before the Act, lobbyists have to report their advocacy activities by hand and
submit it to the Congress. Since then, the lobbyists made these reports electroni-
cally. In addition, Sec. 208 of the Act: "Requires the Secretary of the Senate and
the Clerk of the House to: ... make lobbying activity reports available for public
inspection over the Internet within 48 hours after such report is led". For a lob-
byist, an important source of information to conduct her activities is the activities
that other lobbyists conduct. For instance, with that information lobbyists can set
their advocacy strategies as they understand who is on each side of the debate and
how much they care about specic issues. The Act facilitated the access to this
information as previously, lobbyists had to conduct a manual search on a specic
geographic location. Since the Act, lobbyists could access all lobbyistsreports via
an organized database from any location.
In the body of this chapter, I argue that the main e¤ect of the change in the
reporting technology was to facilitate the acquisition of information for advocacy
activities, reducing the cost of acquiring skills to conduct these activities. Clearly,
the main challenge that this chapter faces, is to show that there was an actual
decrease in the cost of acquiring skills and that this had an e¤ect on integration
patterns. To do that, I use equilibrium conditions from the model developed in
Chapter 1. Using these equations and aggregate measures from the lobbying mar-
ket, I back out some unobservables and I show that under my more conservative
estimations, the cost of acquiring advocacy skills decreased in about 20%.
This Act also included other regulatory changes. Importantly, the Act closed
some of the channels that lobbyists used to access politicians. Since policy makers
acquire knowledge from lobbyists, more-restricted access to them implies an in-
creased need to gather knowledge from other sources. I provide empirical evidence
that congressional committees started using high-knowledge witnesses more heavily,
and, as a result, the type of problems faced by the rms changed. I decompose the
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e¤ect of the Act on the economys vertical integration, showing that around half
of the change is explained by a change in the distribution of problems (di¢ culty
e¤ect), and about half by the cost of acquiring knowledge (technological e¤ect).
Recovering the parameters allows me to conduct additional empirical exercises. For
instance, I show that if the economy had faced only the technological e¤ect, the
fraction of rms with in-house lobbyists would have increased by 150%.
Related Literature
There are two branches of literature that are relevant to this chapter. The
rst branch links characteristics of technological change with integration decisions.
Acemoglu et al. (2010) show that technology intensity of downstream industries is
negatively correlated to the probability of outsourcing whereas the technological in-
tensity of upstream industries is positively correlated. Bartel et al. (2012) show that
rms producing products that require inputs that face rapid technological change
will tend to outsource more. Although both of these papers link technology with
integration, none of them discuss how information and communication technologies
(henceforth ICT) a¤ect skill acquisition or its implications to the vertical integra-
tion decision. A second branch of the literature focuses on the e¤ect of technology
on internal rm organization. A rst set of papers from this branch focuses on this
relationship but neglects the main di¤erences on the e¤ects of information versus
communication technologies.104 On the other hand, Bloom et al. (2014) exploit
the disaggregation of types of ICT and empirically studies its relationship with rm
organization but neglects its distinctive e¤ect on vertical integration. Although this
branch of the literature seeks to analyze the e¤ect of di¤erent types of technology
on internal hierarchies of the rm, no paper has empirically analyzed the e¤ect of
ICT on vertical integration patterns.
This chapter is divided into ve sections. Section 2.2 presents the theoretical
framework. To keep independence across chapters, here I summarize the main
setting fully developed in Chapter 1. In this chapter, I focus on presenting some
results that will guide the empirical section. In Section 2.3, I briey present the
data used and the institutional context. Section 2.4 starts by explaining the OGA
and providing empirical evidence on its consequences. Then, I show the results of
the structural estimations. I end this section by discussing alternative approaches
to explain the e¤ect of the OGA on integration patterns. Finally, in Section 2.5,
I conclude with a short discussion summarizing the main results from the chapter
and proposing further developments.
104See for example, Acemoglu et al. (2007) and Caroli and Van Reenen (2001).
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2.2 Theoretical Framework
2.2.1 Preliminaries
I consider an economy with a large numberM <1 of ex-ante homogeneous clients
(rms) and an innite set N , of ex ante homogeneous service providers. Clients
exogenously receive one problem per unit of time spent in production. Service
providers, not clients, solve problems.
Demand. As in Garicano (2000), problems di¤er by the level of issue-specic
knowledge requirements (i.e., di¢ culty of the problem). I denote this level by
Z 2 [0; 1]. The problems are ordered by increasing level of di¢ culty. The random
variable Z is independent and identically distributed according to a continuous
cumulative distribution function F with F 00 < 0. Solutions to problems in both
issues are equally valuable to these clients. Clientspayo¤ function is production
minus labor costs, and the normalized value of production is 1 when a service
provider solves a problem and 0 otherwise.
Supply. Solving problems requires knowledge. All service providers must learn
the easiest (most common) problems before learning the harder (less common) ones.
Providers are characterized by a variable z 2 [0; 1]. Service providers with issue-
specic knowledge z solve any problem if the di¢ culty of the problem lies between
0 and z. Service providers increase this knowledge at a cost proportional to the size
of the interval of knowledge. That is, learning how to solve problems in the interval
[0; z] costs cz, where c is the constant per-period unit cost of acquiring knowledge.
Without loss of generality, I assume that the outside option of not working in any
market is 0.
Markets. There are two markets in this model- internal and external. First,
there is an internal market, which is characterized by a one-to-one relationship
between the client and the service provider. Second, there is an external market,
in which each service provider works for n 2 R+ clients (i.e., leverage), which is an
endogenous variable to the problem.
Communication Cost-Firm-Specic Knowledge. In addition to the knowledge
required to solve problems, clients need rm-specic knowledge in order to produce.
In-house and external service providers di¤er by the levels of this type of knowledge.
I capture this idea with a communication cost in the external market. This cost,
denoted as h 2 (0; 1) is the time that external providers spend on each client in
addition to the time that it takes to solve problems.
Time constraint. Each service provider has a time constraint with total labor
supply endowment normalized to 1. As in Garicano (2000), the constraint implies
that the expected time for solving problems has to be equal to the total labor
endowment. That is, 1  Pr(problem)  n  [1 + 1external  (h  1)]. Let Pr(problem)
be the probability that service providers face problems and n the leverage (number
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of clients) of the service provider. The leverage is 1 in the internal market and is
endogenously determined in the external market. Finally, 1external is an indicator
function equal to 1 in the external market and 0 otherwise. The burden of this cost
falls fully on the receiver.
Wages. Service providers receive a constant per-period unit wage compensation
w. The total wage compensation is wz if the service provider has knowledge z. The
wages are endogenous to the problem.
Summing up, the total number of clients and set of service providers (M; N),
the distribution of problems (F ), the cost of acquiring issue-specic knowledge (c),
and the rm-specic knowledge of the economy (h) are exogenous parameters in
the economy. The endogenous variables are the vector of wages (w), allocation of
clients to each market and levels of acquired knowledge (z) and leverage (n) for
each service provider.
Timing. First, service providers choose the breadth (market in which they want
to work) and depth of the level of issue-specic knowledge. Then, the problems of
the clients are realized. Finally, clients are allocated to markets; the markets clear
and production takes place.
In the following section, I characterize both rm and market boundaries and I
present the main results concerning the e¤ects of technological shocks on leverage,
vertical integration and earnings inequality.
2.2.2 Main Results
The problem is solved recursively: rst, I characterize the in-house solution and
then do the same for the external market. For the internal market, the solution of
this problem is characterized by the following rst-order condition:
f(z) = c
The level z represents the issue-specic skills level at which the marginal ben-
et of having someone in-house is equal to the cost of acquiring knowledge. The
marginal benet of this problem represents the increase in the probability that a
problem will be solved. The level z represents the rm boundary.
The objective function in the external market is [F (z)  F (z)] czh(1 F (f 1 (c))).
The solution of this problem is characterized by the following rst-order condition:
f(z) = ch(1  F (f 1 (c)))
The level z represents the market boundary. The external market allows ser-
vice providers to acquire higher levels of knowledge by sharing the costs of acquiring
issue-specic knowledge with several clients. Since in this market, for each problem,
the marginal benet (given by the frequency) of bringing someone in-house is lower
than the marginal cost, no single client can hire an internal provider.
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Equilibrium and Leverage in the Economy
The equilibrium conditions in this economy are for the internal market:
M
f 1(c)Z
0
f(x)dx = NI
This condition establishes that the number of providers that go to the internal
market is equal to the number of internal market demanders. And for the external
market:
M
n
f 1(ch(1 F (f 1(c))))Z
f 1(c)
f(x)dx = NE
That is, the total number of service providers needed equals the total number
of clients demanding external services divided by the number of clients that each
service provider works for. Finally, as all the service providers should get the same
ex-ante payo¤:
0 =
 
wI   c z =  nwE   c z
That is, the equilibrium wages are given by wE = c
n
= w
I
n
for z; z > 0. To
characterize the optimal organization of the economy, I solve it as follows: rst,
internal and external market-clearing conditions give me the number of internal
and external service providers. Note that, as (1  F (f 1 (c)))h = 1
n
, the external
providerstime constraint uniquely determines the number of clients for whom each
external provider works. Finally, wages are given by the ex-ante equality payo¤
condition.
Proposition 2.1 The leverage of the external service providers n, is decreasing in
both the cost of acquiring issue-specic skills c and the rm-specic communication
cost h.
This last result is a direct implication of the time constraint. Intuitively, the
part related to the cost of acquiring skills c comes from two facts. First, in-house
sta¤ can acquire a larger set of issue-specic skills which decrease the demand for
external providers. This implies that rms with in-house sta¤ will be less likely to
go to the external market to get their problems solved as their sta¤ would be able
to solve a larger set of problems. Second, external sta¤ acquire more issue-specic
skills, which means that they can solve more di¢ cult problems. These two results
combined, imply that the external providers are not only smarter but also that they
have a less binding time constraint, which they adjust, in equilibrium, by working
for more clients. On the other hand, the impact of the communication cost h, it
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is straightforward. If it is more costly to transmit rm-specic skills to external
service providers, they will have less time to solve problems and therefore, they will
adjust their time constraint by working for fewer clients.
Vertical Integration
The fraction of vertically integrated clients is given by:
V I =
F (f 1 (c))
F (f 1
 
c
n

)
=
F (f 1 (c))
F (f 1 ((1  F (f 1 (c)))hc))
Proposition 2.2 The fraction of vertically integrated clients is increasing in the
communication cost h and decreasing in the acquisition cost c.
These two results are theoretically establishing the intuition that was developed
previously in Chapter 1. Technologies that decrease the cost of acquiring skills will
empower in-house workers whereas technologies that facilitate the communication
of the rm-specic skills will stimulate outsourcing. Intuitively, the rst type of
technology make learning cheaper and decrease the need of the rms to rely on
external service providers, as in-house sta¤ can solve harder problems. On the other
hand, cheaper, rm-specic communication technologies decrease the comparative
value of in-house sta¤ and therefore, promote outsourcing.
Earnings and Knowledge Inequality
I dene knowledge inequality of the economy, as the ratio of the maximum level
of issue-specic skills achieved in the external market over the maximum level of
this type of skills for in-house sta¤. Mathematically, this is represented by the
following ratio:
z
z
=
f 1 (ch(1  F (f 1 (c))))
f 1 (c)
Theoretically, the total earnings for internal and external providers are given
by wIz and nwEz, respectively, where wI = nwE = c. This implies that the
ratio z

z is a representation of both the di¤erence in the issue-specic skills and
earnings levels between the market and rm boundaries (i.e., between external and
in-house service providers). In other words, this ratio represents the di¤erence
between external and in-house service providers.
Proposition 2.3 The earnings inequality of the economy z

z , is decreasing in the
communication cost h and increasing in the acquisition cost c.
This result is a direct implication from the e¤ects of the technology in both rm
and market boundaries. First, an increase in the communication cost makes external
service providers acquire a lower level of issue-specic skills. As this technology does
not a¤ect in-house sta¤, the earnings inequality measure decreases. On the other
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hand, a change in acquisition costs a¤ects more the in-house than the external
provider. Therefore a decrease in acquisition costs decreases knowledge inequality.
Notice, that the knowledge inequality measure is proportional to the inverse of the
fraction of vertically integrated clients. Therefore, the e¤ect of a technological shock
on inequality is opposite to its e¤ect on integration.
2.3 Data and Institutional Context
The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (henceforth LDA) requires lobbyists to regis-
ter and to report on their lobbying activities to the Senate O¢ ce of Public Records
(henceforth SOPR). According to the Act, lobbying activity is dened as contacts
with o¢ cials, including background work performed to support these contacts. Two
types of registrants are required to report under the LDA: external and internal lob-
byists. External lobbyists, who work for lobbying rms, take on lobbying respon-
sibilities for a number of di¤erent clients and, under the LDA, they are required
to le a separate report for each of their clients. Internal lobbyists are self-ling
organizations that conduct in-house lobbying activities. Both types of registrants
are required to report good-faith information every three months. Up until the end
of 2007, they were required to report these estimates biannually.105
The starting unit of observation is a lobbying report. Each SOPR report not
only contains the name of the client and individual lobbyists, but also species the
House(s) of Congress and federal agencies contacted, as well as the bills in which
the client was interested. Clients can have more than one report in a given period,
as they can use both internal lobbyists and one or more groups of external lobbyists.
The lobbying reports dataset starts at the rst semester of 1999 and nishes with
the second semester of 2014. It contains 44,039 clients and 56,759 lobbyists.
2.3.0.1 Bills, Committees and RegData
Bills are legislative proposals that can be introduced at any time while the Congress
is in session by any member of either house. After introduction, the bill is referred
to the appropriate committee or committees, based on the committeesjurisdiction,
which is dened by congressional rules. The objective of the committees is to study
bills and consider whether or not to send them for further action. The committees
are divided into sub-committees that have a narrower jurisdiction in the topics. The
initial stage of this study process consists of public hearings at which committee
or sub-committee members invite witnesses with the purpose of gathering relevant
information. Witnesses are either specialists on the topic or people a¤ected by
the matter. They represent di¤erent views on the topic and can have di¤erent
backgrounds, such as government, academia or business. Committees that manage
more technical subjects require witnesses with more experience or higher education
105For the sake of a better comparison, for most of the estimations, I will focus on semester level
time variation.
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levels.
I have web-scraped the name and title or occupation of all the witnesses in all
the reported congressional hearings since 1999. I have classied these occupations
into two groups: high and low levels of knowledge requirements. Titles that in-
clude PhD, professor or senior manager are classied as high, whereas all other
occupations are classied as low. In order to capture a comprehensive measure
of knowledge requirements, I create a di¢ culty index at the committee-semester
level using principal components analysis. The index uses as an input the number
of sub-committees and the fraction of witnesses with high-knowledge occupations
over the total number of witnesses. Proxying knowledge requirements using the
di¢ culty index, or simply the fraction of high-knowledge witnesses, gives the same
qualitative results.
I propose an additional measure of knowledge intensity using two variables based
on Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlins (2015) RegData 2.2. This database uses text
analysis and machine learning algorithms to create regulation intensity measures at
the industry-year level based on the Code of Federal Regulations (henceforth CFR).
For each industry-year combination, I use two variables from this database: 1) the
number of words related to the regulation of the industry; and 2) the number of
times that any of the following ve strings appears among the regulating words:
shall, must, may not, prohibited, and required.
Given the lack of a comprehensive measure at the rm level, I use the total
number of regulating words as a proxy for industry-specic knowledge. The intuition
is that when clients hire external service providers, they explain the regulations
in their industry. The larger the number of regulating words, the more costly
it is to explain it to the external service providers and, therefore, the larger the
communication costs. I use the fraction of the number of restriction words over the
total number of regulating words to proxy for the di¢ culty of the lobbying activities.
Clients belonging to industries with a larger fraction of regulating words will face a
tougher regulatory environment. In order to match the RegData information with
the lobbying reports, I conducted extensive data work to detect the industry of
the clients using ORBIS, COMPUSTAT and other web sources such as the clients
webpage.
2.3.1 OGA
This policy change, signed in 2007 and taking e¤ect in 2008, is the most relevant
lobbying industry policy shift of the last two decades.106 Remarkably, the Act
did not include a single regulation discriminating between internal and external
106For the period 1999 to 2014, on average, only 3.5% of the bills introduced became law, and
among the bills that were approved by both chambers, 50% became law. The OGA was passed
by both chambers on August 2, 2007. As a great percentage of the bills at this stage become law,
it is intuitive to see OGAs possible e¤ects since the second semester of 2007. More details about
the OGA can be found in the rst part of the Appendix of this chapter.
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advocates. As cited in the OGA, the aim was to provide greater transparency in
the legislative processon two fronts: disclosure and ethics. Disclosure under the
OGA is more strict, as lobbyists must now report their activities electronically and
more frequently. Before the Act, they had to make reports every semester and since
then, the reports must be made every quarter. Before the Act, lobbyists had to
make these reports by hand and submit it to the Congress. Since then, the lobbyists
made these reports electronically. In particular, Sec. 208 of the Act: "Requires the
Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House to: ... make lobbying activity
reports available for public inspection over the Internet within 48 hours after such
report is led". The main e¤ect of the change in the reporting technology was to
facilitate the acquisition of information for advocacy activities.
The OGA also closed some of the channels that lobbyists used to access politi-
cians. One example is given by subtitle C, section 533 of the OGA. In this rule,
the Act revokes oor privileges and the use of the Membersexercise facilities and
parking spaces for some former high-ranking politicians who are registered lobby-
ists.107 Another example of a closed channel is given by subtitle E, section 552 of
the OGA. In this rule, the Act prohibits Senatorssta¤ from having contact with
the members spouse if this spouse is a registered lobbyist. According to a survey
conducted among a large sample of lobbyists, 83% of these advocates think that
the Act made lobbying activities more di¢ cult.108 Unfortunately, the survey did
not ask lobbyists why or how the di¢ culty of their activities increased.
2.3.1.1 Consequences and Interpretation of the OGA
Although the OGA requires quarterly reports, in Figure 2.1, I group all the infor-
mation in terms of semesters for better comparability with the data before 2008.
For each semester, I classify clients into two types of contracts: clients that use
in-house lobbyists and clients that use only external lobbyists. Figure 2.1 shows
the time-series patterns of the fraction of clients using in-house lobbyists.109 On
average, clients with only external lobbyists account for around 72% of the total
number of clients in a given semester, while clients using in-house lobbyists repre-
sent 28% of the total. The gure presents a declining trend before the OGA. One
way to understand this pattern is based on Stigler (1951): in the early phases of
the lobbying industry, clients had to be vertically integrated because there were
no markets for lobbyists. As the lobbying industry became larger, work that had
formerly been done by in-house lobbyists started to be supplied by external lob-
107These high-ranking occupations are Senators, former Secretaries of the Senate, former
Sergeants at Arms of the Senate and former Speakers of the House.
108For more information about the survey, see www.lobbyists.info/HLOGA_Five_Year_Sur-
vey.
109In this graph, if a client uses both types of lobbyists, it will be considered a client using
in-house lobbyists. Similar patterns emerge when I consider the fraction of clients who use only
internal lobbyists over the total number of lobbyists.
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byists.110 The main takeaway from this gure is the change in the pattern around
2007. After the OGA, the fraction of in-house clients increased from 25% to almost
34%.
Change in the Density of Problems Politicians need knowledge to make in-
formed decisions.111They have at least two di¤erent sources to acquire it: lobbyists
and congressional hearings. If lobbyists have more restricted access to politicians,
they need to rely more on other sources to acquire this knowledge. Figure 2.2 shows
the density functions before and after the OGA using the congressional knowledge
measures introduced in Section 2.3.0.1. For the beforeOGA period, I consider
three semesters before the OGA was signed, and for the after-OGA period, three
semesters since the second semester of 2007. Figure 2.2 provides evidence of a
change in the density of problems that the clients face. Bills with low-knowledge
requirements become less common, whereas bills with high-knowledge requirements
become more common. These di¤erences are conrmed by Kolmogorov-Smirnov
tests of equality of distributions.112 Similar conclusions emerge when I estimate
these density functions for di¤erent periods around the enactment of the OGA.113
To provide additional empirical evidence on the increase in di¢ culty around the
OGA, Figure 2.3 shows the estimated residuals obtained from running the ratio
of restraining words over the total number of words on the years considered.114
The gure shows a remarkable similarity with Figure 2.1. There is a decreasing
trend before 2007 and, since then, an increasing trend. For the rest of this section,
I focus on the congressional hearings knowledge measures, as I have variation at
the semester and not yearly (as with the regulating words) level. However, all the
results I present here are robust to the election of the proxies for skills. 115
110Graphical evidence on the increase in the market (i.e. number of rms and lobbyists) can be
seen in Figure 2.A.1.
111See, for instance, Grossman and Helpman (2002b) for an extensive review of the literature
in which lobbying activity is seen as a relevant information transmission process from one better-
informed party (lobbyists or clients) to less-informed politicians. Bertrand et al (2014) give an
empirical argument in favor of this view. They show that politicians listen to lobbyists with
opposite political views when they are considered issue-experts.
112I conduct this test using all the congressional hearings knowledge measures. The corrected
p-value is 0,001, which means that the null hypothesis of equal distributions can be rejected.
113In particular, I try four other combinations: 1. Before: 2005-1/2007-1 and After: 2007-
2/2009-1; 2. Before: 2006-2/2007-2 and After: 2008-1/2009-1; 3. Before: 2006-1/2007-2 and
After: 2008-1/2009-2 and 4. Before: 2005-2/2006-2 and After: 2008-2/2009-2. For all of these
combinations, I obtains qualitatively similar results.
114I run zt = 0+1t+", where zt is the di¢ culty measure at the two-digits levels proxied with
the RegData. Similar patterns emerge for other levels of aggregation. I consider the period 1999
to 2014. The graph simply shows the predicted residuals b" on the years considered.
115In addition, Section 2.6.4.1 provides empirical evidence on the di¤erences of the characteristics
of the lobbyists entering the market. I observe the lobbyists that started working right after the
OGA have more previous work experience in the government. This can be interpreted as suggestive
evidence that the increase in the di¢ culty of the problems is accompanied by an upgrading on
the types of lobbyistsskills. This skill-updgrading is signicant and small, and therefore cannot
provide a full explanation on the observed decrease in the acquisition cost. In Section 2.6.4.2, I
also include robust empirical evidence that shows that the di¢ culty of the problems changed not
only for a specic set of issues but for all of them.
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The empirical shift in the density function presented above can be seen in my
model as follows. DenoteB, for the situation before the OGA andA for the situation
after the shock. Figure 2.4 shows two examples in which the easy problems (to the
left of the intersection of the curves fA and fB) become less common and the more
di¢ cult problems (to the right of the intersection of the curves fA and fB) become
more common. Both graphs include the case in which the knowledge-acquiring cost
technology is at the level after the Act. There are two relevant situations. First, if
the densities cut above the cost, the rm boundary shifts to the right. However, if
these densities cut below the cost, the rm boundary moves to the left.
Change in the Cost: Technological Shock Figure 2.5 represents a decrease in
the cost of acquiring knowledge. If this cost decreases, the rm boundary moves to
the right while if the cost of acquiring knowledge increases, the rm boundary shifts
to the left. The change in the observed cost can be due to a change in the technology
that facilitates the acquisition of knowledge. As mentioned above, one of the main
changes brought by the Act, was to make all the lobbying reports available on the
internet within two days of the reporting activity. This change decreased the cost
of accessing relevant information. The interpretation for this change is simple. As
the technology complements in-house lobbyists and external service providers are
time constrained, the technological shock shifted the decision making to be made
within the rm as opposed to the external market. This is an empowering e¤ect of
technologies that facilitate the acquisition of knowledge.
So at this stage we know that there was an increase in the integration patterns
and a change in the density functions. We also know that there seems to be a
change in the cost technology. However, it is not clear to what extent each of these
components, density and cost of acquiring skills changes, help us to understand
the total change in integration patterns. Clearly, the path to follow is to have an
estimate of the cost technology. In order to recover these costs, I will use the set of
three equations characterizing the equilibrium in the economy. For the rest of the
section, I will assume the knowledge requirements of the problems are distributed
exponentially. Below, I will discuss on the robustness of this assumption.
2.4 The E¤ect of the Open Government Act
In this section, I provide maximum likelihood estimations results and using my theo-
retical framework, I explain how and why the OGA a¤ected the vertical integration
patterns of the economy. Then, I present the main results of the counterfactual
exercises and a discussion of the robustness in my estimations. I nish this section
by presenting a discussion on alternative explanations.
110
2.4.1 Estimation
2.4.1.1 Setting the Problem
The main results of the structural estimations will be for the case in which the CDF
is the exponential function F (z) = 1 e z. Here I present the main results for this
case but in section 2.4.1.4, I discuss the general applicability of this assumption.
In the case of only one issue and zB  Exp (B), the solution of the model is as
follows. The rm boundary is given by zB =   1B ln(
cB
B
) while the market boundary
is given by zB =   1B ln(
c2BhB
2B
).116 The earnings for in-house lobbyists are cBzB and
for external lobbyists nB

cB
nB

zB : Clearly, external lobbyists earn more as they
acquire a larger amount of issue-specic skills in equilibrium.
Remark. As the rm boundary (i.e. zB) is a decreasing function in the cost of
acquiring knowledge cB (i.e.
@zB
@cB
< 0), the total number of clients using
in-house lobbyists (i.e. MB
(B cB)
B
) increases when the cost cB decreases.
Finally, the fraction of vertically integrated clients is given by:
V IB =
nB (B   cB)
nBB   cB
This fraction is increasing (decreasing) in the communication costs hB (acqui-
sition cost cB) and it can be increasing or decreasing in B.117 Finally, the total
number of internal clients IB, total number of external clients EB, and the time
constraint of the external lobbyists, characterize the equilibrium in the economy:
MB
f 1B (cB)Z
0
fB(x)dx= IB =
MB
B
(B   cB)
MB
f 1B

cB
nB
Z
f 1B (cB)
fB(x)dx=EB =
MBcB
B

1  1
nB

 
1  FB(f 1B (cB))

hB =
1
nB
=
cBhB
B
As there is not a clear way to aggregate the industry knowledge of the economy
h, I have decided to back it out from the equations. However, when I calculate
the parameters assuming that industry knowledge is the average number of words
regulating all the lobbying industries, the main results do not change.
116I include the restrictions B > cB and 
2
B > c
2
BhB , to ensure that z

B ; z

B > 0.
117The fraction is decreasing in the communication costs as hB / n 1.
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2.4.1.2 Estimation
In the system mentioned above, I can infer IB, EB and nB from the data by taking
the average of each variable across the three semesters prior to the OGA.118119 How-
ever, there are four unknowns: B; cB; hB andMB.120As I need an additional degree
of freedom to be able to solve the system, I calculate B by maximum likelihood,
and then solve the system analytically. Here, I use all of the congressional hear-
ings with available information on witnesses three semesters before the OGA. For a
congressional hearing i in period B (before OGA), I measure zi;B with the fraction
of witnesses with high knowledge. Alternative ways to measure the skill variable
with a more comprehensive index do not qualitatively change the results presented
in this section. Assuming independent and identically distributed observations, the
likelihood function is:
fB(z1;B; z2;B; :::; zO;BjB) =
OBY
i=1
f(zi;BjB) = L (BjzB) =
OBY
i=1
Be
 Bzi;B
where OB is the total number of observations before the OGA.With the estimate
of B, I get an estimate of the other unknowns in the system. In particular, the
system can be re-written as follows:121
cB =
bBEBnB
nB (EB + IB)  IB , hB =
bB
nBcB
and MB =
bBIBbB   cB
I follow this methodology for both the periods before and after the OGA. Table
2.1 shows the input variables used, the estimated coe¢ cients bB and the estimated
unknowns.122 The top panel in the table shows the main inputs of the exercise. The
fraction of vertically integrated clients increases by 1%, which is about 7% of the
fraction before the OGA. Although there is an increase in the total number of both
external and internal clients, the latter variable increases by about three times as
much as the former.
The estimated coe¢ cient for the parameter of the distribution before the OGA
118The leverage nB is simply the average ratio of the total number of external clients over the
total number of external lobbyists.
119This system needs to impose the restriction that: B > cB : Notice that if B > cB , IB is
positive, and given that hB 2 (0; 1), 1nB < 1 by the time constraint. This, in turn, implies that
EB is positive.
120MB cannot be confused with the total number of rms in the economy. The right inter-
pretation of this parameter is the number of rms willing to lobby. I have decided to abstract
from the decision of whether or not to lobby, as several papers, such as Salamon and Siegfried
(1977), Bombardini (2008) and Kerr et al. (2014), have studied this problem, and I think that
this additional feature does not add content to the main insights I am studying.
121Notice that the original constraint B > cB implies B > BEBnBnB(EB+IB) IB ; which is true as far
as IB (nB   1) > 0. Therefore, as far as nB > 1, B > cB , B > cBhB and MB ; cB ; hB > 0.
122Notice that in this system, cB = B K, where K is EBnBnB(EB+IB) IB . Then, hB andMB have a
unique value for di¤erent 0Bs: That is, MB =
BIB
B cB =
BIB
B BK =
IB
1 K and hB =
B
nBcB
= 1nBK .
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is 1.14, and after the OGA it is 0.91. This shows a decrease in the estimated pa-
rameter of about 20%. Notice that this has a simple interpretation in terms of the
rst moment of the distribution. The mean of the distribution in the case of expo-
nentially distributed observations is equal to 1

. As bA < bB, the average knowledge
requirements after the OGA are larger than the average of these requirements be-
fore the OGA. As larger knowledge requirements are associated with more di¢ cult
advocacy activities, a decrease in  supports the statement of the lobbyists that the
di¢ culty of their lobbying activities increased.
The estimated cost of acquiring knowledge c decreases by 20%. This is one
of the main ndings of the section and provides evidence on the e¤ect of the use
of internet on the reporting of the lobbying activities. While the coe¢ cient for
industry-specic knowledge h, and the total number of (potential) clients M also
change, they do not seem to be large. The estimation shows that the communication
cost only decreased by 0.04 percentage points. This small decrease does not seem
signicant and presents evidence that the OGA did not modify the communication
cost. On the other hand, we observe a slight increase in the total number of clients
in the industry of about 4.7%. Decomposing this number we observe that most of
the new clients start using in-house rather than external lobbyists.
A nal theoretical prediction is also tested in this exercise. A decrease in the
cost of acquiring knowledge empowers in-house sta¤. This makes it less likely that
rms with in-house lobbyists will outsource. As external lobbyists have also become
smarter and their time constraint is not binding (due to the decrease in demand from
clients that now can pay an in-house sta¤), they adjust in equilibrium by working
for more clients. Therefore, a decrease in the cost of acquiring issue-specic skills
increase the leverage of the external lobbyists. This leverage was about 2.33 before
the OGA and it became 2.36 after the OGA. So, we see an increase in this variable,
just as the theory predicts, however not a very signicant one. The reason for
this small change is that the OGA also changed the density of the problems in the
economy. The span of control is increasing in the rate of the exponential function
. As some channels were closed, the activities became harder, and therefore, we
observe a decrease in , with the consequent e¤ect on the decrease in the leverage
of the economy. In section 2.4.1.3, I conduct counterfactual exercises examining the
e¤ect of the technological shock on the leverage of the economy, holding constant
the di¢ culty level of the problems faced by the rms in the economy.
Knowledge Inequality I include an empirical estimate of the knowledge inequal-
ity measure, that is the ratio of the maximum level of issue-specic skills achieved
in the external market over the maximum level of this type of skills for in-house
sta¤. Mathematically, for the period before the OGA, this is represented by the
following ratio z

B
zB
= ln(
c2BhB
2B
)= ln( cB
B
). Theoretically, the total earnings for inter-
nal and external providers are given by wIBz

B and nBw
E
Bz

B , respectively, where
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wIB = nBw
E
B = cB. This implies that the ratio
zB
zB
is a representation of both the
di¤erence in the issue-specic skills and earnings levels between the market and rm
boundaries. Table 2.1 shows a decrease in the knowledge inequality in the economy.
Decomposing the change of this fraction by the numerator and denominator shows
that the market boundary increases by 1.8%, whereas the rm boundary increases
by 8.5%. That is most of the change in the inequality measures are due to a larger
set of issue-specic skills from in-house sta¤.
All of the exercises presented in this section are for two periods, before and
after OGA. Alternatively, I have conducted these estimations for each year of my
database. Figure 2.6 shows the results of the evolving knowledge inequality of the
economy for the period 1999 to 2014. The gure shows an increasing pattern in the
inequality until 2007 and since then, a decreasing pattern.
Decomposing the E¤ect Using these recovered unknowns, one can decompose
the exact contribution of each of the parameters in the total change of the fraction
of vertically integrated clients. The total change of this fraction can be decomposed
as:
dV It =
@V IB
@B
dt| {z }
Demand
+
@V IB
@cB
dct| {z }
Supply=Acquiring Costs
+
@V IB
@hB
dht| {z }
Industry-S. Knowledge
where @V IB
@xB
is the change evaluated with the parameter estimates before the
OGA, xB = B; cB or hB and dxt  xA   xB.123 Table 2.2 shows the percentage
contribution of each of these components: demand, costs and communication costs.
I estimate each of these contributions for the case in which I use the estimated
coe¢ cient b and both its lower and upper limits. The table shows that the industry-
specic knowledge does not contribute signicantly to explaining the total change
in the integration patterns of the industry.124 This result is conrmed when I use
the RegData to proxy for industry-specic knowledge. Table 2.2 shows that about
a half of the change around the OGA is explained by a demand shift and about
half by a change in the costs c. Overall, these results conrm the relevance of the
channel of the frequency of problems but emphasize the importance of supply-shift
channels that can explain the vertical integration patterns.
To sum up, the following interpretation is consistent with the results provided
here. The Act closed lobbying channels and decreased the cost of acquiring knowl-
123These derivatives are @V IB@B =
cB(2B 2cBhBB+hBc2B)
(2B c2BhB)
2 , @V IB@cB =  
B(hBc2B 2cBhBB+2B)
(c2BhB 2B)
2 and
@V IB
@hB
=
B(B cB)c2B
(2B c2BhB)
2 .
124I run ht = 0+ 1t+ ", where ht is the Industry-specic knowledge measure at the two-digit
levels proxied with the RegData. In order to construct it, I have taken the average number of
regulating words across all industries. The period used is 1999-2014. The predicted errors show
a small decrease in the industry knowledge measure between 2006 and 2008. This supports the
fact that the calculated h in Table 14 decreases, but not signicantly. Results are available upon
request. These patterns are robust to the use of any NAICS codes industry denition.
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edge. The closed lobbying channels made the lobbying activities more knowledge-
intensive as politicians needed to rely more heavily on congressional hearing wit-
nesses to acquire knowledge. This is conrmed by Figure 2.2 and theoretically this
translates into a change in the density of the problems. The Act also decreased the
cost of acquiring knowledge as a new technology to acquire relevant information for
advocacy activities was implemented. As a consequence, given that the distribution
of problems shifted and the technology of reporting decreased the cost of acquiring
knowledge, the OGA caused an increase in the fraction of clients using in-house
lobbyists.
An advantage of using structural methodologies is that once one recovers the
underlying parameters of the economy, one can conduct counterfactual exercises.
In the next subsection, I exploit the information on the recovered parameters.
2.4.1.3 Counterfactual Exercises
For simplicity, I call the change in the distribution, the di¢ culty e¤ect and the
change in the estimated cost of acquiring issue-specic skills, the technology e¤ect.
Here, I answer two simple questions. First, what would have been the main out-
comes for the economy if the distributions of the problems had not changed and if
there had been a change in the cost of acquiring knowledge. That is, what happens
if one observes only the technology e¤ect. Second, assuming that the cost tech-
nology had remained constant, what would have happened if one had observed a
change in the density of problems. That is, what happens if one observes only the
di¢ culty e¤ect. For all of these analyses, I assume that the industry-knowledge
measure remains at the level before the OGA.
Figure 2.7 provides a useful way to see the logic behind the counterfactual exer-
cises. The graph represents, for each period before and after, the density function of
problems and the cost of acquiring knowledge. There are four intersections between
the density functions and the costs of acquiring knowledge, each of which represents
a di¤erent rm boundary level. Point (1) represents the intersection that denes the
rm boundary before the OGA and point (4) the intersection dening the bound-
ary after the OGA. Point (2) holds xed the density function of problems before
the OGA but changes the cost of acquiring knowledge from cB to cA. Point (3)
represents the intersection of the acquiring cost technology before the OGA (i.e.,
cB) with the density function of problems after the OGA (i.e., fA). The rst coun-
terfactual exercise aims to see the changes brought about by the technology e¤ect,
which is represented by the changes due to a movement between points (1) and
(2). The second counterfactual exercise analyzes the change due to the di¢ culty
e¤ect-that is, changes brought about by moving from point (1) to point (3).
For these exercises, I focus on three objects: fraction of vertically integrated
clients, I=(E + I); leverage in the economy n; and z

z ; which is a measure of
both knowledge and earnings inequality. For the exponential case, the leverage in
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the economy is increasing in the rate  and decreasing in the cost technology c.
However, the e¤ect of a change in the cost c or the density function parameter
 in the fraction of integrated clients and the knowledge inequality is not trivial.
For instance, the technology e¤ect increases the number of internal clients, but it
can increase or decrease the number of external clients. The e¤ect on the internal
clients is due to the fact that it is now less costly to have in-house sta¤, and, as a
consequence, the rm boundary shifts to the right.
For the case of the external market, there are two countervailing e¤ects. On
the one hand, it is less costly to acquire knowledge for all service providers. This
e¤ect will move the market boundary to the right, and the fraction of clients that
used to leave their problems unsolved but now use external service providers is
given by F (zA )  F (zB ). On the other hand, in-house service providers can solve
problems for more clients; therefore, external service providers will see decreased
demand due to clients that have in-house lobbyists. This area is represented by
F (zA)  F (zB); and, therefore, the total fraction of external clients will change by
F (zA )  F (zB )  [F (zA)  F (zB)], which is not always positive.125
Table 2.3 shows the main results of these counterfactual exercises. The technol-
ogy e¤ect increases the fraction of vertically integrated clients and the leverage of
the economy, and decreases the knowledge and earnings inequality measures. On
the other hand, the di¢ culty e¤ect decreases both the fraction of integrated clients
and the leverage of the economy, and increases the knowledge inequality in the
economy.
The technology e¤ect increases the fraction of vertically integrated clients from
14.8% to 36.8%, an increase in 150%. Intuitively, the decrease in the calculated
cost of acquiring issue-specic skills changes the rm boundary and makes external
service providers less likely to face problems. As a consequence, the time constraint
is relaxed, and the service providers can work with more clients. Conrming this
logic, Table 2.3 shows that the leverage increases by 26%. Finally, a decrease in the
cost c increases both the market and rm boundaries, and, depending on the specic
parameters, the knowledge inequality in the economy can increase or decrease. In
this case, it decreases because the e¤ect on the rm boundary is larger than the
e¤ect on the market boundary.
If the parameter of the distribution of problems decreases from 1.14 to 1.07, the
fraction of vertically integrated clients decreases from 14.8 to 6.13, a decrease of 59%.
For this combination of values, the density functions cut below both costs cB and cA.
As a consequence, the decrease in the rate , shrinks the rm boundary. This means
that external service providers are more likely to receive problems from clients.
Given the time constraint, the increase in the probability of receiving problems,
125This fraction is equal to cA
2A
(A   cAhA)   cB2B (B   cBhB) ; and it is not clear whether or
not this expression is positive, as it depends on the specic values of the parameters of c; h and
 before and after the OGA.
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decreases the number of clients that external service providers have.
2.4.1.4 Robustness in the estimations
One may wonder to what extent the main results from these exercises depend on
the assumption of the exponential distribution and, more generally, on assuming
a specic functional form. I conduct two exercises to alleviate these concerns: 1)
I change the functional form assumption; and 2) I estimate the parameters of the
model by non-parametric methods.
First, I run the same exercises when the problems are distributed according to a
Pareto distribution. This distribution is an ideal candidate as its density function
is strictly decreasing as assumed in the theoretical framework. In this case, the
density function f (z) is given by z

m
z+1
with parameters ; zm > 0, where zm is the
minimum possible value of z. Using maximum likelihood estimation, I recover the
parameters to conduct similar exercises as above.
I calculate the contribution of demand, supply and industry-specic channels
on the change in the vertical integration patterns, and I nd that the cost compo-
nent change explains between 55% and 60% of the change in the patterns. I also
conduct the counterfactual exercises on the technology and di¢ culty e¤ects and get
similar conclusions. In particular, the technology e¤ect increases the integration
patterns twofold, increases the leverage, and decreases the knowledge inequality in
the economy. On the other hand, keeping the value of the cost technology constant
a decrease in the parameter  (di¢ culty e¤ect) decreases the vertical integration in
the economy.126To sum up, the use of the Pareto distribution provides qualitatively
similar results.
I also conduct a simple non-parametric exercise. The estimation here is more
challenging, and I focus only on recovering an estimate of the cost of acquiring
issue-specic skills. The idea is summarized as follows. The fraction of vertically
integrated clients before the OGA is given by
FB(zB)
FB(zB )
=
FB(f 1B (cB))
FB

f 1B

cB
nB
 . As I observe
a set of zB, I can construct the density fB (zB) by kernel methods. Once I have
constructed this density, I can have an estimate of the inverse density f 1B (zB)
using the inverse transform method. Then, I construct F (f 1B (x)) by dening
F (x) = 1
oB
X
1 fzB  xg, where oB is the total number of observations before
the OGA and 1 fzB  xg is an indicator function. Finally, I nd cB by solving
FB(x)
FB

x
nB
   IB
(EB+IB)
= 0 for x. I follow this methodology also for the period after
the OGA and nd two main results. The calculated density functions and the
costs of acquiring knowledge di¤er before and after the OGA. In particular, the
126Notice that a decrease in  for the Pareto distribution is similar to a decrease in  for the
exponential function, as in both cases, the cut with the y-axis (i.e. Pr(Z = z)) is increasing in
the value of the parameter. A decrease in both parameters imply that easy activities became
less common and more di¢ cult activities became more common. Furthermore, the mean value of
the Pareto distribution is decreasing in . This implies that a decrease in  increases the mean
knowledge requirements of the lobbying activities.
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cost decreases, and the density functions cut below both estimated costs. These
exercises conrm the robustness of the main results obtained for the case in which
problems are distributed exponentially.
In this section, I have focused on the e¤ect of closing lobbying channels and tech-
nological shocks on integration patterns in the industry. Potentially, the observed
integration patterns can also be explained by the 2008 Financial crisis, alternative
theoretical mechanisms or simply, by other regulations of the OGA not related to
knowledge-requirement changes. Next section presents evidence that all of these
considerations do not seem to play a key role in explaining the empirical patterns
outlined here.
2.4.2 Alternative Explanations
In this section, I discuss alternative explanations to the change in the vertical in-
tegration patterns circa 2007. I start by presenting empirical evidence supporting
the view that the Financial crisis did not have a strong e¤ect on the integration
patterns. Then, I discuss alternative ways to interpret the technological shock of
the OGA as well as the possible e¤ects of additional regulation changes brought by
the Act.
2.4.2.1 2007-2008 Crisis
The timing of the OGA coincides with the Financial Crisis. In this section I argue
this is not a key determinant to explain the change in vertical integration patterns.
First, according to Figures 1.13 from Chapter 1, there are not changes in integration
patterns for other Professional Business Services occupations aside from lobbyists
around the OGA. Second, Knudsen and Foss (2014) show that rms in Norway
started outsourcing more non-core activities since 2007 due the economic recession.
The idea is that the Crisis decreased the demand for all the rms, which in turn
decreased the frequency of needed non-core activities transactions. Therefore, the
probability of outsourcing increased. As advocacy is considered an ancillary activity,
Knudsen and Foss (2014) predict a decrease in the fraction of vertically integrated
clients. This means that if the Crisis has an e¤ect on the lobbyists integration
patterns it will be the opposite to the one I see around the OGA in gure 2.1.
To add to this preliminary evidence, I explore whether demand or supply shocks
a¤ect the vertical integration patterns in the lobbying industry. Similar to Moreira
(2016) and based on the Bureau of Economic Analysis data, I construct economic
shocks at the industry-year level using supply chain information to capture the
variation in demand from downstream buyers. I proceed as follows: 1. I construct
an annual industry by industry sales matrix using the Use and Make input-output
tables.127 2. I construct shocks for each industry in each year using the annual
127This matrix gives me information on total sales of the industry discriminated by buying
(demanding) industry. The Make-table has dimensions industries-commodities and the Use-table
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industry-specic nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as the primary business
cycle indicator.128 To calculate the shocks I apply the Hodrick-Prescott lter using a
smoothing parameter of 6.25.129 I capture industry-specic shocks as the deviation
of the real GDP from its trend. 3. I construct a weighted average (by percentage
of sales) of demand shocks for industry n simply aggregating the shocks for all the
industries that industry n sells in a given year t (i.e. snt). Then, I estimate the
following equations:
V Iijnt = j + t + zsnt + "ijnt
frjnt = j + t + zsnt + "jnt
The key independent variable of this exercise is snt. This is a demand shock
received by the n-th industry at t-th period. A negative and signicant z suggests
that a positive shock in demand faced by rms from j-th industry decreases the level
of vertical integration of j-th industry. As the Financial crisis can be interpreted
as a negative demand shock, a negative coe¢ cient z < 0 can explain the change
in the vertical integration patterns around 2007.
I also use two additional shocks. First, I consider the case where there is only a
shock to the industry (supply shock). Second, I include a shock that include both
the demand and the supply shocks (economy shock). For each of these variables,
I calculate the independent variable in terms of levels, lags, logarithmic levels and
lag of the logarithmic level. The main result from these exercises is that none
of these economic shocks are statistically di¤erent from 0. That is, I do not nd
empirical evidence that neither demand, supply or economy shocks modify the
vertical integration patterns of the lobbying industry. Therefore, it is hard to argue
that the Crisis a¤ected the integration patterns around the OGA. All these results
are available upon request.130
2.4.2.2 Alternative Mechanisms: Monitoring Costs
One channel that can explain vertical integration patterns is monitoring costs.
When rms require monitoring of the activities of their sta¤, vertical integration
has dimensions commodities-industries. In order to get the symmetric industry-industry matrix,
I normalize the Make-table by the total of each column and then I multiply it by the Use-table.
128I deate it with industry-specic producer prices at 2009 prices.
129For these estimations I deate the nominal GDP with industry-specic producer prices at
2009 prices. The smoothing parameter has been chosen following Ravn and Uhlig (2002).
130Intuitively, one can rationalize this result as follows. A negative economic shock to clients
increase the probability of outsourcing for ancillary activities as the demand for their products have
decreased. On the other hand, the negative shock increase the frequency of lobbying activities,
as policy advocacy seems to be a way to overcome negative economic shocks. Consequently the
probability of outsourcing lobbyists decreases. Therefore, the non-signicant e¤ect of the Crisis
over the lobbying integration patterns can be rationalized if the latter e¤ect is compensated with
the former one.
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can be a solution for situations characterized by costly monitoring. For instance, as
discussed in Williamson (1975), governance (integration) provides the opportunity
for rms to monitor more accurately and economically their employees. The advan-
tage that governance o¤ers is attenuated or inexistent in the external market. A
direct implication from this framework is that a decrease in the cost of monitoring,
will increase outsourcing as the relative value of in-house sta¤ has decreased. That
is, if one of the main advantages of having someone in-house is to reduce monitoring
costs, when these costs are reduced, some rms that were in the margin (indi¤erent
between in-house and external advocate) should be more prone to outsource the
service.
A possible way to interpret the technological shock brought by the OGA is
a decrease in the rmsmonitoring costs. The Act facilitate rms to not only
observe what their lobbyists were doing but also, and more importantly, what other
lobbyists working for rms with similar interests were doing. Therefore, for a rm
that can see the performance of lobbyists working for other organizations, it is
easier to detect, for instance, moral hazard due to information asymmetry with
their employees. If this is the right interpretation, we would expect to see that the
Act produced an increase in the outsourcing of the economy. Clearly, Figure 2.1
provides evidence against this intuition as it is clear that the level of integration in
the economy increased rather than decreased once the Act took place. Therefore,
even if monitoring costs are important in this industry, it does not seem correct to
interpret the OGA as a technological upgrade that reduced the costs associated to
monitoring the activities of the lobbyists.
2.4.2.3 Other Changes brought by the OGA
Change in Mandatory reports Before the OGA, rms had to report lobbying
activities if they were spending at least 10.000 US dollars per semester. As the
frequency of the reports changed since OGA and rms have to make reports every
quarter, the cut-o¤ spending level also changed. Since the rst semester of 2008,
rms have to report lobbying activities if they spend at least 5.000 US dollars per
quarter.
If a rm spends any amount between $5.000 and $10.000 before and after the
OGA in a quarter, the database would show the client was not conducting lobbying
activities before the OGA and started doing it after the OGA. Furthermore, if these
clients were conducting in-house activities, the change in the mandatory reports can
explain the increase in vertical integration in the industry. In Table 4, I provide ev-
idence that this does not seem to be the case. I show that among all the clients that
started lobbying once the OGA took e¤ect, less than 5% of the clients had expen-
ditures close to $10.000 (up to 20.000). Clearly, there is an additional alternative
in which clients were spending less than $10.000 before OGA and since OGA took
e¤ect, they started spending more than $10.000. This makes sense if rms feel that
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once they are engaged in public reporting, they have incurred the lobbying stigma
cost (independent of the actual lobbying expenditure) and as a consequence they
may want to increase the lobbying returns by increasing the lobbying expenditures.
Although the data does not allow me to reject this possibility, private interviews
with lobbyists and interest groups strongly reject this alternative.131
Reporting Incentives Fines for compliance failure increased with the OGA.
This change may a¤ect the incentives to hide lobbying activities. If it is more likely
that clients with in-house lobbyists hide their activities, an increase in compliance
failures punishment will raise the total number of clients reporting in-house ac-
tivities. Then, an increase in the observed fraction of vertically integrated clients
follow. A possible reason to hide lobbying activities is to avoid sharing sensitive
information. For instance, using information of 150 lobbying contacts at the Federal
Communications Commission, de Figueiredo and Kim (2004) argue that rms tend
to use in-house lobbyists for rm-specic topics prone to sensitive-information leak-
age.132 Sensitive information can be production secrets, corruption issues and so
on. Due to the lack of data it is hard to know to what extent sensitive information
leakages is a relevant force to explain integration patterns. However, I provide two
arguments supported by personal interviews with lobbyists that suggest that this
is not a rst-order factor to explain the change in the integration patterns around
the OGA.
First, there are di¤erential legal privileges to protect information when rms
use in-house or external sta¤. Attorney-client privilege is a legal concept that keeps
condential the information exchanged between clients and attorneys. This concept
applies more commonly in the external rather than the internal market. That is, in
the former there is an o¢ cial relationship between the two entities that benet from
this privilege. However, the internal market is characterized by a situation where
the attorney is not an entity but just an employee, and therefore the privilege does
not always apply. Therefore, from a legal point of view, clients will prefer external
sta¤ to benet from the privilege.
Second, the demand from external lobbyists depends on their ability to pro-
tect sensitive information from their clients. For instance, Demski et al. (1999)
argue that rms related to banking, accounting, consulting, and legal services tend
131In addition, one can focus on the rms that were lobbying both before and after the Act. I
nd that among the switcher rms (rms that were only using in-house (external) lobbyists and
after the Act start using only external (in-house) lobbyists) 90% went from using only external
lobbyists to only using in-house lobbyists, whereas 10% went from only in-house lobbyists to
external lobbyists. Similar percentages appear when I allow di¤erent ways to dene switching
rms. Interestingly, the absolute value of switchers going from the external to the internal market
(immediately the Act took e¤ect) is signicantly larger than the number of this type of shifters
for any other period.
132Anderson (1985) argue that large appropriation hazards are associated with a higher prob-
ability of integration. A general problem with this literature is that it leaves unexplained why
integration does a better job of restoring e¢ ciency than an outsourcing contract.
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to process proprietary information which their clients wish to protect. As a con-
sequence, the rms ability to safeguard and manage information determines its
demand. Then, if a client wants to keep sensitive information secret they can do
it with external sta¤. As a matter of fact, anecdotal evidence shows that sensitive
information leakage tends to be more common among employees or former ones
rather than external service providers.133 That is, protecting information may be
more e¤ective in the external than in the internal market.
There may be one argument that I cannot totally reject given the available data.
There may be some clients that think that the cost of public lobbying reporting
is high. However, as there are benets from the lobbying activity, these clients
will lobby without reporting it. If the nes for compliance failure increase, the
expected cost of hiding increases and therefore it will be more likely that clients start
reporting. If it is more di¢ cult to lobby and not publicly report with external than
internal lobbyists, the change in the nes brought by the OGA could have increased
the observed fraction of internal clients. Personal interviews with both internal and
external lobbyists, in particular with some that started lobbying around the OGA
show that this is not the case. They think the cost of public lobbying reporting
is very low as the advocacy activities are protected by the First Amendment of
the US constitution.134 They argue that is unlikely that clients will avoid lobbying
just for this stigma cost, and in fact, they think that the expected cost (nes and
probability of detection) of hiding public reporting is larger than the cost associated
to the stigma of lobbying.
A nal comment on the di¤erences of hiding technologies between in-house and
external sta¤. The OGA made it the responsibility of the US Government Ac-
countability O¢ ce (henceforth GAO) to determine the extent to which lobbyists
can demonstrate compliance with disclosure requirements.135 The o¢ ce releases
yearly reports summarizing the main ndings about compliance for a stratied ran-
dom sample of 100 lobbying reports. I have been through all of these reports to
correlate non-compliance patterns with lobbyists integration status.
The GAO reports release information about the specic lobbyists and clients
133See for instance, Rajan and Zingales (2001), Zabojnik (2002), Baccara and Razin (2007),
and Baccara and Bar-Isaac (2008). These papers study the case where either rms em-
ployees or former ones leak crucial information outside the rm. Anecdotically, see the case
of Chelsea Manning (former US Army soldier) leaking sensitive military information to Wik-
iLeaks, Mark Felt (former FBI special agent) leaking information about the Watergate scan-
dal and Sky company employee leaking customer data to a rival rm (http://www.information-
age.com/technology/security/2129443/sky-employee-leaked-customer-data) I acknowledge this is
not proof that employees are more likely to leak information than external contractors as this
result may be due to selection. For instance, rms may share the sensitive information only with
employees. Therefore, leakages cannot come from external providers.
134The Amendment does not call it lobby but "to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances". The point is that what is a grievance is a matter of debate and rms can always
argue over this right using almost any goal they have.
135For more information about GAO, see https://www.gao.gov/about/index.html.
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under investigation. I have matched all of the names of lobbyists with its integration
status at the time of investigation. In results not presented here, I show that both in-
house and external lobbyists have been caught under non-compliance cases. Neither
group has a noticeably larger fraction of non-compliant lobbyists. A natural way to
interpret this nding is that the technologies that lobbyists have to hide information
do not di¤er by the market (internal vs external) they are in. As a consequence,
the integration decision should not respond to the demand of hiding information.
To sum up, the change in the integration patterns can be explained through
an increase in nes for non-compliance or hiding activities, if it is more likely that
clients use in-house lobbyists when they want to hide sensitive information. I rst
provide two arguments to explain why rms would like to use external rather than
internal lobbyists when they want to hide information. Second, I provide suggestive
empirical evidence that the hiding technology of in-house lobbyists is not better than
external lobbyists. Therefore, given the arguments provided here, it is di¢ cult to
argue that the change in the incentives to report can explain the observed, big shift
in the integration patterns around 2007.
2.5 Final Discussion
The aim of this chapter has been to understand the way technological change a¤ects
the vertical integration decision when rms need to solve problems that can only
be tackled by service providers. The central point this chapter wants to make is
that there are at least two di¤erent types of technological change that have deeply
di¤erent e¤ects on the knowledge economy in general, and the integration decision,
in particular.
Technological shocks that decrease the cost of acquiring skills empower in-house
sta¤and therefore decreases outsourcing in the economy. On the other hand, shocks
that facilitate the transmission of rm-specic skills decrease the comparative ad-
vantage that in-house sta¤ have and therefore increase outsourcing. To the best of
my knowledge, the impact of these two types of technologies on the integration of
the economy has not been analyzed before. Luis Garicano has been a pioneer in the
discussion on the distinctive e¤ects of these two types of technologies. This chapter
borrows from his ideas and provides an empirical setting to test predictions on the
e¤ect of changes in the acquisition cost on integration patterns.
I have found strong evidence supporting the claim that the policy change studied
in this chapter decreased the cost of acquiring issue-specic skills and that this
could explain the strong increase in integration patterns in the economy. The
exercises developed in this chapter use equilibrium conditions for the case of only
one issue. Extending this methodology to the case of multiple issues seems very
challenging. The main problem consists in that the burden of the estimations would
be very large because I need to make inferences on the actual (and not observed)
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complementarities across issues and I would need to include in the calculations the
potential number of generalists and specialists in each market. I aim to consider
these extensions in the future and I include a short discussion of some empirical
patterns for several issues in section 2.6.4.2.
Abstracting from the current application, the analysis underscores the potential
of non-incentive integration theories to explain the e¤ect of technology change in
the way the rms use knowledge workers. Here I have provided a simple setting
to study these e¤ects but I have not provided empirical evidence on the way that
changes in communication costs a¤ect integration patterns. A natural sequel of this
chapter would be an empirical study of an event in which the cost of transmitting
rm-specic skills has been modied, and to test, whether this has any implications
for the integration decision.
124
2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Regulation in the OGA
The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 is a law that amended
parts of the LDA of 1995. To follow, there is a summary of the main changes that
the bill introduced:
 Increase the cooling o¤ period for Senators from one to two years before they
can lobby Congress.
 Prohibits Cabinet Secretaries and other very senior executive personnel from
lobbying the department or agency in which they worked for two years after
they leave the position.
 Prohibits senior Senate sta¤ and Senate o¢ cers from lobbying contacts with
the entire Senate for one year, instead of just their former employing o¢ ce.
 Prohibits senior House sta¤ from lobbying their former o¢ ce or Committee
for one year after they leave House employment.
 Prohibits lobbyists from providing gifts or travel to Members of Congress.
 Prohibits Members and their sta¤ from inuencing hiring decisions of private
organizations on the sole basis of partisan political gain ( imprisonment for
up to 15 years).
 Requires lobbyist disclosure lings to be led twice as often.
 Increases civil penalty for knowing and willful violations of the Lobby Disclo-
sure Act from $50,000 to $200,000 and imposes a criminal penalty of up to
ve years for knowing and corrupt failure to comply with the Act.
 Denies Congressional retirement benets to Members of Congress who are
convicted of bribery or other related crimes.
 Requires that candidates, other than those running for a seat in the House,
pay the fair market value of airfare (charter rates) when using non-commercial
jets to travel.
 Increases the penalty for Members of Congress, Senior Sta¤ and Senior Exec-
utive o¢ cials for falsifying or failing to report nancial disclosure forms from
$10,000 to $50,000 and establishes criminal penalties of up to one year of
imprisonment.
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 Requires the disclosure of businesses or organizations that con-
tribute more than $5,000 per quarter and actively participate in
lobbying activities by certain coalitions and associations.136
 Requires that travel by members nanced by outside groups be posted on a
searchable, sortable and downloadable website by August 1, 2008.
 Prohibits Members from attending parties held in their honor at national
party conventions if they have been sponsored by lobbyists.
 Prohibits Members from engaging in any agreements or negotiations about
future employment until a successor has been selected.
 Requires that Members prohibit their sta¤ from having any lobbying contact
with the Members spouse if such individual is a registered lobbyist or is
employed or retained by a registered lobbyist to inuence legislation.
 Revokes oor privileges and the use of the Membersexercise facilities and
parking for former Senators, former Secretaries of the Senate, former Sergeants
at Arms of the Senate and former Speakers of the House who are registered
lobbyists.
136The cut-o¤ before was 10.000 per semester. Therefore, there is not a change in the semester
total amount cut-o¤.
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2.6.2 Tables
Variable Before After % Change
External Clients (E) 11207.3 11709 4.5
Internal Clients ( I) 1952 2208 13.1
Total Clients (E + I) 13159.3 13917.6 5.8
Fraction VI ( I=(E + I)) 14.83 15.87 7
Estimated Coe¢ cient (b) 1.1413 0.913 -20
Lower Limit (95%) 1.0949 0.8749 -20.1
Upper Limit (95%) 1.1908 0.9535 19.9
Cost ( c) 1.0380 0.8237 -20.6
Lower Limit (95%) 0.9958 0.7893 -20.7
Upper Limit (95%) 1.0831 0.8602 -20.6
Industry-Knowledge (h) 0.4718 0.4716 -0.04
M 21585.84 22590.93 4.7
Knowledge Inequality (z

z ) 9.92 9.3 -6.2
Table 2.1: Input and Output of the Structural Estimation.
Note: The top panel shows the main inputs of the exercise and the bottom panel shows the outputs. External
clients represent the total number of clients that never use in-house lobbyists. Internal clients represent the total
number of clients using in-house lobbyists. The rate parameter of the distribution is calculated by Maximum
Likelihood. The table reports the point estimate and the calculated value one standard deviation above and one
standard deviation below the point estimate. With these estimates and using the system of equations, the table
reports the estimated values for the cost of acquiring knowledge, the industry-specic knowledge, the total
number of potential clients (M) and the knowledge inequality of the economy.
Contribution of each component in the change of VI
Demand Supply Industry-Knowledge
Estimated Coe¢ cient 46.98 52.96 0.07
Lower Limit (95%) 44.9 54.99 0.11
Upper Limit (95%) 49.11 50.85 0.04
Table 2.2: Fraction of VI Changes Explained by Demand, Supply and Industry-specic
Knowledge (Communication Costs) Components.
Note: The table reports the decomposition of each of these components on the total change of vertical integration
of the economy. Each row denotes a di¤erent rate parameter of the distribution of the problems. The rst row
presents the decomposition when the rate parameter is the point estimate of the Maximum Likelihood estimation.
The next rows reports the decomposition when the rate parameter is calculated one standard deviation above and
one standard deviation below the point estimate.
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Fraction of V.I. Clients Leverage of the Economy Knowledge Inequality
( I=(E + I)) (n) (z

z )
cB= 1:03 cA= 0:82 cB= 1:03 cA= 0:82 cB= 1:03 cA= 0:82
B= 1:14 14.83 36.89 2.33 2.93 9.92 4.3
A= 1:07 6.13 32.3 2.19 2.76 23.49 4.82
Table 2.3: Counterfactual Exercises.
Note: Each row denotes a di¤erent level in the parameter of the distribution of problems; each column represent
di¤erent values of the cost of acquiring knowledge. Starting from left, each panel shows the counterfactual values
for the fraction of integrated clients, the leverage of the economy and the knowledge inequality measure. As the
model imposes the restriction that  > c, I use A= 1:075 for the rate parameter of the distribution after
the OGA. This value represents 4 deviation standards above the estimated coe¢ cient A= 0:913.
2008 2009 2010
Semester I II I II I II
Fraction entrants Int. 3.9 2.7 3.6 2.2 5.1 6.8
Spending <10K Ext. 3.8 4.5 5 5.1 5.2 5.2
Mean Expenditure Int. 167299.5 123559.1 122789.5 129382.1 252445.1 120182.8
Ext. 30700.6 35181.8 31982.7 32546.4 32626.3 35839.6
Table 2.4: Characteristics of Entrant Clients After the OGA.
Note: The rst two rows of the table report the fraction of clients that report lobbying expenditures less than
10.000 US dollars over the total number of entrant clients , discriminated by their use of in-house lobbyists. The
last two rows present average lobbying expenditures for those clients, discriminated by their use of in-house
lobbyists. Int means that the client is using in-house lobbyists whereas Ext means that the client is using external
lobbyists. The table provides information on 6 semesters for the period 2008 to 2010. For the row denoted as
semester, I means rst semester (January-June) while II means the second semester (July to December).
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2.6.3 Figures
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Figure 2.1: Time Series of the Fraction of Clients Using In-House Lobbyists. Note. The
two vertical lines denote the second semester of 2007 and the rst semester of 2008. An observation is a semester.
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Figure 2.2: Di¤erences in Congressional Knowledge Measures Before and After the OGA.
Note: The x-axis represents the deciles of the index and the y-axis shows the normalized number of bills for each
decile. The group Before OGA represents three semester before the OGA and the group After OGA represents
three semesters since the OGA.
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Figure 2.3: Plotted Residuals of the Economy-Wide Di¢ culty Measure Over Time. Note:
Di¢ culty is measured with the ratio restraining words over regulating words. These calculations include all the
industries in the economy. An observation is a year.
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Figure 2.4: Theoretical Predictions of the E¤ect of a Change in the Frequency. Note:
B denotes before the OGA and A denotes after the OGA. LHS: In this case, the densities cut above the cost of
acquiring knowledge and the rm boundary shifts to the right. RHS: In this case, the densities cut below the cost
of acquiring knowledge and the rm boundary shifts to the left.
Figure 2.5: Theoretical Predictions of the E¤ect of a Change in the Costs. Note: B denotes
before the OGA and A denotes after the OGA.
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Figure 2.6: Time Series on the Knowledge Inequality. Note: The dashled line represents the
quadratic t whereas the other line shows the tted line.
Figure 2.7: Graphical Explanation of the Counterfactual Exercises. Note: B denotes before
the OGA and A denotes after the OGA. To simplify the presentation of this gure, I do not present the market
boundary levels. However, the counterfactual exercises consider them. Point (1) represents the intersection that
denes the rm boundary before the OGA and point (4) the intersection dening the boundary after the OGA.
Point (2) holds xed the density function of problems before the OGA but changes the cost of acquiring knowledge.
Point (3) represents the intersection of the acquiring cost technology before the OGA with the density function of
problems after the OGA.
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2.6.4 Other Patterns observed in OGA
The aim of this section is to provide a clearer description of the main changes
observed around the OGA. Graphical evidence that the industry became larger
both in terms of clients and number of registered lobbyists is presented the Figure
2.A.1. The rst vertical line denotes the rst semester of 2006 whereas the second
vertical line shows the rst semester of 2008. The main take away from this graph
is that the number of clients and lobbyists are characterized by both an increasing
trend before 2008 and a constant or decreasing trend after the OGA took e¤ect. We
can also observe a change in the slope for the clients line between 2006 to 2008. The
growth rate was higher than ever before. Anecdotally, one can connect this change
in the slope with the Jack Abramo¤ scandal.137 Abramo¤ is a former American
lobbyist who was at the center of an extensive corruption investigation where not
only he but also White House o¢ cials, one congressman and nine other lobbyists
and congressional sta¤ers were convicted of corruption. Abramo¤ was convicted of
fraud and conspiracy -trading expensive gifts, meals and sports trips in exchange
for political favors- in the rst semester of 2006. 138139
2.6.4.1 Transition Matrices
To understand the observed ows of lobbyists around the OGA, Table 2.A.1, de-
scribes a transition matrix of lobbyists. Among the rows there are four di¤erent
categories: Internal, external, mixed and new lobbyists. Among the columns there
are four categories: the rst three same categories of the rows and the exit lobby-
ists. Among each row-category there are three rows. The rst one (i.e. #) shows
the actual number of lobbyists, whereas the second (third) one shows the percent-
age of the number of lobbyists as a proportion of the total row (column). The
table cuts the sample into two di¤erent periods: 3 years before 2008 and 3 years
after 2007. Modifying the number of periods before and after provide qualitatively
similar results.
In the rst period there were about 19.000 lobbyists and in the second period
there were 27.000. It seems natural to ask who are the lobbyists leaving and
entering the market. Given that the threshold to be a (good) lobbyist increased,
I expect to see that the entrant lobbyists has a better set of skills than the exit
lobbyists.
137https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jack_Abramo¤_scandals
138It is also interesting to mention that according to several sources, this scandal was one of the
main motivations for Congress to introduce, pass and sign the OGA.
139The change in the pattern for clients is not trivial to understand as there may be two e¤ects
in place: On the one hand, under higher scrutiny from the public, clients that lobby without
reporting their activities will be more prone to start reporting lobbying actions. On the other
hand, the whole lobbying activity has not only become more di¢ cult but also more disreputable.
The rst e¤ect will increase the number of clients we observe whereas the second e¤ect will decrease
it. The magnitude of these e¤ects is an empirical matter. From this graph, it seems that the rst
e¤ect has dominated for the period 2006-2008.
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In order to test this hypothesis, I use the data based on lobbyist.info. This
database contain information on previous working experience for the lobbyists. Ta-
ble 2.A.2 classies lobbyists in two categories. Lobbyists that leave the lobbying
market within three years after the OGA took e¤ect and lobbyists that entered the
market for the same period. Changing the time span around the OGA does not
change the main results. I focus on three variables: experience in the US Senate,
experience as a political counsel, and experience as Chief sta¤ of any politician.
For each of these variables, I conduct t-statistic tests to see if there are statistically
signicant di¤erences between the group of lobbyists exiting the market right after
the OGA took e¤ect and the group of lobbyists that entered the market. Among
each previous job experience, I conduct this exercise for the lobbyists according to
the market they worked on.
The bottom line of this table is that the exit lobbyists have a worse set of ad-
vocacy skills than their counterparts.140 The lobbyists leaving the market have less
political working experience.141 For instance, 12% of the new lobbyists have working
experience in the Senate whereas only 7% of the ones that exit had some experience.
Similar patterns also emerge for the other two categories: political counsel and chief
sta¤ experience. Also interestingly, for the rst two variables the di¤erences in the
quality can be explained only with the internal lobbyists. For instance, the fraction
of internal lobbyists entrants with the Senate experience is about three times larger
than the fraction of in-house lobbyists leaving the market with this type of experi-
ence. However, the di¤erence for the case of external lobbyists is not statistically
signicant.142 Results not presented here also show that internal and external exit
advocates tend to have worse skills than the sample of lobbyists that remain in the
market.
2.6.4.2 Results for di¤erent Issues
In this section, I conduct some empirical exercises to understand the variation of
the data focusing on issue-year combinations. At this stage I have abstracted for
the complementarity problem but I aim to include it in the future. In this section
I proceed in two steps. I rst provide empirical evidence there was a change in the
lobbying di¢ culty for each topic when the OGA took e¤ect. Then, I estimate the
structural parameters using non-linear squares estimations.
Changes in the Lobbying Di¢ culty per Issue Most of the federal lobbying
activity is destined to a¤ect congressional bills. The policy agendas project (hence-
forth PAP) classies the bills proposed in the US Congress in 20 major topics and
140Other variables do not turn to be signicantly di¤erent for both group of lobbyists.
141Similar conclusions emerge when I change the three year period window.
142For sake of brevity I have decided to not include the numbers for the mixed types lobbyists.
This type of lobbyists correspond to a small fraction of both set of lobbyists: entrants and exiters.
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220 subtopics.143 In this classication all the topics and sub-topics are consecutive
and the code system is mutually exhaustive and hierarchical (i.e. only one topic for
each bill title and every subtopic belongs to a major topic).144 The Congressional
Bill Project has a separate database providing bill-level information for more than
400.000 bills from 1947 to 2012 and use the PAP classication system.145
I propose to proxy the level of di¢ culty of a topic with the level of di¢ culty of
passing bills related to that topic. This is to use better the variation of the data as
only some bills are studied in Congressional committees. The idea is that topic A
is more di¢ cult than topic B if in average topic A has bills that are more di¢ cult
to pass than topic B. Although I can focus on the actual passing bills ratios per
topics I prefer to construct an index by using six di¤erent variables using Principal
Components Analysis146: Number of bills where the bill 1. was sponsored by a
member of the majority. 2. passed the House debate 3. passed the Senate debate
4. Became law and the inverse of the fraction of bills that 5. received veto 6. were
proposed by a rst-time congressmen.147.
I construct these six variables for each of 11 topics for each semester of the
period 1999-2012.148 The index is decreasing in the level of di¢ culty. That is, the
larger the index the easier is to pass bills. If the bills are easy to pass, the lobbying
activity is easier. Therefore, the lower the index, the more di¢ cult the topic is.
Given that the rst principal component is explaining a large amount of the
variance and for the sake of parsimony, I will use this component as the di¢ culty
index.149Figure 2.A.2 shows the observations of the rst principal component dis-
criminated by issue. For each issue, the gure also shows the mean value and one
standard deviation above and below the mean value. Red circles denote observa-
tions since 2008 whereas grey circles denote observation before this date.
The gure shows several patterns. First, there is a lot of variation in the dis-
persion of the observations between topics. Budget and Appropriations and Trade
have both large variance in the index whereas communication, taxes and transport
143The project o¤ers a description about each of these classications at:
http://www.policyagendas.org/.
144Congressional Bills project (http://congressionalbills.org/codebooks.html)
strives "... for 90% interannotator reliability at the major topic level, and 80% at the subtopic
level."
145http://congressionalbills.org/index.html.
146PCA reduces the dimensionality of the data by providing uncorrelated linear combinations
of the variables that contain most of the variance of the intial data.
147I have used the inverse instead of the fraction of bills in the last two variables to make easier
the interpretation of the index.
148The 11 topics I use are: Health, Tax, Finance, Budget and Appropriations, Defense, Energy,
Education, Communications, Transport, Trade and other Issues.
149As the PCA analyzes the correlation matrix of the variables, each variable is standardized
to have unit variance. Therefore, the total variance is the number of principal components (i.e.
6). The rst principal component is explaining a great amount of the variance of the data: 72%
(eigenvalue of the rst component is 4.3 divided by the total variance). Given the rst principal
component is explaining a large amount of the variance and for the sake of parsimony, I will use
this component as the di¢ culty index.
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have low values. Second, Health and budget are the easiest topics to pass bills
whereas tax and communications are the most di¢ cult ones. Third, among the
positive outlier values of the index (i.e. larger than 1.7) only one point is after the
OGA. In addition, it can also be seen that the levels of di¢ culty after the OGA
tend to be below the ones before the OGA.
Figure 2.A.3. shows the evolution of the index for 10 topics (I exclude the
other category) and linear predictions for both periods: after and before the OGA.
The bottom line of this gure is the change in the pattern of the observation once
the OGA took e¤ect. From the rst four plots is clear that the level of di¢ culty
start increasing (recall that the index is decreasing in the level of di¢ culty) since
the rst semester of 2008. However, the last plot does not show a clear pattern
in the change. The gure also show cycles in the levels of the index. The index
tend to be larger in the rst semester of each year and then in the second semester
tend to decrease. To have a more robust empirical evidence of this change in the
pattern, I also run xed-e¤ect regressions. The interested reader can see results in
the following sub-section.
Overall this section has shown a change in the di¢ culty of lobbying activities per
topic. However, there are two important shortcomings with this approach. First,
for each bill there are two sides: one in favor and one against. The empirical exercise
I conducted in this section is showing the di¢ culty has changed for clients in favor
of bills. Of course, the total e¤ect on the di¢ culty will depend on the distribution
of clients in favor and against the bills. Second, not all the lobbying reports have
information about the bills. Therefore, I am measuring the e¤ect of the OGA for
only a sample of the rms.
Fixed E¤ect Regressions: Change in the di¢ culty by Issue To have a
more robust empirical evidence of this change in the pattern, I also run the following
xed-e¤ect regression:
Iit = i + t + aftert + "t
In this regression, an observation is an issue-semester combination and I control
for both issue and semester xed e¤ects. The variable Iit represents the di¢ culty
level of the issue i at period t. I include issue dummies, i, to control for mean
di¤erences in the index across topics, and semester dummies t, that control for
index growth common to all issues. The variable aftert takes a value of 1 for
periods after the second semester of 2007 and 0 otherwise. I cluster standard errors
at the issue level. Table 2.A.3 shows the results of the estimated coe¢ cient  for
di¤erent combinations in the inclusion of the xed e¤ects. I include the calculated
coe¢ cients when I run the regression without xed e¤ects, with only one type of
xed e¤ects and when I include both. I report the standard errors of the coe¢ cients
as well as the number of observations used, the overall R2 and the Wald test.
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The table shows a robust and consistent pattern. The level of di¢ culty of the
issues increased once the OGA took e¤ect. This result is robust to the combination
of the xed-e¤ect controls we use. The standard deviation of the index is close to
2 points. Therefore, one way to interpret the result of this table is that the index
become approximately one standard deviation more di¢ cult after the OGA took
e¤ect.
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2.6.5 Tables of the Appendix
Transition Matrix for Lobbyists
2005-2007 to 2008/2010
Internal External Mixed Exit Total
Internal # 6854 43 5 4147 11049
Row (%) 62 0.4 0 37.6 100
Col(%) 56 0.5 6.7 63.2
External # 80 4726 12 3284 8102
Row (%) 1 58.3 0.1 40.5 100
Col(%) 0.6 60.4 16 50
Mixed # 6 11 12 44 73
Row (%) 8.2 15 16.4 60.3 100
Col(%) 0 0.1 16 0.7
Entry # 5398 3050 46 8494
Row (%) 64 36 0.5 100
Col(%) 44 40 61
Total 12338 7830 75 7475
Net Change 1289 -272 2 1019
Table 2.A.1: Transition Matrix for Lobbyists 2005-2010.
Note: An observation is a lobbyist. Among the rows there are four di¤erent categories: Internal, external, mixed
and new lobbyists. Among the columns there are four categories: the rst three same categories of the rows and
the exit lobbyists. Among each row-category there are three rows. The rst one (i.e. #) shows the actual number
of lobbyists, whereas the second (third) one shows the percentage of the number of lobbyists as a proportion of
the total row (column). The table cuts the sample into two di¤erent periods: 3 years before 2008 and 3 years
after 2007. Modifying the number of periods before and after provide qualitatively similar results.
Senate Political Counsel Chief Sta¤
Sample All Int. Ext. All Int. Ext. All Int. Ext.
Exit 7.2 3.6 11.2 5.35 2.22 7.93 2.78 0.92 5.0
Entrants 12.2 13.5 8.0 8.89 6.7 9.95 7.77 6.74 12.7
ttest 0.015 0.000 0.4205 0.049 0.000 0.606 0.000 0.000 0.012
Table 2.A.2: Entrant and Exit Revolving Doors.
Note: An observation is a lobbyist..Table A.2 classies lobbyists in two categories. Lobbyists that leave the
lobbying market within three years after the OGA took e¤ect and lobbyists that entered the market for the same
period. I focus on three variables: experience in the US Senate, experience as a political counsel, and experience
as Chief sta¤ of any politician. For each of these variables, I conduct t-statistic tests to see if there are
statistically signicant di¤erences between the group of lobbyists exiting the market right after the OGA took
e¤ect and the group of lobbyists that entered the market. Among each previous job experience, I conduct this
exercise for the lobbyists according to the market they worked on.
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 -0.480*** -0.480*** -2.346*** -2.347***
Std Err. 0.148 0.148 0.479 0.480
Issues N Y N Y
Semesters N N Y Y
Obs 308 308 308 308
Overall R2 0.012 0.650 0.102 0.740
Wald Test 10.49 549.75 107.04 770.44
Table 2.A.3.: Change in the Di¢ culty Before and After OGA.
Note: An observation is a semester. All the coe¢ cients are signicant at 1%. In this regression, an observation is
an issue-semester combination and I control for both issue and semester xed e¤ects. The variable Iit represents
the di¢ culty level of the issue i at period t. I include issue dummies, i, to control for mean di¤erences in the
index across indexes, and semester dummies t, that control for index growth common to all issues. The variable
aftert takes a value of 1 for periods after the second semester of 2007 and 0 otherwise. I cluster standard errors
at the issue level.
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2.6.6 Figures of the Appendix
Figure 2.A.1: Time Series on the Total Number of Clients and Lobbyists.
Note: An observation is a semester.
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Figure 2.A.2: Values of the Di¢ culty Index for Each Topic-year Combination.
Note: The gure shows the values of the di¢ culty index discriminated by topic.
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Figure 2.A.3: Time Series on the Di¢ culty Index for Each Topic.
Note: The gure shows the values of the di¢ culty index discriminated by topic. An observation is a semester.
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Chapter 3
Market Concentration and
Lobbying Expenditures150
Abstract
The collective action literature predicts that less-concentrated industries
spend less than more concentrated industries on lobbying activities. This
chapter presents a robust empirical fact that is at odds with this core
result. To explain this fact, I include a neglected but, arguably, impor-
tant dimension in the analysis: the level of excludability of the goods
being lobbied. I present examples of excludable US political goals and,
using new measures of excludability at the industry level, I show that
less-concentrated industries tend to lobby more heavily for excludable
goods. The central point is that neglecting the fact that different in-
dustries can lobby for goals that differ by their level of excludability
can bias the estimates that link market concentration and group efforts.
Then, I show that once one controls for the level of excludability in the
industry-level lobbying goals, the standard collective action prediction is
reestablished. I end this chapter by using national-level mergers as an
exogenous source of changes in city market concentration. I show that,
controlling for the level of excludability of their advocacy goals, firms
that faced these shocks increased their lobbying expenditures dispropor-
tionately, providing validity to Olson’s seminal prediction.
150I found the empirical fact presented in this chapter in 2014. All of the other material presented
in this chapter is new. I am deeply indebted for the insightful conversations on this motivating
result with Kevin Murphy. The following people provide insightful conversations to make the
empirical fact more robust: Scott Ashworth, Marianne Bertrand, Jordi Blanes i Vidal, Tim Bres-
nahan, Andre Boik, Ethan Bueno de Mezquita, Austin Clemens, Alexia Delfino, Quoc-Anh Do,
Liran Einav, Josh Feng, John de Figueiredo, Alfred Galichon, Luis Garicano, Alessandro Gavazza,
Matthew Gentzkow, Brent Hickman, Ali Hortacsu, Brian Kelleher Richter, Steven Levitt, Leslie
Marx, Michael Peters, Andrea Prat, Mar Reguant, Amit Seru, Jim Snyder, Jr., Paulo Somaini,
John Sutton, Chad Syverson, Matt Tady, Richard Van Weelden, Glen Weyl, Hye Young You and
Owen Zidar. I also acknowledge the comments and suggestions made by participants at Work in
Progress seminars at UChicago and Stanford University. E-mail: m.espinosa@lse.ac.uk.
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3.1 Introduction
There has been great interest in understanding the ways in which market structure
affects economic and political outcomes. At least since Olson (1965), a particular
branch of this literature has focused on individual and group efforts as the main
choice outcome. The extensive theoretical collective action literature predicts that
groups with fewer members exert higher levels of effort. A great number of empirical
studies with very limited span (i.e., time period, number of industries and so on)
have found that, in most cases this relationship does not appear significant, and for
the cases that appear significant, the evidence is mixed. In this chapter, I present
robust empirical evidence for a comprehensive set of industries and periods that is
at odds with the theoretical prediction. I measure effort with lobbying expenditures
and show that more-concentrated industries spend less on advocacy activities.
To present this puzzle, I use data first presented in Chapter 1, and I exploit
the fact that I have been able to match the primary industry code for each of
the interest groups that have lobbied at the federal level in the last 20 years. To
complement this information, I use different data sources to extract diverse measures
of market concentration, such as the total number of firms, concentration ratios, and
the Herfindahl index. I show that this empirical puzzle seems robust to the time
period chosen, the specific sample of industries used, the number of digits defining
the industries, the ways in which we control for the size of the industry, and the way
in which we measure market concentration.
To explain this puzzle, I include a new dimension to the collective action analysis:
excludability of the goods for which firms lobby. I first present empirical evidence
to support the fact that there are numerous examples of distinct political objects
that have an important component of excludability. Examples include earmarks,
tax breaks, duties giveaways, (legally intentional) fiscal loopholes, loans at favorable
rates, price controls, and private bills, among others. To the best of my knowledge,
there is no comprehensive dataset with information on all of these types of excludable
goods. To advance in this direction, I focus on exploiting a new dataset I have
constructed with information on earmarks. I take advantage of a transparency
policy in which Congressmen have to report detailed information on earmarks, and
I construct empirical measures that quantify the extent to which industries focus
on the lobbying efforts for these political objects. I show that once one controls for
this dimension, Olson’s theoretical prediction is recovered.
To explain how the excludability of the goods being lobbied for can help to
explain the empirical puzzle, I develop a theoretical framework in which firms face
bills with different levels of excludability and choose whether or not to lobby and,
if they decide to lobby, the magnitude of their lobbying expenditures. The key
insight is that as the incentives to exert effort are increasing in the private benefit,
excludable goods have larger associated lobbying expenditures. Then, I provide
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empirical evidence on less-concentrated industries lobbying more intensively (i.e.,
both at the extensive and intensive margins) than more concentrated industries for
excludable goods. This implies that the observed positive relationship between the
number of the firms and industry-level lobbying expenditures can be easily explained
by the fact that different industries lobby for goods that differ by their level of
excludability.
I end this chapter with an empirical exercise that allows me to explore the rela-
tionship between market structure and lobbying expenditures with exogenous shocks
to industry-city concentration levels. The key idea is to explore how national-level
mergers modify city-level lobbying expenditures for firms that are not involved in
the merger but are affected differentially by changes in market structure. Mergers
have a differential impact across cities, as the firms involved in the mergers have a
presence only in a subset of these locations. Controlling for the level of excludabil-
ity of the goods for which firms are lobbying, I find significant and robust evidence
showing that firms and industries that face an increase in city market concentra-
tion (i.e., after a merger, there are fewer firms) increase their city-level lobbying
expenditures.
This chapter makes three contributions. First, I use a newly compiled dataset
to provide robust empirical evidence against the standard collective action predic-
tion: more-concentrated industries tend to spend less money than less-concentrated
industries on advocacy activities. Second, I provide a possible explanation for this
empirical puzzle based on the excludability of the goods that are being lobbied for.
I start by presenting some examples of excludable political objects that are lobbied
in the US to show the empirical relevance of this dimension in the analysis. Then,
I develop a simple theoretical framework that includes new theoretical predictions.
Importantly, this model not only generalizes some of the most important models
in the collective action literature, but, to the best of my knowledge, is also the
first one to include the excludability dimension and to provide predictions on its
effect on both the intensive and extensive margins of lobbying activities. Third, I
compile a new dataset of city-level lobbying expenditures and study how these are
affected when there are changes to the national-level market structure. To the best
of my knowledge, there has been no other attempt to provide exogenous variation in
market structure in order to measure its effect on city-level lobbying expenditures.
Related Literature
At least since the seminal work of Olson (1965) and Stigler (1971, 1974), aca-
demics have asked how special interest groups affect public policy.151 Recently,
there has been increasing academic interest in the specific way in which special
interest groups affect public policy through lobbying.152 However, to the best of
151For recent overviews on the topic Grossman and Helpman (2002a) and Ansolabehere, de
Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003).
152See, for example: Richter et al. (2009), Blanes i Vidal et al. (2012), Bombardini and Trebbi
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my knowledge, the focus on market concentration and lobbying expenditures has
been neglected. Naturally, there are some papers measuring the relationship be-
tween special interest groups’ characteristics and political influence.153 But there
are two main differences between these papers and my approach: 1. Some of them
try to understand how firm or market characteristics are related to public policy
outcomes. I focus only on lobbying expenditures. It makes more sense to focus on
choice variables rather than on outcomes that depend on unknown interactions. 2.
Among the papers focusing on these choice variables, all of them analyze the case of
political campaign contributions (henceforth PAC) rather than lobbying measures.
Empirically, lobbying expenditures are quantitatively more important than PAC
expenditures, as they are, on average, six times bigger.
This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 3.2 presents the main empirical
fact that motivates this chapter. In Section 3.3, I briefly present the theoretical
framework that allows me to analyze the effect on the excludability of the benefits
of the political goals. Here, I also present empirical evidence on the relevance of the
excludability dimension by showing its relationship with market concentration, as
well as its power to recover the standard collective action prediction. Section 3.4
takes a further step and presents some empirical evidence on the lobbying reports at
the city level, showing that firms that face an increase in their city-industry market
concentration increase their lobbying expenditures. Finally, in Section 3.5, I finish
with a short discussion summarizing the main results and limitations of the chapter,
and propose further developments.
3.2 Empirical Fact
In this section, I present the main empirical fact of this chapter: controlling for
different measures of the size of the industry, less concentrated industries spend
more on lobbying efforts than more concentrated industries.
3.2.1 Data Used
For this exercise, I use different data sources. On the lobbying expenditures side, I
use the same data as in the two previous chapters and I refer the interested reader
to seek the description of the data in Chapter 1. On the concentration measures, I
use information from Orbis, Compustat and the Economic Census.154
(2012), Bertrand et al. (2014), Clemens (2014), Karam (2014), Kerr et al. (2014) and de Figueiredo
and Richter (2014).
153See, for example: Pittman (1976, 1977, 1988), Salamon and Siegfried (1977), Mann and
McCormick (1980), Esty and Caves (1982), Zardkoohi (1985), Andres (1985), Masters and Keim
(1985), Munger (1988), Boies (1989), Snyder (1990), Grier, Munger and Roberts (1991, 1994),
Mizruchi and Koenig (1988, 1991), Potters and Sloof (1996), Mitchell, Hansen, and Jepsen (1997),
Hansen and Mitchell (2000), Schuler, Rehbein and Cramer (2002), Hansen, Mitchell and Drope
(2004), Ansolabehere, Snyder and Ueda (2004), Ozer and Lee (2009), Macher, Mayo and Schiffer
(2011), Vannoni (2013), Weymouth (2013).
154Orbis is a global database containing information on nearly 150 million companies worldwide,
with an emphasis on private company information. In this section, I focus on US companies’
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For each of these databases, I quantify market concentration with five different
measures: total number of firms (henceforth n), three concentration ratios (hence-
forth C4, C8 and C20) and the Herfindahl index (henceforth HHI).
155 I calculate
these four measures using the Orbis data with the total number of employees for
each firm for the year 2012. With Compustat, I calculate this information using
data on number of employees for the period 1998 to 2014. Finally, I use the concen-
tration measures that the Economic Census releases every five years. The Census
gives these five concentration measures for all of the manufacturing industries. For
non-manufacturing industries, the US Census Bureau only releases the first 4 con-
centration measures. For this data, I focus on the most recent available year: 2012.
I obtain qualitatively similar results when I look at different years.
Each of these three data sources provide information for industries defined at
the level four, three and two digits 2007 NAICS codes. Table 3.1 summarizes the
data used showing the main data source, variables used, and the dates available.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 present descriptive statistics of the data used. Table 3.2 presents
statistics for the cross section data (i.e., Orbis and Economic Census) and Table 3.3
presents information for the panel data, based on the Compustat database. As ex-
pected, the average number of firms grows as we use broader definitions of industries.
Correspondingly, the HHI and the concentration ratios decrease monotonically as
we move from four to two digits industries.
3.2.2 Main Result
In order to estimate the relationship between market concentation and lobbying
expenditures, I conduct the following set of estimations. First, I use ORBIS and the
Economics Census databases to run:
Li
Xi
= α + β1MCi + εi (1)
where Li is the total lobbying expenditures for i-th industry and MCi is one of
the aforementioned concentration measures. To control for the size of the industry,
I divide the total expenditure of the industry by proxies of industrial scale Xi such
as total turnover, sales or employees. In this chapter, I present the results for the
case in which Xi is measured by total sales. I obtain qualitatively similar results
when I use different measures for industry size. In addition, with these databases I
run:
information for the year 2012. I use compustat database annual information from January 1998 to
January 2014 on active and inactive publicly held companies, comprising more than 28000 active
and inactive firms in North-America. Finally, I use data for the Economic Census for 2012, 2007,
2002 and 1997. This data is classified and organized by the North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS). For all of these databases I focus only on US firms.
155Let Sj =
∑j
i=1 Si, where Si is a size measure (sales, employees and so on) of firm i-th. Firms
are organized by size, that is Si ≥ Si+1. Then, C4 = S4Sn and C8 and C20 are defined accordingly.
Finally, HHI =
∑n
i=1(Si/Sn)
2.
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lji
xji
= α + β2MCi + εi (2)
where lji is the lobbying expenditure of j-th firm in i-th industry and xji is a
measure of its size. Finally, I use Compustat to run:
Lit
Xit
= γt + β3MCit + εit (3)
where Lit is the lobbying expenditure of i-th industry in t-th year, Xit is as before,
a measure of size, and γt represents time-fixed effects. I also include estimates at
the firm level:
ljit
xjit
= γi + γt + β4MCit + εit (4)
where ljit is the lobbying expenditure of j-th firm in i-th industry at t-th period
and xjit is a measure of its size. Table 3.4 to Table 3.7 report the main results of
these exercises for the case that industries are defined with four and three digits
code. I obtain qualitatively similar results when I define industries according to
the two-digit NAICS classification. Table 3.4 shows the coefficient and standard
errors for β1 whereas Table 3.5 shows the results for β2. Results for β3 and β4, are
presented in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7, respectively. To facilitate the interpretation of
the results, the independent variables are normalized by their standard deviation.
These tables show some robust patterns. First, looking at the significance of the
coefficients, we see that all of the estimated coefficients are significant at least at
10% for equations (1) and (3), whereas most of the coefficients are significant for
equations (2) and (4). Second, the four tables show two robust patterns. First, less
concentrated industries spend more on lobbying. That is, controlling for the scale
of the industry, an industry that is more concentrated (fewer firms, or larger levels
of C4, C8, C20 or HHI) tend to have lower reported levels of lobbying expenditures
than a less concentrated industry. Second, firms in more concentrated industries
spend more on lobbying. That is, if we observe two firms with similar size, the firm
in the more concentrated industry tends to spend more on lobbying than the firm
in the less concentrated industry.
Orbis and Compustat also provide firm-level information on assets, total turnover
and sales. In results not presented here, I construct the concentration measures
using these alternative variables and I found the same patterns shown in Table 3.4
to Table 3.7. As an additional robustness check, I have also run the same estimations
including other controls such as industry-level elasticities of substitution from Broda
and Weinstein (2006) or measures of geographic and political concentration from
Busch and Reinhardt (1999). These patterns are robust to the inclusion of these
controls. In the next section, I propose a candidate explanation for this result.
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3.3 Excludability of the Benefits
In this section, I argue that the introduction of the excludability of the benefits of
political goals allows us to rationalize the empirical patterns observed in the previous
section. This section is divided into three parts. I will first start explaining what
I mean by excludability in the benefits and I will provide some examples. Then, I
move to a simple theoretical model, that will allow me to have clear predictions on
the relationship between market concentration, and firm and industry-level lobbying
expenditures. I will explain how neglecting this dimension may bias the previous
empirical results. I will end this section by providing empirical evidence on the
relationship between market concentration and excludability of the benefits.
3.3.1 Types of Bills
The literature on lobbying has not emphasized a simple fact. Firms lobby for dif-
ferent types of bills. Although bills are complex, multidimensional objects, I think
there are at least two dimensions that are of first order concern in my analysis:
excludability and/or rivalry of the bills. Each combination of these two variables
affects the benefits of the firms in a different way. As a consequence, the decision
whether to lobby or not, how much money spend on it, and the effect of lobbying
expenditures in the economy as a whole are very different.
3.3.1.1 Excludable Bills
Excludable bills are bills in which it is possible to prevent certain agents from en-
joying the benefits to the bill. In particular, it is interesting to think that these
excluded agents are non-lobbying units. Notice that there are two natural levels
to think about this excludability problem: firm and industry levels. The first level
assumes it is possible to prevent non-lobbying firms within a beneficiary industry
to receive the benefits, while the second level assume that it is possible to exclude
non-lobbying industries from receiving the benefits that a bill provides.156
Althought there are several examples of excludable bills, I want to briefly com-
ment on only three: Earmarks, Tax breaks (or duties suspension) and Private bills.
Earmarks. A typical example of excludable bills are earmarks. An earmark
is a legislative money provision that directs approved funds to be spent on specific
projects, or that directs specific exemptions from taxes or mandated fees. There
has been an extensive debate around these legislative objects. In fact, earmarks
to for-profit institutions were banned in March 2010 by the House Appropriations
Committee. Just to have a sense of how important these expenditures are, according
to the Office of Management and Budget of the White House, the total amounts
given by earmarks in Congress for the years 2008 to 2010 were 39.3, 39.2 and 37.8
156In addition, it may be difficult to explictly assess what a lobbying unit means as it may be
necessary to include firms that have not only federally lobbied but that also are politically active
in other dimensions (i.e., grassroot lobbying, PAC, SuperPACs, 527 groups and so on).
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US billion dollars, respectively.157
Tax Breaks. The main difference between this category of excludable bills
and earmarks is that the first directs benefits to specific units while the second
provides benefits to a group of agents with certain defined characteristics. Tax
breaks are mainly of two types: Transitory or permanent, although the first type
is more common. In December 2014 the US Congress passed the bill H.R. 5771
with more than 50 tax breaks targeting specific groups and industries such as small
companies, public transportation commuters, and teachers who spend their own
money on classroom supplies.158 Congressional estimates calculate that this bill
is worth over 42 US billion dollars of federal budget.159 Some recent examples of
tax breaks for businesses in other legislative objects are tax credits for R&D, tax
exemptions for financial companies with foreign profits, provisions to allow retailers
to write off capital investments easily, and breaks for racehorse owners, film, TV,
alternative fuel, and rum producers.
Private Bills. These bills are “designed to provide legal relief to specified per-
sons or entities adversely affected by laws of general applicability.” 160 Private laws
apply only to the person named in the law and grant a benefit from the govern-
ment to that person, not otherwise authorized by law. An alternative House of
Representatives’ definition is “A private bill is a bill for the relief of one or several
specified persons, corporations, institutions, etc., and is distinguished from a public
bill, which relates to public matters and deals with individuals only by classes.”161
No House rule defines what bills qualify as private, but most private bills have of-
ficial titles stating them to be “for the benefit of” named individuals. Subjects of
contemporary private bills include: Immigration and claims matters (is the most
common subject), Patents and copyrights, Taxation (e.g., income tax liability, tar-
iff exemptions), Public lands (e.g., sales, claims, exchanges, mineral leases) among
others. Most of these bills have been targeted to specific individuals in recent years.
3.3.1.2 Rival Bills
Rival bills are bills whose consumption by one firm prevents simultaneous consump-
tion by other firms. Typical examples of rival bills are law initiatives that give a
fixed monetary subsidy to an industry. The more firms there are in the industry, the
less each firm gets. Rival bills can also be thought of as bills that provide congestible
157For more information, see here. Earmarks have wrongly been associated as a synonym of
Pork barrel legislation. Although they are similar in several dimensions, they are not exactly the
same, as there is a more objective determination in the spending of an earmark, while pork-barrel
spending tends to be more subjective. However, with the aim to know the order of magnitude of
these expenditures, according to the organization Citizens Against Government Waste, the average
pork barrel spending in the years 1998-2010 was of the order of 19.2 billion US dollars, which is
about half of the size of the amount of the estimated earmarks.
158For more information, see Journal News.
159For more information, see H.R.5771 of 113th.
160For more information, see Oleszek et al. Congressional Procedures.
161For more information, see Hinds’ Precedents of the House of Representatives.
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goods. Typical examples of congestible bills are private or public parks.
Examples of non-rival bills are subsidies as a proportion of any observable scale
of the firm or tax breaks. Although it is probable that the number of firms was a
variable that legislators took into consideration when they set the percentage of the
subsidy or the size of the tax break, the benefit received by one company does not
affect the subsidy received by another firm.
3.3.1.3 Some Examples
Stigler (1971) thinks there are four policies that industries lobby for: 1. Direct
Subsidy or Money. 2. Control Over New Entrants (by price policies or vertical
integration). 3. Affecting Substitutes or Complements Goods. 4. Price Fixing.
Although there may be several particularities about how these policies are defined,
in general, policy one can be excludable within an industry whilst policies two to
four are non-rival policies. To follow, I provide one example of each combination of
rival/excludable bills.
Non Rival/ Excludable: Schrimp Importation Financing Fairness Act. (H.R.
155 of the 108-th Congress).162 This bill prohibits the Secretary of Commerce from
imposing any new restrictive regulations on the domestic shrimping industry within
the area that is under the jurisdiction of the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management
Council. Besides that, this bill eliminates the financial help available that the United
States provide to other countries exporting shrimp to the country. This is excludable
at the industry level and non rival within the beneficiary industry. In this case, the
bill is restricting the competition of production of Shrimp in the United States. So,
only that industry and only the firms producing schrimps in that geographic region
are actually benefited (excludable) and the fact that one schrimp producing firm
in that region receives the benefit, does not imply that other firms with similar
characteristics receive less from that benefit (non-rival).163
Non Rival/Non Excludable: A bill to designate Taiwan as a visa waiver
program country. (S.1545 of the 112-th Congress). These legislative proposals are
by definition public goods: they are neither rival nor excludable. The bill aims
to avoid Taiwan citizens to require a visa to legally enter the United States. The
162Another example is the Middle Class and Small Business Tax Relief Act of 2012 H.R.6262 of
112 th Congress. The bill makes provisions of a 2003’s act that reduce the tax rate on dividend and
capital gains income for taxpayers whose incomes do not exceed the base amount permanent (i.e.,
$200,000 for individual taxpayers and $250,000 for married couples filing jointly). Increases to 20%
the tax rate on dividend and capital gains income for taxpayers whose incomes are above the base
amount. Of course, this bill exclude people from their income but for every person who is in the
aceptable income range, has a tax relief. Another example is the bill S.1808 of the 99th Congress.
The bill amends the 1954’s IRC to exempt from taxation trusts which acquire and manage real
property for certain exempt organizations. More information about this bill can be consulted here.
Details of thie Schrimp bill can be seen here.
163There are basically 4 regions of Shrimp production New England, South Atlantic, Gulf and
Pacific. The Gulf contains about 90% of the total production. More information about this
industry can be consulted here. Information of this bill can be found here.
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beneficiaries of the bill are Taiwan citizens. The bill does not exclude the waiving
privilege to a certain subset of Taiwan citizens so it is non-excludable. As the benefit
that one Taiwanese person receives does not decrease the future benefit of another
Taiwan citizen, the bill is also not rival.164
Rival/ Excludable: Transportation Infrastructure Grants and Economic Rein-
vestment Act. (S.942 of 112-th Congress). This bill directs the Secretary of Trans-
portation (DOT) to establish a national infrastructure investment program with a
finite budget to provide competitive grants (of $10-$500 million), secured loans, and
loan guarantees to a state, local government, or transit agency for eligible transporta-
tion projects. This bill benefits all the firms in the construction of transportation
infrastructure industry, so it is excluding by industry. This bill is also clearly rival
not only because the allocation of grants is competitive, but the total amount of the
programme is bounded.165
Rival/ Non Excludable: Harriet Tubman National Historical Parks Act.
(S.247 of 112-th Congress). This bill establishes that in some parts of Dorchester
and Maryland a historical Park. This park does not charge any fees, so the park is
a non-excludable good. However, as with other common goods, it is congestible. In
particular, the park has some small historical sites, that get crowded easily.166
I acknowledge that the key requirement, to be able to classify bills within these
four categories, is to distiniguish the good offered. For instance, in the second
example, I assumed that the good offered was visa waiving to Taiwanese people.
However, if I would have considered that the good offered was visa waiving rights,
then although the good is non rival it is excludable, because it is only providing
the rights to Taiwanese citizens. The aim of this subsection was to provide simple
examples in which the levels of excludability and rivalry of the bills differ. The
specific way in which these levels are defined is not relevant for the rest of the
chapter.
3.3.2 Theoretical Framework
To understand better the difference in the incentives for lobbying units among these
combinations, let us consider a simple model. Let li be the lobbying expenditure of
the i-th firm and let G be the benefit of the bill. Let c (li) be an increasing function
representing the cost of lobbying li dollars and G˜ the benefit of the bill when the
i-th firm does not lobby.167 Finally, let n be the number of firms in the industry
164The details of this bill can be consulted here.
165Information of this bill can be found here.
166Information of this bill can be found here.
167At this stage the reader should recognize that this is quite general. For instance, if there
are budget constraints, firms can borrow money to lobby, then the cost to a lobbying firm is just
(1 + r)li where r is the interest rate. If the lobbying units are measured in personal effort or
time, or even income but the capital markets are imperfect, then it may make sense to think that
additional units of effort are increasingly costly, making the cost function a convex one. If the
convexity is explained by the imperfections of the credit market, the distorsion will be higher for
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and nl is the number of firms lobbying. The number of firms lobbying is defined as
nl :
{
n|G
nl
− c (li) ≥ 0 > Gnl+1 − c (li)
}
.
A firm will lobby if the net benefit of doing so is larger than the net benefit of
not lobbying. Table 3.8 shows the net benefit of lobbying and the net benefit of not
lobbying according to the level of rivalry and excludability of the bill being lobbied.
The first row differs from the second in that the benefit of the bill is spread out to
other firms in the case the firm is lobbying, while the first column predicts a zero
payoff for non-lobbying firms. Intuitively, when goods are rival, firms have a smaller
incentive to lobby because they do not receive fully (proportionally) the benefit of
the good. On the other hand, non-excludable goods provide bigger incentive to free-
ride than excludable goods. Notice that if the good is excludable, firms will lobby
as long as G > nlc (li), while if the good is non-excludable, firms will lobby if:
168
G− G˜ > nc (li) (∗)
3.3.2.1 Collective Action Problem
The typical story assumes that the benefits of lobbying are non-excludable goods.
That is the goods are either rival (common goods) or non rival (Public Goods). For
most firms, especially the small ones, the costs of lobbying will outweigh the marginal
benefits of lobbying. So, as market concentration tends to be an increasing function
of the average size of the firm in the industry, Olson suggests that concentrated
industries are more likely to overcome this problem. To be more specific, Olson’s
prediction is that as n is higher in less-concentrated industries, there is less lobbying
in these industries because equation (∗) tend to not hold. There are two parts to
this explanation and each of them is changing one side of inequality (∗).
The first explanation is that the RHS of inequality (∗) increases as n increases.
The second explanation is that more concentrated industries tend to have fewer
firms, so we expect to see that the actions of each of these firms has a stronger
impact on the others firms in the industry. As this impact is measured by G−G˜, we
expect to see that this difference is an increasing function in the level of concentration
in the industry. Then, less concentrated industries have a lower LHS of (∗). The
prediction, then, is that more concentrated industries will lobby more. If you also
add to this intuition the fact that firms in more concentrated industries tend to be
richer (so they have more money available to spend) then the stylized fact exposed
in the previous section becomes a puzzle.
the poorer (less concentrated industries). Then, the cost for the less concentrated industries firms
will rise more steeply with expenditure. In this chapter, I abstract from these issues.
168That is, for the case of excludable goods, if the firms lobby for the case in which the good is
rival (i.e., G > nlc (li)) they will also do it when the good is not rival (i.e., G > c (li)). For the
case, the good is not excludable, if firms lobbying when the good is rival, they will do it when the
good is not rival because G−G˜n > c (li) → G− G˜ > c (li) for a fixed n > 0 and li.
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3.3.2.2 A model: There ain’t no such thing as a free lunch
The typical model used to understand the collective action problem does not include
the excludability dimension in the analysis. In this sub-section, I propose a way to
do it. All of the proofs can be found in the Appendix of this chapter.
Setting Let pi(L) be the probability of passing the bill, where L =
∑n
j=1 lj is the
total lobbying expenditure of the industry and assume the benefit of the bill depends
on the total lobbying expenditures, that is G(L). I assume ∂pi
∂li
, ∂G
∂li
> 0 ∀i : 1, ..., n.
As before, let n be the number of firms in the industry. This will be the measure of
market concentration. The benefit that each firm receives depends on the divisibility
of the benefit. For instance, if G(L) is purely congestible good, the firm will receive
G(L)
n
; whereas, if G(L) is non congestible at all, the firm will receive G(L). Then, a
convenient way to represent these extremes as well as intermediate cases where the
benefit is partially divisible is G(L)
nβ
where β ∈ [0, 1] is an exogenous constant that
represent how rival the bill is. If β = 1 the bill is purely rival and if β = 0 the bill
is non-rival.169
To include heterogeneity in a simple way, let us assume that the expected benefit
for the i-th firm is simply pi(L)G(L)
nβ
Si (n), where Si is a variable that measures the
scale of the firm, such as the sales level or the number of employees that depends
on the total number of firms in the industry.170 In the Appendix, I discuss how
we can relate this variable with the firm size distribution. Finally and inspired by
Mitra (1999) and Kerr et al (2014), let ci (li) be the cost function depending on
the i-th firm. This last assumption allows firms to differ by organizational abilities,
relationships of the CEO’s of the firm with lobbyists and senators, previous political
activities (inertia in lobbying), frictions in the lobbying entry etc.
The excludability of the bill can be due to several factors. Here I focus on the case
of empirical relevance, that is, when bills are excludable, only lobbying firms receive
the bill’s benefits. Let us denote nθ as the number of firms sharing the benefit of the
bill. Two extreme cases seem relevant. If the bill is excludable, then nθ is equal to
the number of firms lobbying, nl; whereas nθ is equal to the total number of firms in
the industry, n if the bill is perfectly non-excludable. Then, a representation of this
term is nθ as the convex combination of the total number of firms in the industry
and the number of firms lobbying, that is nθ = θn + (1− θ)nl where θ ∈ [0, 1] is a
dummy variable equals to one if the bill is perfectly non-excludable and zero if it
is perfectly excludable. When the bill is neither perfectly excludable not perfectly
non-excludable θ ∈ (0, 1), and therefore, nθ ∈ (nl, n). Notice that
∑n
j=1 lj =
∑nl
j=1 lj
as lj = 0 for non-lobbying firms.
169Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) were the first papers to
use a similar specification to represent the divisibility problem.
170Hillman et al (2004) has an excellent review of the variables employed in empirical studies to
explain political participation of firms. He concludes that the firm’s size is the most common and
perhaps the best proxy of the scale of the firm to explain political participation.
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The objective function for the i-th firm is:
pi(
∑n
j=1 lj)G(
∑n
j=1 lj)
nβθ
Si (n)− ci (li)
Notice that if the bill is excludable then the expected benefit is only shared by
the lobbying firms, however, if the bill is not excludable the benefit is shared among
all the firms in the industry.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, there is a random draw of the bill
and its characteristics, β and θ. This information as well as n and the functions pi,
G, Si and ci are public knowledge. The model has two stages. In the first stage of
the game, firms decide whether or not to lobby. This stage is related to the extensive
margin of the lobbying game and can be understood as a stage where we analyze the
probability of lobbying. From this stage we know the identities of the firms willing
to lobby and the number of these firms (i.e., nl).
In the second stage, the firms that have decided to lobby in the first stage make
a choice about the level of the lobbying expenditures by maximizing their objective
function. Each firm takes the lobbying expenditures of other firms as given. This
stage is related to the intensive margin of the lobbying game and it characterizes
the equilibrium amount of lobbying expenditures for each of the lobbying firms. The
problem is solved by starting from the second stage. An equilibrium in this game is
the number of firms lobbying nl and a nl-dimensional vector of firm-level lobbying
expenditures.
3.3.2.3 Main Results
I start with the extensive margin.171
Theorem 3.1 Firms are more likely to lobby when they are bigger, when they can
be affected more by the bill, when the firm can affect more the expected benefit of the
bill, if the lobbying costs are smaller or when the bills are more excludable and/or
less congestible.
The positive relationship between size and lobbying participation has been em-
pirically explored in several papers, for instance in Bombardini (2008), Macher et
al. (2011), Hill et al. (2013) and Kerr et al. (2014). Notice this is a simple way
to see the Olson (1965)’s famous “exploitation of the large by the small.” Hill et al.
(2013) provide evidence that firms lobby most actively if there are greater potential
payoffs from favorable policy and regulations. That is, it will be more likely to see
firms lobbying, when either the benefit of the bill or the probability of passing the
171Let
∑n
j=1,j 6=i li = L−i be the total lobbying expenditure of all firms except firm i-th. Taking
nl − 1 firms lobbying, let firm i-th decide whether to lobby or not. Then, firm i-th will lobby
if [pi(L)G(L)−θpi(L−i)G(L−i)]Si
nβθ
> ci (li). Notice that as far as pi(L−i)G(L−i) > 0 lobbying for the
non-excludable good imply lobbying for the excludable good, ceteris paribus.
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bill are larger.172 To the best of my knowledge, the predictions about excludability
and rivalry are new.173
Now I provide a result on the effect of market structure on the extensive margin
decision. Let ∈b= b
′
i(n)n
bi(n)
with bi (n) = [pi(L)G(L)− θpi(L−i)G(L−i)]Si, then:
Lemma 3.1 ∂Pr(li>0)
∂n
=∈b −β ∂nθ∂n
This result simply says that if the expected benefit is sufficiently sensitive to the
number of firms (i.e., large ∈b), less concentrated industries have a larger probability
than more concentrated industries of having firms lobbying. I include a discussion
of this lemma in section 3.6.3.2. Now, I start by presenting two simple results on
the intensive margin decision. The interested reader can see more theoretical results
not presented here, in the Appendix of this chapter. I start by presenting a result
that links firm- and industry-level lobbying expenditures with market concentration.
First, I assume that the lobbying expenditures are symmetric, that is li (n) = l (n),
∀i : 1, ..., n.
Theorem 3.2 sign(∂L
∂n
) = sign(1− ∈l,n) where ∈l,n= −nl′(n)l(n) .
This result states the relationship between the elasticity of firm- and industry
levels lobbying expenditures.174 Notice that the average lobbying expenditure is
increasing (decreasing) if l′ (n) > (<) l(n)
n
. There are three relevant regions. Two in
which the industry-level lobbying expenditure is increasing in the number of firms
and one in which is decreasing. When the firm-level lobbying function is increasing
then the industry-level function is always increasing. However, when the firm-level
172The prediction on the lobbying costs is intuitive but to the best of my knowledge it has not
been empirically explored.
173A discussion with David Baron has called my attention to the following not obvious effect.
First, notice that the equation defining the extensive margin decision also works in a case where
we analyze the lobbying decision with respect to the status quo benefits. Second, and more
importantly, firms will be more likely to lobby when the bill negatively affects them than in other
cases. To see these facts, let Gsq ≥ 0 be the benefits that the firm has in the status quo. Then,
the firm can decide whether to lobby or not. If it lobbies it will get Gl, while if it does not lobby,
it will get Gnl. Then, the firm will lobby if Gl − Gsq ≥ Gnl − Gsq. This is the same condition
stated above. To see the second result, notice that the incentives to lobby may be different if the
firm can increase its profits or if the firm tries to avoid a decrease in its benefits. To understand
this, note that if Gnl < Gsq, the RHS of the extensive margin inequality is negative, so as far as
Gl −Gsq ≥ 0, the firm will always decide to lobby. However, if Gnl > Gsq, Gl −Gsq ≥ 0 it is not
a sufficient decision to make firms lobby. It will also depend on Gl − Gnl ≥ 0. This simple idea
shows that it is more likely to see firms lobbying when they are going to be adversely
affected by the bill than when they can be positively affected.
174If l′ (n) ≥ 0, ∈l,n< 0 and then ∂L∂n ≥ 0. On the other hand, if l′ (n) < 0, ∈l,n> 0, then we
need the elasticity to be inelastic to have ∂L∂n > 0 and elastic to have the reverse case. Inelastic
would mean the average lobbying expenditure is larger than the marginal lobbying expenditure
(i.e., l(n)n > −l′ (n)). Notice also that if there is no relationship between the firm-level lobbying
expenditure and the number of firms l′ (n) = 0, then the firm-level lobbying elasticity is zero
∈l,n= 0 which implies that ∂L∂n > 0. This is the pure effect of having a large number of firms in the
industry. Finally, notice that ∂L∂n = 0 if and only if ∈l,n= 1. The elasticity reachs this value when
l′ (n) < 0 and the marginal lobbying expenditure is exactly equal to the average expenditure.
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lobbying function is decreasing the elasticity of the firm-level function (i.e., ∈l,n) will
determine whether the industry-level lobbying function is increasing in the number
of firms or not.
Figure 3.1. shows these three regions. In the first region, l′ (n) , L′ (n) ≥ 0.
Region 2 represents the case in which l′ (n) < 0 but the marginal expenditure is larger
than the mean expenditure, therefore, ∈l,n> 1 and as a consequence L′ (n) < 0.175
Finally, the last region represents the case in which l′ (n) < 0 and L′ (n) ≥ 0. This
last region is the only region representing the empirical results of Section 3.2. Less
concentrated industries spend more than more concentrated industries, and firms
in industries with more firms spend less than firms in industries with fewer firms.
The take away here is that with symmetric lobbying expenditure functions, the only
way to rationalize the empirical fact from Section 3.2 is when ∈l,n< 1, that is when
firm-level lobbying expenditures are inelastic to the number of firms in the industry.
The following result states the relationship between the elasticities when I allow
for heterogeneity in lobbying expenditures. A thorough discussion on the differences
between symmetric and asymmetric lobbying expenditure functions can be found in
the Appendix of this chapter. Let wi =
li
L
be the proportion of the i-th lobbying
expenditure to the total industry lobbying expenditure, ∈li,n is the elasticity of the
lobbying expenditure of the i-th firm to the number of firms of the industry and
∈li,L is the elasticity of the firm-level lobbying expenditure of the i-th firm to the
industry-level lobbying expenditure, then
Theorem 3.3 sign(∂L(n)
∂n
) = sign(
∑n
i=1wi ∈li,n)sign(1−
∑n
i=1 wi ∈li,L)
This result simply states that the total industry lobbying expenditure elasticity
depends on all the individual elasticities of both the number of firms and the total
lobbying expenditure weighted by their relative size on the lobbying expenditure.
One implication of this equation is that even if most of the companies tend to
decrease their lobbying expenditures as the number of firms in the industry increases
∂li
∂n
< 0 and these firms are very sensitive to the total lobbying expenditure (i.e.,∂li
∂L
>
1), if there are just a few big companies in the industry for which ∂li
∂n
> 0 and ∂li
∂L
< 1,
the total industry elasticity may be positive.
Now I state, two results for the intensive margin. Assume there is a single lobbyist
whose income is L, and who is going to choose a signal s to send to the politicians
she wants. Then, in the same spirit of Bernheim and Whinston (1986) the lobbyist is
maximizing the total lobbying expenditures received L (s) .176 In equilibrium, total
lobbying expenditures depend on the number of firms lobbying L(n). To follow, I
focus on characterizing the symmetric equilibrium schedule lobbying functions.
175If l (n) is a concave function in n, then l′ (n) (n′ − n) ≥ l (n′) − l (n) for all n′, n. If n′ = 0,
then l′ (n) ≥ l(n)n .
176The reader should notice that the extension to the case where the lobbyist care about other
variables such as her reputation is straightforward.
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Theorem 3.4 The lobbying expenditure (truthful schedule) l (n) of one firm is given
by max(c−1 (−ng′ (n) , 0).
The lobbying expenditure of one firm compensates for the reduction in the gross
welfare of the other lobbying firms brought about by the decision of the firm to
lobby. Now, I present the key result of this section.
Lemma 3.2 ∂l(n)
∂θ
, ∂L(n)
∂θ
< 0.
This result states that the lobbying expenditures both at the firm and indus-
try level are larger when they lobby for bills that are more excludable. That is,
holding everything constant, more excludable bills have larger associated lobbying
expenditures.
Discussion of the Model This model provides a generalization of some of the
most important papers in the literature. In section 3.6.3.1, I explain how my model
generalizes Olson (1965), Stigler (1974), Esteban and Ray (2001) and Pecorino and
Temimi (2008). The most important take away here is that none of these papers
consider excludable goods at all.
I am not the first one to study the relationship between excludability and col-
lective action. Chamberlin (1974), among other authors, points out that Olson’s
proposition of an inverse relationship between effective collective action and group
size hinges on the assumption that the collective good is purely non-excludable.
However, these authors do not provide a theoretical framework to understand its
dynamics.
The typical collective action story does not emphasize that the size of the bill can
be affected and completely neglects that the probability of passing the bill can be
manipulated. 177 If a firm does not lobby, it incurs in two costs: 1. The probability
that the bill is passed is reduced, so the expected gain is also reduced. 2. In certain
cases, the size of the benefits of the bills can be affected by lobbying. So, the size
of these benefits is also reduced, decreasing again the expected gain.178 Rides are
not free. When firms do not lobby, firms change their expected benefits, that is
not only the size of the pie but the probability of seeing the pie. To the best of my
knowledge, my model is the first one including not only the excludability dimension
but the fact that rides are not for free.
Main Implication To understand better why the excludability of the bill can ex-
plain the main empirical fact presented in the previous section, let’s consider Figure
3.2. This graph represents the relationship between industry-lobbying expenditures
and number of firms in the industry for two different levels of excludability of the
177For more information on the limitations of the collective action theory, see Wilkerson, Smith
and Stramp (2015)
178According to Stigler (1974) this idea was realized by Harold Demsetz.
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bill. The right (left)-hand decreasing function represents the case of lobbying ex-
penditures for excludable (non-excludable) goods.
The graph represents a situation in which less concentrated industries have lower
expenditures, just as Olson’s main prediction. For the sake of argument, imagine
we start in point A. This point corresponds to the combination (n, L) (i.e., an
industry with n firms spending L dollars). Now, let’s imagine we see a different
market structure, that is a horizontal move from n to n∗ > n. This change can be
due to a change in the market structure of the industry that was located at point A
or simply a different industry with more firms. The relationship between lobbying
expenditures and the number of firms in the industry will imply that we have to
reach point B, which is (n∗, L′). However, as excludable bills have a higher lobbying
expenditure for all levels of market concentrations, as we stated in the last result of
the previos sub-section, we can change the market structure and be in a point like C,
that is (n∗, L′′). This can happen for instance, if the change in the market structure
may have also changed the type of bills the industry is interested in lobbying for.
This point has the same market structure but it has a higher lobbying expenditure
L′′ > L′.
Then, the main implication of this analysis is that if different market structures
lobby for legislative objects with different excludability levels, the main empirical
finding of the previous section can be explained by the simple fact, that less con-
centrated industries tend to lobby for more excludable goods. The aim of the next
sub-section will be to provide empirical evidence in favor of this hypothesis.
3.3.3 Empirical Evidence
In this section, I provide empirical evidence that firms in less-concentrated industries
tend to lobby more heavily for excludable goods. In order to conduct this exercise,
I use information on earmarks. Earmarks are appropriations of the federal budget
that members of Congress give to firms or organizations. Deciding on the recipient
necessarily means excluding other potential firms or organizations.
I base my empirical exercises on information publicly released by Taxpayers for
Common Sense (henceforth TCS ). This database contains the recipients of earmarks
for the period 2008 to 2010. TCS started creating this database using information
released by members of Congress, during a time when a transparency policy was
in place. Under this policy, politicians had to release the description and amount
of money committed to a project, as well as the main requester of the earmark.
TCS expanded this database by including earmarks that were not reported by any
member but that meet the definition of an earmark.
I have webscrapped the industry of the main recipients of the earmarks and have
matched the earmark information with market concentration measures from the
Economic Census. Table 3.9 shows descriptive evidence on the relationship between
industry market concentration and earmarks recipients. Here, I measure market
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concentration with the total number of firms in the industry. The main results of
this section are robust to alternative ways of measuring market concentration. To
facilitate the interpretation of the table, I have standarized the levels of concen-
tration by quintiles.179 Larger quintiles represent less-concentrated industries. The
main takeaway from this table is the sharp concentration of recipients among larger
quantiles. For each year of the database, at least 63% of the recipients are in the
two largest quintiles. This is more than expected, as these two quantiles represent
only 40% of the total number of industries. It is also remarkable that one out of
three recipients is in the largest quintile.
I have also conducted these cross-tabulations for the sample of recipients that
were also lobbying in the years before the earmarks were awarded. The conclusions
are robust. Most of the recipients that were lobbying belong to industries with larger
number of firms.
An alternative way to confirm the extent to which industries differ by their
interest in earmarks is to use information about all of the bills that are lobbied and
to see the extent to which the bills with earmarks are a large or small fraction of
the total number of bills. Unfortunately, TCS does not report the exact bill that
allocated the earmark money. To overcome this limitation, I have webscrapped all
of the information about earmark declarations.180
For the period 2008 to 2010, policy makers had to report detailed information
about the earmark. This exercise, contrary to TCS’ information, provides me with
information about the specific bill that introduced the earmark. The limitation is
that I include only earmarks that have been declared by congressmen, and, contrary
to TCS’ information, I would not be able to see the universe of those.
The main results of this exercise are given in Table 3.10. This table is divided
into two panels. Panel A shows the fraction of bills with earmarks lobbied over
the total number of bills lobbied for each quintile and year. For instance, the table
shows that among all of the bills lobbied in the less-concentrated industries (i.e.,
Quintile 5), in 2008, 55% of these legislative proposals had an earmark attached.
Panel B shows the fraction of expenditures on bills that had any earmark over
the total lobbying expenditure. The table shows that about 60% of the lobbying
expenditures by the less-concentrated industries were targeted to bills that contain
earmarks. Panel A of this table shows that less-concentrated industries lobby more
for bills with earmarks than for other types of bills. The percentage for the largest
quintile ranges from 55% to 62%. In contrast, this percentage is not larger than
24% for the first three quintiles. That is, more-concentrated industries do not spend
179To make this standarization, I calculate the quintiles on the total number of firms for all of
the four-digits code industries reported by the Economic Census. For these analyses, I use 2007
data and no other year, for two reasons. First, it is more accurate, given that the earmark data
are from one to three years after the Census information; and, second, not all of the industries
have information for 2012, but all of them have them information for 2007.
180For more details on the main source of the earmark declarations, see here.
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more than one fourth of their advocacy efforts on bills with earmarks. Panel B
shows similar patterns. The least-concentrated industries always devote more than
52% of their expenditures to bills with earmarks, whereas this percentage is never
greater than 24% for the case of the first three quintiles. The main takeaway from
Table 3.10 is that, if we measure the level of excludability in lobbying activities
with either the number of bills with earmarks or the money spent on those bills,
less-concentrated industries tend to disproportionately exert more effort than more
concentrated industries on excludable bills.
3.3.3.1 Omitted Bias
All of these results suggest that the main empirical fact of Section 3.2 can be ex-
plained using the omitted variable bias logic. To better understand the problem,
imagine that we want to estimate the lobbying expenditures equation as follows:
Li = β1MCi + β5Exi + εi
where Li are the lobbying expenditures of the i-th industry; MCi is the level
of market concentration of the industry; and Exi is the level of excludability of
the goods for which industry i is lobbying. In Section 3.2, we ran the estimation
above without considering a variable for the level of excludability. However, as
the theoretical section has shown, the level of excludability of the goods explains
heterogeneity in the lobbying expenditures. Therefore, we may be estimating:
β̂1 = β1 + β5γ,
where γ measures the correlation between MCi and Exi. The evidence given in
Tables 3.9 and 3.10 suggests that γ < 0, whereas the theoretical section argues for
β5 > 0; therefore, we have that:
β̂1 < β1
To investigate this possibility, I focus on market concentration data for four-digit
industries from the Economic Census of 2007, as well as on lobbying expenditures
for 2007. To measure the excludability dimension, I use 2008 earmarks data from
TCS.181 I propose a measure of excludability based on congressional committees, in
the same spirit of Chapter 1. For each committee, I calculate the fraction of bills
that receive an earmark. Then, to have a measure at the industry level, I simply
calculate the average (weighted by the number of bills) of these fractions over all of
the committees that study bills for that industry.
Table 3.11 shows the results of this exercise. Here, I present the estimates of
the coefficient when I include only market concentration measures (n, C4, C8, C20
181Unfortunately, this seems the most plausible estimation at the industry level. Orbis data are
from 2012, and the most recent year with earmark information is 2010.
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and HHI) and when I include both the concentration measures and the measure
of excludability. When I include only the concentration measures, I obtain results
that are qualitatively and significantly similar to the ones shown in Section 3.2
-in particular, Table 3.4.182 Less-concentrated industries tend to spend more on
lobbying efforts. However, the inclusion of the excludability dimension changes the
sign and significance of the market concentration effect. First, the results for the
market concentration measures are less significant. For instance, measures C8 and
C20 are not significant, while measures n and HHI move from being significant at
95% level to 90% significance level. Second, the sign of the coefficient is completely
reversed, implying that, controlling for the level of excludability, more-concentrated
industries spend more on lobbying, just as in the standard Olson’s prediction.
These results support the idea of the omitted variable bias. In Section 3.2, the
estimated coefficient is about -0.01, whereas it is about 0.01 in Table 3.11. This
is explained by the fact that the -0.02 difference is equal to the coefficient of the
excludability on market concentration β̂5 =0.04 and the correlation between market
concentration and the excludability measure, which is about -0.5.
3.4 Identification
As a final empirical exercise in this chapter, I investigate if the negative correla-
tion I found between market concentration and lobbying expenditures in Section 3.2
can be interpreted causally. One way to investigate this possible causation effect is
by using Difference in Difference analysis. The idea is to explore a national-level
exogenous shock to the market structure of an industry that affects city markets
differently. Its effect is manifested by changes in lobbying expenditures. Standard
econometric estimations measuring the relationship between market concentration
and advocacy efforts suffer from reverse-causality problems. In this setting, this
concern is implausible since it is difficult to argue that city-level lobbying expen-
ditures can change the national-level market structure for a certain industry. This
is the case as city-level lobbying expenditures have very concrete goals that target
changes in the status quo of local as opposed to national markets.
3.4.1 Data Used
There are two main sources of data: reports of lobbying expenditures at the city
level and, a mergers database.
3.4.1.1 Lobbying Expenditures
I have collected city-level lobbying expenditures for firms in different industries. I
focus on the nine biggest cities that have lobbying disclosure requirements allowing
me to identify the client, lobbyist, lobbying expenditure, main issue for discussion
182The main difference between these estimates and the ones in Table 3.4 is that there, I use
data for the Economic Census of 2012, whereas in this table, I use data for the 2007 census.
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and time of the lobbying activity.183 There are other cities in the US with disclosure
requirements, but some do not make the information publicly available, are too
small (i.e., scarce advocacy activities), or do not require lobbyists to register relevant
information such as the specific client or the amount of lobbying expenditures.
Table 3.12 presents the main features of this database. The collected data shows
large geographical dispersion, as I have cities in states as distant as California, Wash-
ington, New York and Florida. The cities make available lobbying reports starting
from different years. Some have been reporting data for long periods, whereas others
have started more recently. For instance, there have been data available on New
York City since 1998, while for Chicago, the data have been available only since
2012.
In five of these cities, lobbyists have to make these reports every quarter; in three
cities, they have to make reports every time that they start a contract; and only in
San Francisco, lobbyists have to make these reports monthly. For comparability, I
focus on time variation at the quarter level.184
3.4.1.2 Mergers Database
I use the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum database.185 This database provides de-
tailed information on worldwide mergers, acquisitions and alliances. The database
contains both US and non-US companies’ targets. This database is updated daily
and uses, as its source, Securities and Exchange Commission filings with their inter-
national counterparts, over 200 news sources in English and other languages, trade
publications, and others sources. The database contains all public and private cor-
porate transactions involving at least 5% of the ownership of a company, where the
transaction was valued at $1 million or more or where the value of the transaction
was undisclosed. The initial database contains 823,337 observations of mergers and
acquisitions of more than 220 countries for the period 1995 to 2016. The database
reports information about the location and industry of both target and acquiring
companies. Besides information on the target and acquirer, each observation con-
tains a small summary of the history of the merger, information on the status of the
operation, total shares acquired (if the merge was successfull otherwise the number
of shares promised to be transferred), the value of the transaction, and other finan-
cial information such as the forecast value of the companies, as well as sales and
revenues after taxes.
This database also provides the month of the announcement of the merger, as
well as the month in which the merger was effective. The status of the merger has
183These nine cities are Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, Miami, NYC, Philadelphia, San Diego,
San Francisco and Seattle.
184In the case of contracts with a duration longer than a quarter, I assume that the expenditure
is divided uniformly across months, and I allocate the corresponding fraction to each quarter in
which the contract was available. For instance, if there is a contract from January to April for
$400, I will register $300 for the first quarter and $100 for the second quarter.
185For more information, see Thomson Reuters.
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three different categories: Category 1 (77%) is when there was a successfull merger.
Among the observations in this category, 91% contain a merger in which 100% of the
targeted company was acquired. For the baseline estimations, I will focus on this
sub-sample. Category 2 (3%) represents unsuccessful mergers -that is, circumstances
in which the parties intended to merge, but it did not happen. Finally, Category 3
(20%) groups all the other cases that have neither been successful nor withdrawn.
Table 3.13 shows statistics descriptive of this database classified for three differ-
ent levels of industry aggregation: two-, three- and four-digit SIC codes. The first
part of the table shows the mean and standard deviation (between and within) for
the number of mergers by category. The bottom part of the table contains informa-
tion on the successful mergers. For this part, I focus on only three variables: total
value of the mergers at the industry level; average percentage of shares acquired;
and average value of the transaction. This last variable is simply the total value of
all the mergers divided by the total number of successful mergers, for each industry.
3.4.2 Estimation
With this database, I am interested in understanding how changes in market concen-
tration brought about by national-level mergers and acquisitions affect both firm-
and industry-level lobbying expenditures. In order to investigate this relationship,
I estimate:
ljict = γic + γit + γct + β6Dict + εjict
where j index firms, i industries, c cities and t quarters. The model provides full
nonparametric control for industry-specific city effects (γic), time-varying industry
effects (γit) and city-specific time effects that are common across industries (γct).
The variable ljict is the firm-level lobbying expenditure. The coefficient β6 measures
the relationship of interest. Dict takes the value of 1 for mergers and acquisitions
that affected industry i in city c at period t. Here, if Dict = 1, Dics is also 1 for all
of the periods s > t. The variable takes the value of 0 otherwise.
A second estimation of interest is to run the above equation with a dependent
variable at the industry level. That is, Lict. As in Section 3.2, this is simply the sum
of all the firm-level expenditures of industry i. For these exercises, and with the aim
of obtaining cleaner results, I consider only the lobbying expenditures of the firms
that were not involved in the merger. These estimations cluster the standard errors
at the industry-city level.
3.4.2.1 Selection
In the following exercises, I focus on observations where both the target and acquir-
ing firms are based in the United States and belong to the same two-digit industry,
and I examine them only for the years 2012 to 2016. Furthermore, I restrict the set
of mergers to the ones in which there is a transfer of 100% of the shares, and the
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total value of the transfer is above 95% of the population of transfer values.186
A possible empirical exercise is to classify all the city-level political goals in a
dimension of excludability and create an empirical measure of the intensity of the
excludability goals at the local market level. This seems a challenging exercise as
there is not a clear way to classify some lobbying objects. In this chapter, I focus only
on the sample of lobbying reports in which there is a clear excludable component
in the lobbying goal. Examples of those are earmarks, tax breaks, duties giveaways,
(legally intentional) fiscal loopholes, loans at favorable rates, price controls, and
private bills, among others. In exercises not shown here, I have conducted the
same estimations as presented below for the non-excludable goals sample of lobbying
activities and I found qualitatively similar results.
Tables 3.14 and 3.15 present information on the 15 unique mergers that conform
to all of the criteria above. Table 3.14 provides information on the specific names
of the companies in the merger, as well as the industries to which the companies
belong. The information on the industry is shown with both the two-digit SIC code
and the specific name of the industrial sector. Table 3.15 shows the specific month
and quarter in which the merger took effect. The quarter with more mergers is the
last quarter of 2014, while the quarter with fewer mergers is the second quarter of
2014. The first quarter of 2014 and the second and third quarters of 2013 each have
three mergers. This table also provides the specific value of the transaction, which
ranges from 550 to 9.700 million dollars. Finally, the table provides information on
the total number of cities affected by each merger. A city is affected if both of the
firms involved in the merger were conducting lobbying activities in that city for at
least one year prior the merger. This number ranges from three to five cities. On
average, a merger affects four cities.
Table 3.16 presents descriptive information on the city-level lobbying expendi-
tures. This table presents the total number of firms and the two-digit industrial
codes for each city. The number of industries ranges from 61 in San Francisco to
78 in New York City. The average number of firms actively lobbying in a given
quarter ranges from 387 in San Diego to 621 in New York City. Finally, the table
presents the average firm-level lobbying expenditure per quarter for each of the nine
selected cities. San Diego and Dallas have the lowest average firm-level lobbying
expenditures, while Chicago and New York City have the highest.
3.4.3 Results
Table 3.17 presents the main results of the above estimations. The first two columns
of this table present the estimated coefficient β6. The first column presents the re-
sults for the case in which the unit of observation is firm-level lobbying expenditures,
whereas the second column presents the results for the case in which we consider
186Percentile 95% corresponds to US 2300 million dollars.
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total industry lobbying expenditures.
For both dependent variables, the coefficient is positive and significant, meaning
that both firms and industries that faced an increase in their market concentra-
tion (through a merger that affected their local market -industry*city-) increased
their average lobbying expenditures. The average firm-level lobbying expenditure is
about 6200, while the point estimate is about 690. This represents an increase of
about 11%. For the case in which the dependent variable is the industry-lobbying
expenditures, this increase is about 10%, as the point estimate is about 9900 and
the average value industry-level lobbying expenditures are 102000.
To get a sense of these magnitudes, note that, on average, each local market (an
industry-city combination) has seven firms. Therefore, a merger, which decreases
the number of firms by one, represents a decrease in the total average number of
firms by about 14%=1/7. Putting these estimates together, we see that a decrease
in the number of firms by 14% increases the firm and industry-lobbying expenditures
by about 11%. That is, the relationship between lobbying expenditures and market
concentration is inelastic.
3.4.3.1 Robustness
The previous estimation is the baseline estimation in this section. This estimation
is robust to different changes in the selection of the sample. In Table 3.17, I also
present the results with different samples of mergers. For all of these cases, I focus
on mergers in which both the target and acquiring firms are companies based on the
United States and only for years 2012 to 2016. I conduct several exercises. First,
I consider the largest mergers for companies that belong to different industries,
and I focus on analyzing the effect of the firms that belong to the same industry
as the acquiring firm. That is, the point estimates present the effect of lobbying
expenditures for firms that belong to the same local market of the acquiring firm.
The intuition is that local markets face a change in the market structure not by
means of a change in the number of firms, but by a change in the size of one of the
companies in this market. There are 37 mergers with those criteria. Columns 3 and
4 of Table 3.17 present the results of these exercises, showing that the coefficients
for both firm and industry estimations are positive and with a similar magnitude as
before, but not significant. This means that there is no statistical evidence to imply
that companies increase their lobbying expenditures when one of the companies in
the same local market has acquired a company in another industry.
An alternative exercise is to focus on firms that belong to the same industry but
to change the definition of a merger. In the baseline estimation, we consider mergers
in which there was a 100% transfer of shares and that belong to transaction values
of at least the 95th percentile of the total distribution of values. Columns 5 and
6 of Table 3.17 present the results when I also include mergers in which there was
at least an 80% transfer of the shares. In columns 7 and 8, I present the results
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when I include transfer values of at least the 90th percentile of the distribution of
values. For both of these exercises, the coefficient is still positive and significant.
This implies that the selection of mergers in terms of percentage of transfer of shares
and value of the transaction do not have an impact on the results in this section. In
results not presented here, I show that I obtain qualitatively the same results, when
I use different thresholds for the two aforementioned variables.187
For all the previous estimations, I estimated the impact of a merger on other
firms belonging to the same local market of the firm in the merger. Columns 9
and 10 of Table 3.17 show the results when I also include the merged firms in
the calculations. The results are still significant and positive. However, the point
estimates are smaller than the effects found in the baseline estimations. Overall,
Table 3.17 present evidence on the positive robust effect of mergers on city-level
lobbying expenditures.
3.4.3.2 Parallel Assumption
An important assumption in the difference-in-difference methodology is the parallel
trend assumption before the shocks. In order to test this assumption, I conduct a
modified version of the baseline estimation by changing β6Dict by
t+3∑
τ=t−3
βτDicτ . In
this case, Dicτ = 1 if t = τ and 0 otherwise, and Dict = 1 in the quarter in which
the i-th industry at city c faced a merger. Table 3.18 presents the results of this
exercise. As in the previous tables, I present the results for both firm and industry-
level lobbying expenditures. The table shows that the coefficient estimates for the
periods before the merger are positive but not significant, meaning that there are
no statistical differences between the treated and control groups before the market
concentration shocks. On the other hand, the coefficients for the period of the
merger and the following two quarters are significant, implying a differential effect
on lobbying expenditures for local markets that faced a merger. For the case of the
firm-level estimations, the effect of the merger remains up to the second quarter
after the merger. However, for the case of the industry-level estimations, this effect
persists for three quarters afterwards. Overall, the main message from Table 3.18 is
that the assumption of parallel trends holds and the effect of market concentration
on lobbying expenditures has an impact in the same quarter that the merger occurs,
as well as half a year after.
3.4.3.3 Placebo Tests
I end this section by conducting alternative estimations. First, I consider the case
in which the observed mergers occur at a date different from the one observed. For
187I have also conducted estimations in which I consider mergers in which there is a transfer of
at least 70, 75, 85, 90 percent of the shares, and I obtain the same results. These results are also
robust when I try different percentiles for the distribution of transfer values, such as 75, 80, 85.
Finally, one can also try mergers defined by combinations of these two thresholds, and the main
results still hold.
166
each existing merger, I change the actual date of the merger to a random quarter.
This randomly selected quarter can be before or after the actual event took place.
Second, I fix the dates in which the mergers occur, but I allocate two different
companies randomly selected to be in the merger. That is, I hold the change in the
market structure for each local market (the same change in each industry for each
city) constant, but I change the identity of the merged firms. These two exercises
aim to distinguish whether or not there are some events explaining the effects on
the lobbying expenditures due to some unobservable characteristics of the industry
that received the shock or the date on which the event occurred, respectively.
Third, I consider mergers with the same characteristics of the selected sample
of the baseline estimation (i.e., at least 95th percentile of the transaction value,
only 100% shares transferred, etc.) in which a merger was announced but did not
happen. Finally, for the mergers of the baseline sample, I change the dates on which
the event occurred. I consider the date of the initial announcement instead of the
day on which the merger took place, as in the baseline estimation. On average, the
announcement happened two quarters before the merger took place.
Table 3.19 show the results of these exercises. For all of these estimations, the
effect of the merger is not statistically different from 0. The only coefficient from
these estimations with some statistical significance is for the fourth exercise, in
which I measure the effect of a merger (with its initial announcement date, instead
the date in which the merger took place) on industry-level lobbying expenditures.
An interpretation of this result is that the industry as a whole started reacting to an
announced merger as soon as it was announced. However, the coefficient represents
a smaller effect than the estimates in which the date of the merger is the actual effect
date (when the merger took place instead of when it was announced). Overall, this
implies that there is an industry-level reaction once the merger is announced but
that the reaction to it is smaller than the reaction at the time that the merger takes
place. A possible way to explain this result is that there are some circumstances
in which the intention to merge is withdrawn once it has been announced, and,
therefore, there is no need to adjust for advocacy strategies once the announcement
takes place.
The results collected in this section provide empirical evidence on the effect
of merger on city-level lobbying expenditures. Firms and industries that face an
increase in their market concentration increase their lobbying expenditures. This
result is robust to different ways of defining the sample of mergers, as well as to
different placebo tests.
3.5 Final Discussion
The aim of this chapter has been to understand the way in which the excludability
of the goods for which interest groups lobby can have an impact on the way that
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market structure is related to lobbying expenditures.
The central point is that even if this dimension has been largely neglected by the
literature, it is important because it allows us to understand why we observe that
less-concentrated industries tend to spend more on lobbying than more-concentrated
industries. Mancur Olson was the first scholar to establish a well-structured link
between the number of individuals in the group and individual efforts. His main
claim is that unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, self-interested
individuals will face the free-riding problem and, therefore, will not overcome the
collective-action problem. My contribution to this debate is that as groups can
have goals that differ by their excludability level, we can empirically observe that
Olson’s prediction does not hold. I show that once one controls for a measure of the
excludability in effort goals, we reestablish his prediction. The main takeaway is,
therefore, that future studies should keep in mind, in a general context, the main
characteristics of the groups’ goals and, in particular, the level of excludability of
these goals.
Although I believe that this chapter has progressed our understanding of the
collective-action problem, there are some weaknesses that should be addressed in
future work. First, the theoretical framework developed here relates lobbying efforts
to several underlying variables. Here, I focused on the level of excludability of the
lobbying goals, as there were no clear ways to construct empirical measures for other
variables. Future work could explore how changes in the rivalry of these goods or
how the perceived effect of the lobbying expenditures can explain the variance in
these efforts.
Second, in Section 3.3, I measure the level of excludability of the goals of the
groups using earmark data. Although I think that this is an appropriate measure
for excludable goods, it is an incomplete one, and, therefore, it should be interpreted
as a lower bound of the total excludability measures we may observe. In the future,
scholars may consider measuring other types of excludable goods or extending the
earmark time period.188 Finally, in Section 3.4, I focused on only nine cities, as they
were among the few asking detailed information about advocacy activities. The
transparency rules regulating advocacy activities at both the city and state levels
are changing rapidly. I expect, in the near future, to see a larger set of cities and
states with detailed information of their lobbying activities. A natural sequel to this
chapter would be to extend this work to more cities and to explore the possibility
of better understanding the lobbying world with the use of state-level advocacy
activities.
Abstracting from the current application, the analysis underscores the potential
188For the first part, I refer the interested reader to some early attempts to categorize tax
exemptions. For instance, the literature in Accounting and Law have studied some tax exemptions
in a broad category called rifle-shot rules (Hanna (2006)). For the second part, I refer the reader
to the possibility of using a promising but incomplete text data analysis on earmarks detection at
DSSG.
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of including excludability in the collective-action analysis. Here, I have provided a
simple setting to study its effects in the lobbying context. A natural continuation of
this chapter would be to see the extent to which this dimension contributes to our
understanding of collective action in other economic and political contexts.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Tables
Data Source
Variable Used Orbis Compustat Economic Census
n Yes Yes Yes
C4, C8 and C20 Yes only C4, C8 Yes
HHI Yes Yes only Manufacturing
Years Available 2012 1998-2014 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2012
Definition Industry SIC 2, 3, 4 digits SIC 2, 3, 4 digits SIC 2, 3, 4 digits
Variables Used Turnover, Employees Assets, Employees, Revenue, Sales Sales, Employees
Table 3.1: Variables Used by Data Source.
Note: For each of these databases, I measure marker concentration with five different measures: total number of
firms (henceforth n), 3 concentration ratios (henceforth C4, C8 and C20) and Herfindahl index (henceforth HHI).
I calculate these measures using the Orbis information with both total turnover and total number of employees for
each firm for the year 2012. For Compustat, I calculate this information using data on total assets, number of
employees, total revenue and total sales for the period 1998 to 2014. Finally, I use the concentration measures that
the Economic Census release every five years (1997 to 2012). The Census give these concentration measures for all
of the manufacturing industries. For non-manufacturing industries, the US Census Bureau only releases the first 4
concentration measures.
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Orbis Economic Census
4 Digits 3 Digits 2 Digits 4 Digits 3 Digits 2 Digits
n Mean 15844.05 48641.24 194565 35509.37 115860.2 405371.8
Stdv 39029.91 98731.47 193772.7 55164.97 163462 284203.7
C4 Mean 8.20 6.46 3.23 24.00 22.94 8.04
Stdv 16.26 12.63 10.65 19.48 20.31 6.52
C8 Mean 8.37 6.60 3.31 31.45 30.30 12.47
Stdv 16.25 12.62 10.64 22.80 22.40 8.78
C20 Mean 8.45 6.68 3.38 40.96 39.41 20.8
Stdv 16.23 12.61 10.63 24.84 24.39 13.89
HHI Mean 85.08 67.17 34.25 401.64 178.65 NA
Stdv 162.22 12.60 10.62 389.40 188.50 NA
Industries 307 100 25 258 74 12
]
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for Orbis and Economics Census.
Note: The table reports mean and standard deviation for concentration measures n, C4, C8 and C20 and HHI.
All the statistics are calculated for year 2012 except for the industries Utilities (2007 NAICS code 22) and
Administrative and support and waste management and remediation services (2007 NAICS code 22) for the
Economic Census. For these two industries, 2007 is the most recent data available. For the Economic census, n is
calculated with the total number of establishments whereas it is the total number of firms for Orbis. For Orbis,
Concentation measures C4, C8, C20 and HHI are calculated using data on the number of employees per firm.
Similar results emerge when I calculate these estimations with total revenue. For the Economic Census, the
concentration measures C4, C8 and C20 are calculated using information on Sales, receipts, or revenue. Finally,
for the Census, HHI is only calculated for manufacturing industries (codes 31-33) for the 50 largest companies for
three and four 2007 NAICS digits for the year 2007. There are 21 (85) 3 (4) digits 2007 NAICS code industries
among codes 31-33. The Census do not report information for Mining (21), Construction (23) and Management of
Companies and Enterprises (55).
171
4 Digits 3 Digits 2 Digits
Mean Stdv Mean Stdv Mean Stdv
n Total 20.04 56.60 31.84 96.90 121.98 233.60
Bet/With 51.6/21.4 90.3/32.4 222.3/68.3
Sales HHI Total 0.45 0.28 0.39 0.27 0.21 0.24
Bet/With 0.26/0.13 0.26/0.12 0.27/0.07
C4 Total 0.87 0.17 0.83 0.19 0.63 0.23
Bet/With 0.15/0.08 0.17/0.07 0.23/0.06
C8 Total 0.94 0.12 0.92 0.13 0.77 0.2
Bet/With 0.11/0.06 0.12/0.05 0.19/0.05
Emp HHI Total 0.46 0.27 0.40 0.28 0.22 0.24
Bet/With 0.25/0.14 0.25/0.13 0.25/0.07
C4 Total 0.87 0.19 0.83 0.2 0.62 0.24
Bet/With 0.16/0.10 0.18/0.08 0.24/0.07
C8 Total 0.94 0.15 0.92 0.15 0.76 0.22
Bet/With 0.12/0.09 0.14/0.07 0.21/0.06
Observations 6370 440/12 4011 275/14 1047 72/14
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics for Compustat.
Note: Initially I have 127715 observations, comprending 14 years (1998-2014) and 16581 companies. The panel is
unbalanced because some companies enter or exit during this period. The statistics are classified by the number of
digits for which an industry is defined. Within each industry classification, the first column represents the mean
value, while the second column presents the standard deviation. The variables of interest are number of firms n,
HHI, C4 and C8. For each firm, I present the mean for the sample and the standard deviation between (across
industries) and within (across years). After the statistics representing the number of firms, there are two panels.
The first panel is based on the sales of the firms, while the second panel is based on the number of employees of
the firm. The last row contains information on the total number of observations, industries and years used in the
analysis.
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Dependent Variable: LiXi [Estimates of β1]
4 Digits
n 0.012** 0.015**
(0.008) (0.010)
C4 -0.012** -0.013**
(0.009) (0.010)
C8 -0.013** -0.013**
(0.008) (0.008)
C20 -0.010** -0.010**
(0.005) (0.005)
HHI -0.017** -0.016**
(0.010) (0.010)
Obs 307 258
Database Orbis Economic Census
Adj R2 0.478 0.456 0.421 0.433 0.542 0.490 0.479 0.446 0.471 0.569
3 Digits
n 0.020* 0.024**
(0.015) (0.013)
C4 -0.019** -0.021**
(0.011) (0.012)
C8 -0.020* -0.023*
(0.016) ( 0.018)
C20 -0.012** -0.015**
(0.007) (0.009)
HHI -0.019* -0.024**
(0.014) (0.013)
Obs 100 74
Database Orbis Economic Census
Adj R2 0.419 0.386 0.356 0.375 0.462 0.428 0.391 0.347 0.368 0.471
Table 3.4: Estimates of Equation (1).
Note: The table shows the estimated coefficients, standard errors, total number of observations and adjusted R
2
from equation (1). The table has two different panels. The top panel presents the results for the case that the
industry is defined with four-digits whereas the bottom panel presents the results for the case the industry is
defined with three-digits. In these estimations, an observation is an industry. The left-side part of the table uses
data from Orbis, whereas the right side part of the table uses data from the US Economic Census. The dependent
variable is the same for these 20 econometric estimations. Each pair of rows present results for different ways to
measure market concentration. (*) means significance at 10%, whereas (**) and (***) stand for significance at 5%
and 1%, respectively. Obs is the number of observations used in order to run the regression. Standard errors in
parenthesis are clustered at the industry level.
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Dependent Variable:
lji
xji
[Estimates of β2]
4 Digits
n -0.024* -0.023
(0.019) (0.021)
C4 0.022* 0.020*
(0.017 ) (0.015)
C8 0.023* 0.025*
(0.016) (0.017)
C20 0.015* 0.018
(0.010) (0.017)
HHI 0.025* 0.023*
(0.019) (0.018)
Obs 43125 29568
Database Orbis Economic Census
Adj R2 0.258 0.243 0.221 0.213 0.262 0.218 0.213 0.191 0.201 0.222
3 Digits
n -0.024 -0.025*
(0.022) (0.019)
C4 0.020* 0.021*
(0.015) (0.016)
C8 0.028* 0.028*
(0.019) (0.019)
C20 0.019* 0.019
(0.014) (0.018)
HHI 0.023* 0.024*
(0.018) (0.019)
Obs 43125 29568
Database Orbis Economic Census
Adj R2 0.208 0.193 0.178 0.186 0.214 0.198 0.173 0.168 0.172 0.208
Table 3.5: Estimates of Equation (2).
Note: The table shows the estimated coefficients, standard errors, total number of observations and adjusted R2
from equation (2). The table has two different panels. The top panel presents the results for the case that the
industry is defined with four-digits whereas the bottom panel present the results for the case the industry is
defined with three-digits. In these estimations, an observation is a firm. The left-side part of the table uses data
from Orbis, whereas the right side part of the table uses data from the US Economic Census. The dependent
variable is the same for these 20 econometric estimations. Each pair of rows present results for different ways to
measure market concentration. (*) means significance at 10%, whereas (**) and (***) stand for significance at 5%
and 1%, respectively. Obs is the number of observations used in order to run the regression. Standard errors in
parenthesis are clustered at the industry level.
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Dependent Variable: Lit
Xit
[Estimates of β3]
4 Digits
n 0.025**
(0.014)
C4 -0.021**
(0.012)
C8 -0.029**
(0.015)
C20 -0.020**
(0.010)
HHI -0.025*
(0.017)
Obs 4908
Database Compustat
Adj R2 0.912 0.823 0.901 0.899 0.877
Industry FE X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
3 Digits
n 0.027**
(0.015)
C4 -0.022*
(0.015)
C8 -0.029**
(0.016)
C20 -0.020**
(0.010)
HHI -0.026*
(0.019)
Obs 1589
Database Compustat
Adj R2 0.859 0.786 0.876 0.875 0.841
Industry FE X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
Table 3.6: Estimates of Equation (3).
Note: The table shows the estimated coefficients, standard errors, total number of observations and adjusted R2
from equation (3). The table has two different panels. The top panel presents the results for the case that the
industry is defined with four-digits whereas the bottom panel present the results for the case the industry is
defined with three-digits. In these estimations, an observation is an industry*year. These estimations are based on
the Compustat database. The dependent variable is the same for these 10 econometric estimations. Each pair of
rows present results for different ways to measure market concentration. (*) means significance at 10%, whereas
(**) and (***) stand for significance at 5% and 1%, respectively. Obs is the number of observations used in order
to run the regression. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the industry level. All of the results include
the estimation of both industry and year fixed-effects.
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Dependent Variable: lit
xit
[Estimates of β4]
4 Digits
n -0.022*
(0.012)
C4 0.020*
(0.014)
C8 0.020
(0.018)
C20 0.018*
(0.009)
HHI 0.024*
(0.018)
Obs 436789
Database Compustat
Adj R2 0.732 0.765 0.702 0.657 0.621
Industry FE X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
3 Digits
n -0.024*
(0.013)
C4 0.026
(0.024)
C8 0.024
(0.021)
C20 0.019*
(0.011)
HHI 0.029*
(0.021)
Obs 436789
Database Compustat
Adj R2 0.729 0.741 0.76 0.729 0.718
Industry FE X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
Table 3.7: Estimates of Equation (4).
Note: The table shows the estimated coefficients, standard errors, total number of observations and adjusted R2
from equation (4). The table has two different panels. The top panel presents the results for the case that the
industry is defined with four-digits whereas the bottom panel present the results for the case the industry is
defined with three-digits. In these estimations, an observation is a firm*year. These estimations are based on the
Compustat database. The dependent variable is the same for these 10 econometric estimations. Each pair of rows
present results for different ways to measure market concentration. (*) means significance at 10%, whereas (**)
and (***) stand for significance at 5% and 1%, respectively. Obs is the number of observations used in order to
run the regression. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the industry level. All of the results include the
estimation of both industry and year fixed-effects.
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Excludable Non Excludable
Lobbying Non-Lobbying Lobbying Non-Lobbying
Rival Gnl − c (li) 0 Gn − c (li) G˜n
Lobbying Non-Lobbying Lobbying Non-Lobbying
No-Rival G− c (li) 0 G− c (li) G˜
Table 3.8: Net Benefit of Lobbying by Excludability/Rivalry of the bill.
Note: The table represents the benefits of goods according to the combination of excludability and rivalry of the
bills that the firms lobby. The first row differs from the second in that the benefit of the bill is spread out to other
firms in the case the firm is lobbying, while the first column predicts a zero payoff for non-lobbying firms. The
number of firms lobbying can be defined as nl :
{
n| G
nl
− c (li) ≥ 0 > Gnl+1 − c (li)
}
.
% of Recipients 2008 2009 2010
Quintiles
1 6.48 6.37 4.81
2 9.87 6.7 8.15
3 21.2 22.3 17.86
4 24.95 29.65 31.17
5 37.5 34.98 38.01
Total 100 100 100
Total Recipients Firms 1531 1543 4502
Table 3.9: Relationship Between Market Concentration and Earmarks Recipients.
Note: The table shows descriptive evidence on the relationship between industry market concentration and
earmarks recipients. Here I measure market concentration with the total number of firms of the industry. The
main results of this section are robust to alternative variables measuring market concentration. I have standarized
the levels of concentration by quintiles. To make this standarization, I calculate the quintiles on the total number
of firms for all of the 4-digits code industries that report the Economic Census. Larger quantiles represent less
concentrated industries. For these analyses, I use 2007 data for two reasons. First, it is more accurate, given that
the earmarks data is three years after the Census information and second, not all of the industries have
information for 2012 but all of them have them for 2007. The table provides information for each year of data
available (2008-2010). Each column adds to 100.
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Panel A
% of Bills Lobbied with Earmarks
Quintiles 2008 2009 2010
1 17.61 20.12 21.34
2 18.91 19.59 24.67
3 24.57 20.15 22.75
4 47.58 48.5 40.17
5 54.55 61.26 58.7
Panel B
% of Expenditures in Bills with Earmarks
Quintiles 2008 2009 2010
1 23.59 22.63 11.90
2 19.05 11.14 17.44
3 21.05 17.52 16.47
4 54.17 50.63 41.97
5 60.72 53.51 51.26
Table 3.10: Bills and Expenditure with Earmarks by Quintiles.
Note: The table is divided in two panels. Panel A shows the fraction of bills with earmarks lobbied over the total
number of bills lobbied for each quintile and year. Panel B shows the fraction of expenditure spend on bills that
had any earmark over the total lobbying expenditure.
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Dependent Variable: LiXi [Estimates of β1]
4 Digits
n 0.014** -0.012*
(0.008) (0.008)
Ex 0.04**
(0.022)
C4 -0.016* 0.011*
(0.011) (0.009)
Ex 0.035*
(0.026)
C8 -0.014 0.012
(0.012) (0.011)
Ex 0.041**
(0.022)
C20 -0.009** 0.009
(0.005) (0.009)
Ex 0.038*
(0.026)
HHI -0.019** 0.013*
(0.011) (0.009)
Ex 0.042**
(0.024)
Obs 258
Database Economic Census
Adj R2 0.486 0.589 0.478 0.592 0.458 0.610 0.465 0.584 0.489 0.568
Table 3.11: Effect of the Inclusion of Excludability Measures.
Note: The table shows the estimated coefficients, standard errors, total number of observations and adjusted R
2
from estimating the effect of market concentration and excludability measures on lobbying expenditures. The
table presents the results for the case that the industry is defined with four-digits. In these estimations, an
observation is an industry. The table uses data from the 2007 US Economic Census. The dependent variable is the
same for these 20 econometric estimations. Each pair of rows present results for different ways to measure market
concentration. Each pair of columns use the same concentration measure. (*) means significance at 10%, whereas
(**) and (***) stand for significance at 5% and 1%, respectively. Obs is the number of observations used in order
to run the regression. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the industry level.
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City State Beginning period Timing Reports Source
Chicago Illinois 2012 Quarter Web
Dallas Texas 2010 Quarter Web
Los Angeles California 2003 Quarter Web
Miami Florida 2006 Contracts Web
New York City New York 1998 Contracts Web
Philadelphia Pennsylvania 2012 Quarter Web
San Diego California 2011 Quarter Web
San Francisco California 2010 Monthly Web
Seattle Washington 2008 Contracts Web
Table 3.12: A subset of cities with lobbying disclosure requirements.
Note: The table presents the main information used in Section 3.4. The dataset has nine cities. Each row
represents a different city. The second column represent the state of the city. The third column present the first
year for which there is available information for the city. The fourth column presents the periodicity in which
lobbyists have to report advocacy activities. The last column presents the link in which the main information has
been extracted.
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4 Digits 3 Digits 2 Digits
Category # Mean Stdv Mean Stdv Mean Stdv
1 Total 2.85 12.07 8.03 38.37 46.34 114.88
Bet/With 11.47/3.75 37.54/8.14 111.91/26.57
2 Total 0.08 0.50 0.22 1.28 1.32 3.73
Bet/With 0.34/0.37 0.94/0.86 2.76/2.53
3 Total 1.09 4.64 2.67 9.93 13.88 29.47
Bet/With 3.94/2.46 8.73/4.75 25.73/14.6
Obs. 14416 901 6240 390 1280 80
Tot. Value Total 1414.68 6094.46 2267.13 8811.48 7280.4 19538.73
Bet/With 2522.82/4527.22 4740.95/6085.51 13652.04/ 13282.7
Obs. 3781 677 2749 329 1016 73
% Shares Total 93.37 17.40 93.63 15.13 94.57 8.70
Bet/With 12.27/14.39 10.08/12.59 4.87/7.26
Obs. 6229 867 3827 383 1135 79
Ave. Value Total 163.96 570.03 153.94 489.07 163.21 466.89
Bet/With 394.49/ 467.21 259.32/410.51 316.20/359.60
Obs. 3780 677 2748 329 1016 73
Table 3.13: Descriptive Statistics for SDC Platinum.
Note: This table presents mean value, number of observation as well as standard deviation for between and within
groups. Because all the variables contain information for 16 years, the rows labelled observations represent the
total number of observations and the number representing the between categories that correspond to the number
of industries considered. The data is grouped under three different definitions of what is an industry according to
the level of digits: four, three and two digits. The first part of the table present statistics for three different
categories of mergers: Category 1 is when there was a successfull merger, Category 2 is an unsucessfull merger,
where the parties had an intention to merge but it did not happen and Category 3 groups all the other merger
attempts that has neither been sucessfull nor withdrawn. The second part of the table present descriptive
statistics for three variables (across all of the categories for a given industry): Total value of the mergers at
industry level, average percentage of shares acquired and average value of the transaction. This last variable is
simply the total value of all the mergers divided by the total number of successfull mergers, for each industry.
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Merger Company 1 Company 2 SIC Industry
1 Longview Timber LLC Weyerhaeuser Co 8 Forestry
2 Consolidation Coal Co Murray Energy Corp 12 Coal Mining
3 Apache Corp-Shelf Assets Fieldwood Energy LLC 13 Oil & Gas Extraction
4 Onyx Pharmaceuticals Inc Amgen Inc 28 Chemical & Allied Prod.
5 BP PLC-Carson Refinery,ARCO Tesoro Refining & Marketing Co 29 Petroleum & Coal Prod.
6 LSI Corp Avago Technologies Ltd 36 Electronic & Other Elect. Equip.
7 US Airways Group Inc AMR Corp 45 Transportation by Air
8 T-Mobile USA Inc MetroPCS Communications Inc 48 Communications
9 NV Energy Inc MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co 49 Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services
10 Harris Teeter Supermarkets Inc Kroger Co 54 Food Stores
11 NYSE Euronext IntercontinentalExchange Inc 62 Security & Communication Brokers
12 Coventry Health Care Inc Aetna Inc 63 Insurance Carriers
13 Cole Real Estate Investments American Rlty Capital Ppty Inc 67 Holding & Other Investment Offices
14 ExactTarget Inc Salesforce.com Inc 73 Business Services
15 Health Management Assoc Inc Community Health Systems Inc 80 Health Services
Table 3.14: Basic Information of 15 Selected Mergers.
Note: The table provides information on 15 selected mergers. The table presents the name of the companies
involved in the mergers in columns two and three. The table presents information on the specific 2-digits SIC code
as well as the industrial sector name.
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Merger Effective Date Quarter Value Transaction (Mill) # Cities
1 7/2013 3-2013 2650 3
2 12/2013 4-2013 3462 3
3 9/2013 3-2013 5250 3
4 10/2013 4-2013 9692.50 4
5 6/2013 2-2013 2425 4
6 5/2014 2-2014 6685.51 4
7 12/2013 4-2013 3080 3
8 5/2013 2-2013 3689.93 4
9 12/2013 4-2013 553.96 4
10 1/2014 1-2014 2543.53 5
11 11/2013 4-2013 8052.28 4
12 5/2013 2-2013 5695.60 3
13 2/2014 1-2014 6952.60 4
14 7/2013 3-2013 2640.79 3
15 1/2014 1-2014 7547.68 5
Table 3.15: Complementary Information of 15 Selected Mergers.
Note: The table provides information on 15 selected mergers. In columns two and three, the table presents month,
quarter and year in which the merger took place. The table also provides information on the total value of the
transaction and the number of cities affected by the merger. A city is affected if both of the firms involved in the
merger were conducting lobbying activities in that city for at least one year prior the merger.
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City 2-D SIC Codes Firms Lobbying Expend./Quarter
Chicago 72 560 8657.23
Dallas 65 389 4857.21
Los Angeles 71 589 6578.12
Miami 68 435 4956.01
New York City 78 621 9124.43
Philadelphia 64 417 6867.87
San Diego 65 387 4678.91
San Francisco 61 423 5678.76
Seattle 69 565 5245.77
Table 3.16: City-level Lobbying Expenditures.
Note: The table provides information of number of industries, firms and average lobbying expenditure per quarter
for each of the nine cities selected for this exercise. The second column represents the average number of two-digits
SIC codes across all of the quarters. The third column presents the average number of active lobbying firms across
all of the quarters. The last column presents the average lobbying expenditure per active firm across quarters.
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Firm Level Industry Level
βt−3 87.96 1562.85
St. Err. 76.09 1467.46
βt−2 68.95 1325.66
St. Err. 59.65 1244.75
βt−1 156.44 1601.55
St. Err. 135.33 1503.80
βt 215.65* 4156.98**
St. Err. 148.11 1908.62
βt+1 245.68** 3256.89*
St. Err. 123.58 2049.65
βt+2 289.57** 2899.45**
St. Err. 145.66 1331.24
βt+3 105.66 658.96*
St. Err. 91.40 414.70
Obs 72891 12608
Adj R2 0.895 0.921
Average Dependent 6156.23 101568.1
Time Period 2012-2016
Total Mergers 15 15
Fixed Effects
γic Y Y
γit Y Y
γct Y Y
Sample Baseline
Table 3.18: Leads and Lags Estimations.
Note: The table presents the coefficient estimates and standard errors for the Leads and Lags exercise. The table
provides information on the number of observations used, adjusted R2, average value of the dependent variable,
time period and combination of fixed effects used. An observation in the columns marked as firm-level estimations
is a firm*city*quarter. An observation in the industry-level estimations is an industry*city*quarter. Columns
named Firm-Level mean that the dependent variable is the firm-level lobbying expenditure whereas columns
named Industry-Level mean that the dependent variable is the lobbying expenditures of the industry affected by
the merger. All of the estimation comprised the time period 2012-2016. The table presents the coefficient
estimates for three periods before and after the merger occur as well as the estimate for the quarter in which the
merger occurred. (*) means significance at 10%, whereas (**) and (***) stand for significance at 5% and 1%,
respectively. Obs is the number of observations used in order to run the regression. Standard errors are clustered
at the industry-city level.
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3.6.2 Figures
Figure 3.1:
Three Relevant Regions when firm-level lobbying functions are symmetric.
Note: The figure represents three relevant regions. Two in which the industry-level lobbying expenditure is increasing
in the number of firms and one in which is decreasing. When the firm-level lobbying function is increasing then
the industry-level function is always increasing. However, when the firm-level lobbying function is decreasing the
elasticity of the firm-level function will determine whether the industry-level lobbying function is increasing in the
number of firms or not. The third Region is the only region representing the empirical results in the previous section.
Figure 3.2:
The effect of Excludability in Lobbying Expenditures.
Note: The figure represents two industry level lobbying expenditures as a function of the number of firms in the
industry. Right decreasing curve represents the case in which the industry lobbies for excludable goods, whereas
Left decreasing curve represents the case for non-excludable goods. The figure shows the possibility in which two
different market structures lobby for different types of bills and therefore, we observe an increasing pattern between
lobbying expenditures and number of firms in the industry.
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3.6.3 Theoretical Appendix
3.6.3.1 This Model is General
I think this simple model may be able to rationalize my data and provide a general-
ization to some of the most important papers in the literature. To follow I explain
how my model generalizes Olson (1965), Stigler (1974), Esteban and Ray (2001)
and Pecorino and Temimi (2008). The most important take away here is that these
papers do not consider exludable goods at all.
Olson (1965): Olson’s objective function is Vi−c (li), where αg is the size of the
group, Fi is the fraction of the individual gain, Vg is the group value, T is the rate
of level at which the collective good is obtained and Vi is the gain to the individual
i-th. In his setting, Fi =
Vi
Vg
and αgT = Vg.
You get Olson (1965)’s setting if pi(
∑n
j=1 lj) = β = 1, αg = n, c (li) = ci (li) ,
Vg = G, T =
G
αg
and Vi =
GSi
n
. The two main results in Olson are: 1. Individual
i will contribute if Fi >
c
Vg
, the gain to an individual from seeing that the good is
provided will exceed the cost. As the only associated cost is the lobbying cost, it
seems this setting is exactly for excludable goods. 2. In the optimum, the rate of
gain to the group (dVg
dli
) must exceed the rate of increase in cost
(
dc(li)
dli
)
by the same
multiple that the group gain exceeds the gain to the individual concerned ( 1
Fi
= Vg
Vi
),
that is dVg
dli
/dc(li)
dli
= Vg
Vi
. dG(li)
dli
/dc(li)
dli
= n
Si
.
Notice a very important difference is that the payoff is not a function of group
effort, that is G(li) = G.
Stigler (1974): The objective function in Stigler is G(m, e) − e(m), where
G(m, e) is the gain to the individual if collective action is taken, m is the number
of individuals joining the coalition and e(m) is the expenditure per individual who
joins.
You get Stigler (1974) setting if Si = 1 = pi(
∑n
j=1 lj), ci(li) = li , e(m) = li(n)
and Gi(m, e) =
G(
∑n
j=1 lj)
mβ
.
The main difference between his setting and mine is that while I am talking here
about the probability of passing a bill, Stigler is talking about the probability of a
given individual joining the collective action.
Esteban & Ray (2001): Their objective function is Ai
A
[
λP + (1− λ) M
Ni
]
−
v (ai), where Ai is the total effort contributed by group i, Ni is the size of the group
i, A =
∑N
i=1Ai, Ai =
∑Ni
i=1 ai,
Ai
A
is the probability of sucess of group i, P is the
public component of the good, M is the private component, and v (ai) is the cost
function. In intuitive terms, P represents the non rival part whilst M represents the
rival part.
You get Esteban & Ray’s (2001) setting if Si = 1, pi =
Ai
A
189, ci (li) = v (ai) and
finally
G(
∑n
j=1 lj)
nβ
= λP + (1− λ) M
Ni
with β = 1− λ.
189In my case, this probability will be liL , which means that only one group will get the good.
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Chamberlin (1974) explains that we may expect ∂L
∂n
< 0 when the good is rival
but ∂L
∂n
> 0 when the good is fully public. Esteban & Ray’s main result is that ∂L
∂n
> 0
for both perfectly private and perfectly public goods if the cost function increase
sufficiently fast. In other words sign
(
li
∂2c
∂l2
i
∂c
∂li
− 1
)
= sign
(
∂L
∂n
)
. Although I can
model the competition between groups, the way I am doing it simplifies the analysis
without leaving aside the main objective of capturing the essential mechanisms in
mind. Another difference between their model and mine is that their payoff in the
event a group’s policy is chosen is not a function of group effort. This setting is
by assumption perfectly excludable at the group level, and non-excludable within a
group.
Pecorino & Temimi (2008): Their objective function is G(S−i+si)
nβ
− v (si).
From the main objective function, we can get Pecorino & Temimi (2008) if we set
pi(
∑n
j=1 lj)Si = 1 and ci (li) = v (ai). The main results from this paper are robust
to the presence of small fixed costs of participation (i.e. lim
s→0
v(s) = c) in the case of
a non-rival good, but not in the case of a fully rival good. This is true, regardless
of the value of the elasticity li
∂2c
∂l2i
1
∂c
∂li
. The intuition is that if the good is rival, the
per person benefit approaches to 0 as the group grows large.
This shows that my simple setting is a generalization of these 4 models. My
main contribution to these 4 models are: 1. None of those contain the excludabil-
ity/Rivalry dimension. I have shown in the body of this chapter that there are
several bills with these combinations, so it seems important to include these differ-
ences. Furthermore, all these models analyze exclusively the case where the goods
are non-excludables. None of those discuss the excludable goods’ case. 2. The
last three models implictly assume symmetric solutions by imposing homogeneity
in the individuals. I try to go a step further as in Olson (1965) to allow any de-
gree of heterogeneity. Although there may be several ways to do that I use a scale
parameter Si multiplying the expected benefit. 3. I do not restrict my analysis
to particular functional forms such as full certainty pi(
∑n
j=1 lj) = β = 1 in Olson
(1965), linear cost functions c(li) = li in Stigler (1974), c (li) = ci (li) exactly equal
cost function, particular probability function pi = li
L
in Esteban and Ray (2001) or
pi(
∑n
j=1 lj)Si = 1 in Pecorino and Temimi (2008).
3.6.3.2 Discussion on Lemma
Let ∆i = pi(L)G(L)− θpi(L−i)G(L−i) be the net effect of the lobbying expenditure
of firm i-th on the expected benefit. Then, it is more likely to see firms lobbying
if they can exert a greater change in the expected benefit. The change in the
expected benefit only matters when the good is non perfectly excludable (i.e., θ >
0), otherwise, this effect is equal to the expected effect of the bill. Most of the
discussion of Olson (1965) is focused here. This factor can be understood as the
perceived effectiveness of the contribution. Then, the fewer firms an industry has,
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the more likely each firm thinks it is important for the industry, then, the larger
the incentive to contribute. For instance, if the group is large is very likely that
each individual cannot exert such a big change in pi(L)G(L) (i.e., as L → L−i),
so ∆i (n) will tend to be decreasing in n. To better understand this term lets add
θpi(L)G(L−i)− θpi(L)G(L−i) to ∆i. Then, we get:
pi(L)G(L)− θpi(L−i)G(L−i) + θpi(L)G(L−i)− θpi(L)G(L−i)
factoring common terms:
pi(L) (G(L)− θG(L−i)) + (pi(L)− pi(L−i)) θG(L−i)
and redefining terms we get
∆i = ∆Gpi(L) + ∆piθG(L−i)
where ∆G = G(L) − θG(L−i) and ∆pi = pi(L) − pi(L−i). Notice that ∆i =
pi(L)G(L) if θ = 0, and ∂∆i
∂θ
= −pi(L−i)G(L−i) < 0. Then, the net effect of the
participation of the firm i-th can be decomposed into two parts: The expected
change due to the change in the size of the good ∆G for a given probability of
passing the bill if the firm i-th participates pi(L) and the expected change due to
the change in the probability of passing the bill ∆pi for a given size if the firm i-th
does not participate G(L−i). So the total effect is a combination of the change in
the size of the good weighted by the probability and the change in the probability
weighted by the size of the good.190 Now I am interested to have predictions on
the effect of changes in both the number of firms in the industry and the number of
firms lobbying.
First notice that ∆i depends on the total lobbying expenditures L, and those
will depend on equilibrium on the total number of firms of the industry n as well as
the total number of firms lobbying nl. That is, ∆i (n, nl). To keep things tractable,
I assume that the cost of lobbying does neither depend on the number of firms of
the industry nor the number of firms lobbying but the reader should realize that this
extension is straightforward. Now, in order to know how this condition changes as
we change the number of firms n, and taking into account that nl is an endogenous
object, nθ = θn+ (1− θ)nl (n) we can take derivatives of the equation defining the
extensive margin with respect to n to get:
[
∆′i,n (n, nl)Si (n) + ∆i (n, nl)S
′
i (n)
]
nβ − β (θ + (1− θ) ∂nl
∂n
)
∆i (n, nl)Si (n)n
β−1
θ
n2βθ
190Notice that if I would have added pi(L−i)G(L) − pi(L−i)G(L) to ∆i I would have got ∆i =
∆Gpi(L−i) + ∆piG(L) which has a similar interpretation.
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where ∆′i,n (n, nl) represents the total derivative with respect to the number of
firms in the industry ∂∆i(n,nl)
∂n
= ∂∆i(n,nl)
∂n
+ ∂∆i(n,nl)
∂nl
∂nl
∂n
.
Then, this condition is positive if
[∆′i,nSi+∆iS′i]
∆iSi
>
β
(
θ+(1−θ) ∂nl
∂n
)
nθ
. Now, let bi (n) =
∆iSi and let ∈b= b
′
i(n)n
bi(n)
be the elasticiy of bi (n) with respect to the number of firms,
then our condition is summarized as:
∂Pr(li > 0)
∂n
=∈b −β
(
θ + (1− θ) ∂nl
∂n
)
=∈b −β∂nθ
∂n
That is, if the expected benefit is sufficiently sensitive to the number of firms
, then more firms in the industry imply a higher probability of seeing these firms
lobbying.191 Some Remarks about equation∂Pr(li>0)
∂n
:
1. The sign of ∆′i,n does not determine the sign of
∂Pr(li>0)
∂n
but the interaction of
the elasticity of ∆i (n) and the elasticity of the scale of the firm. If we denote
∈∆i=
∆′i,nn
∆i
and ∈Si= S
′
i(n)n
Si(n)
then the equation defining ∂Pr(li>0)
∂n
is equivalent
to ∈∆i + ∈Si −β ∂nθ∂n .
2. Notice that if ∆′i,n, S
′
i (n) < 0 <
∂nθ
∂n
, then less concentrated industries will be
less likely to lobby. However, if the first two derivatives are positive, I cannot
say something about the effect of the number of firms in the probability.
3. Let ∈E= E′(n)nE(n) be the elasticity of the expected benefit E (L) = pi(L)G(L).
Then, the sign(∂Pr(li>0)
∂n
) can be summarized in Table A.1.
3.6.3.3 Other Results on the Intensive Margin
Asumming positive lobbying expenditures and taking derivatives on the equilibrium
truthful schedule with respect to the number of firms we get:
sign(l′ (n)) = sign(−c−1′ (·) [g′ (n) + ng′′ (n)])
Then, the sign of the lobbying expenditure of a given firm will depend on the
concavity the expected benefit as well as both the slopes of the expected benefit and
cost functions. As we know that the cost function is increasing by assumption, the
sign of sign(l′ (n)) is simplified to be
−sign([g′ (n) + ng′′ (n)])
Now, lets inspect each part of this equation. First the derivative of the total
expected benefit g′(n) is equal to [
∂E(n)S(n)
∂n ]nβ−E(n)S(n)βnβ−1
n2β
which means that
191Notice that in order to assure unicity of the equilibrium in the number of firms let’s suppose
that β ∂nθ∂n ≥ 0 .Then, we simply need to show that either 1. If b′i (n) > 0, then bi (0) ≤ β ∂nθ∂n
≤ bi (N) or 2. If b′i (n) < 0, then bi (N) ≤ β ∂nθ∂n ≤ bi (0). I still need to get more information about
the b′i (n) to be able to guarantee the unicity. We can also work out some static comparative on
the parameters of the function on bi (n).
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sign(g′(n)) = sign(∈E + ∈Si −β)
Some tedious algebra shows that g′′ (n) =∈E
(
γE − 1n [∈E −1]
)
+ ∈Si
(
γSi − 1n [∈Si −1]
)
where γx =
X′′(n)
X′(n) . Finally
the term g′ (n) + ng′′ (n) is equal to:
∈E + ∈Si −β+ ∈E (nγE − [∈E −1]) + ∈Si (nγSi − [∈Si −1])
and simplifying we get ∈E (nγE− ∈E +2) + ∈Si (nγSi− ∈Si +2)−β. Which can
be summarized as:
sign(l′ (n)) = −sign(∈E αE+ ∈Si αSi − β)
where αX = 2 + nγX− ∈X .192 Notice here that the sign of the lobbying expen-
diture depends in a complicated way on both the concavity of the expected benefit
and scale function as well as the number of firms and the rivalry of the bill.
Elasticities at the firm and and Industry level This subsection tries to clar-
ify the main differences between the possible combinations of asymmetric/symmetric
firm-level expenditures and endogenous/exogenous number of lobbying firms. First,
notice that in general L =
nl∫
j=1
ljdj but if the firm lobbying expenditures are sym-
metric, L = nll (nl, n, θ, β). If the number of firms lobbying is also endogenous, then
in equilibrium nl also depends on (n, θ, β). Let’s see the four possible combinations
between the asymmetric assumption on the firm-level expenditures and endogeneity
in the number of lobbying firms.
• l symmetric and nl exogenous.
In this case L = nll (nl, n, θ, β). Then, taking derivatives with respect to the
number of firms in the industry we get ∂L
∂n
= nl
∂l(·)
∂n
which is the same as
εL,n = εl,n
The term εL,n (εl,n) represents the elasticity of the industry (firm) lobbying
expenditures to the number of firms of the industry. Notice that in general ∂L
∂γ
=
nl
∂l(·)
∂γ
with γ = θ, β. So, sign(∂L
∂γ
) = sign
(
∂l(·)
∂γ
)
or εL,γ = εl,γ. In Section 3.2, I
have empirically shown that εL,n > 0 > εl,n, then the assumptions used under this
scheme (i.e., l symmetric and nl exogenous) are empirically ruled out at least for the
case of the analysis on the effect of a change in the number of firms in the industry
(i.e., n).
192If for instance, I assume a Pareto firm size distribution with exponent 1γ (i.e., S (n) =
A
nγ )
then ∈Si αSi = −γ.
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• l symmetric and nl endogenous.
In this case, L = nl (n, θ, β) l (nl (·) , n, θ, β). Then, taking derivatives with re-
spect to the number of firms in the industry we get ∂L
∂n
= ∂nl
∂n
l (n)+nl
[
∂l(·)
∂n
+ ∂l(·)
∂nl
∂nl
∂n
]
.
Multiplying both sides by n
L
, we get εL,n =
∂nl
∂n
l (n) n
L
+ nl
[
∂l(·)
∂n
n
L
+ ∂l(·)
∂nl
∂nl
∂n
n
L
]
which
is the same as
εL,n = εnl,n (1 + εl,nl)︸ ︷︷ ︸
IE
+ ε
l,n︸︷︷︸
DE
where εnl,n is the elasticity of the number of lobbying firms with respect to the
number of firms in the industry, and ε
l,nl is the elasticity of the firm-level lobbying
expenditures with respect to the number of lobbying firms. This equation says that
in order to understand the effect of the market structure in the industry lobbying
expenditures, there are two main effects: indirect and direct effect. The latter is sim-
ply the relationship between firm-level lobbying expenditures and market structure
whereas the indirect effect shows the effect of the market structure on the number
of lobbying firms. This indirect effect is composed of two parts: εnl,n and εnl,nεl,nl .
The first part shows how the market structure directly affects the number of lob-
bying firms. The second term shows how the firm-level lobbying expenditures are
affected by the market structure through the effect that the market structure has
on the number of lobbying firms. Therefore, the direct effect measures all the effects
that explain a firm-level expenditure not related to the externalities effects of the
other firm-level expenditures. Notice, the case studied here is not ruled out by the
empirical evidence as far as ∂nl
∂n
> 0. Also notice that for γ = θ, β, the assumptions
above imply
εL,γ = εnl,γ + εl,γ
That is, the total effect of the excludability (rivalry) of the bill is decomposed
in two effects: 1. How the excludability (rivalry) of the bill affects the number of
lobbying firms and 2. How the excludability (rivalry) level affects the firm-level
lobbying expenditure.
My problem with this combination of assumptions is that if all firms are equal,
then either all of them lobby nl = n or none of them nl = 0. That is, if all the
firms are equal to each other, it is difficult to understand why nl ∈ (0, n) in some
industries as empirical evidence shows. If nl = 0, then total lobbying expenditures
are equal to zero (i.e., L = 0) for all levels of excludability and rivalry of the bills
as well as all market concentration levels.
However, for the case where all firms lobby in the industry the condition relating
elasticities at the firm and industry levels can be summarized as:
sign(εL,n) = sign(1− ∈l,n)
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which is the case explored in the text.
• l asymmetric and nl exogenous.
Notice that L =
nl∫
j=1
lj (nl, n, θ, β) dj =
n∫
j=1
lj (nl, n, θ, β) dj as lj = 0 in the com-
plement of nl. The objective function for the firm i-th is
pi(L)G(L)
nβ
Si − ci (li). This
equation can be written in a more concise way as B (li, L) − ci (li). Notice that
∂B(li,L)
∂li
≥ 0 and if ∂B(li,L)
∂L
> (<)0 there are positive (negative) externalities. In the
lobbying context there are positive externalities, because larger lobbying expendi-
tures not only increase the size of the bill but also raise the probability of the bill
being passed. Then, taking the first order condition of the objective function with
respect to the lobbying expenditure implies ∂B(li,L)
∂li
− ∂ci(li)
∂li
= 0 which is equal to
∂B (·)
∂li
+
∂B (·)
∂L
∂L
∂li
=
∂ci (li)
∂li
Notice that ∂B(·)
∂li
, ∂B(·)
∂L
, ∂L
∂li
, ∂ci(li)
∂li
> 0. Then, inverting the equation we get the
demand of political manipulation or simply the lobbying expenditure function li =
di(n, L). In equilibrium
n∫
i=1
lidi =
n∫
i=1
di(n, L)di = L then taking derivatives with
respect to the number of firms n we get:
∂L
∂n
=
n∫
i=1
(
∂di
∂n
+
∂di
∂L
∂L
∂n
)
di
Then, ∂L
∂n
=
n∫
i=1
∂di
∂n
di
1−
n∫
i=1
∂di
∂L
di
which implies:
εL,n =
n∫
i=1
wiεli,ndi
1−
n∫
i=1
wiεli,Ldi
where wi =
li
L
is the proportion of the i-th lobbying expenditure to the total
industry lobbying expenditure, εli,n is the elasticity of the lobbying expenditure of
the i-th firm to the number of firms of the industry and εli,L is the elasticity of
the firm-level lobbying expenditure of the i-th firm to the industry-level lobbying
industry. Then, the total industry lobbying expenditure elasticity depends on all the
individual elasticities of both the number of firms and the total lobbying expenditure
weighted by their relative size on the lobbying expenditure. One implication of this
equation is that even if most of the companies tend to decrease their lobbying
expenditures as the number of firms in the industry increases ∂li
∂n
< 0 and these
firms are very sensitive to the total lobbying expenditure ∂li
∂L
> 1, if there are just a
few big companies in the industry for which ∂li
∂n
> 0 and ∂li
∂L
< 1, the total industry
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elasticity may be positive. If we define εl,n =
n∫
i=1
wiεli,ndi and εl,L =
n∫
i=1
wiεli,Ldi, we
conclude that
−sign(εL,n) = sign(εl,L − 1) · sign(εl,n)
The empirical finding shown in section 2 of this draft is −sign(εL,n) < 0,
which means that the signs of the RHS should be different (i.e., sign(εl,L − 1) =
−sign(εl,n)). That means that if the weighted demand elasticity of the lobbying ex-
penditure is inelastic (elastic) (i.e., εl,L < (>)1), then the weighted demand elasticity
of the number of firms should be positive (negative). A possible way to interpret
our finding of a positive correlation between firm-level expenditure and number of
firms is that on average εl,n > 0. If that is the case, then, we can conclude that
εl,L < 1. That is, on average the firm-level expenditures do not respond strongly to
the industry expenditures.193
• l asymmetric and nl endogenous.
Similar to before but allowing the term nl to be endogenous, we get
L =
nl∫
j=1
dj (L, n, nl (n)) dj, then li = di(n, L, nl (n)).
In equilibrium
n∫
i=1
lidi =
n∫
i=1
di(n, L, nl (n))di = L , then taking derivatives with
respect to the number of firms n we get:
∂L
∂n
=
n∫
i=1
(
∂di
∂n
+
∂di
∂nl (n)
∂nl (n)
∂n
+
∂di
∂L
∂L
∂n
)
di
Then, ∂L
∂n
=
n∫
i=1
(
∂di
∂n
+
∂di
∂nl(n)
∂nl(n)
∂n
)
di
1−
n∫
i=1
∂di
∂L(n)
di
which implies:
εL,n =
n∫
i=1
wi (εli,n + εli,nlεnl,n) di
1−
n∫
i=1
wiεli,Ldi
If we define εl,n =
n∫
i=1
wiεli,n and εl,L =
n∫
i=1
wiεli,L, and εl,nl,n = −
n∫
i=1
wiεli,nlεnl,n
we conclude that:
−sign(εL,n) = sign(εl,L − 1) · sign(εl,n − εl,nl,n)
The empirical finding shown in Section 3.2 is εL,n > 0 and we can argue that
εl,n < 0. Then, if εl,n − εl,nl,n < 0, εl,L < 1 and if εl,n − εl,nl,n > 0, εl,L > 1.
193This is obviously a simplification of a more serious interpretation because the elasticies are
weighted.
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To sum up, Table A.2 shows the main results of this sub-section.194
According to this table the main difference between the first and second column is
the indirect effect of the market structure on the number of lobbying firms, whereas
the main difference between the first and second row is the externalities effect that
appears in the denominator of the equation.
In intuitive terms, the relationship between industry lobbying expenditures and
market structure (i.e., εL,n) depends on two key factors:
1. The level of firm-level lobbying expenditure (i.e., li) and how this function
depends on the market concentration (i.e εli,n),the number of firms lobbying
(i.e., εli,nl) and the other firms’ lobbying expenditures (εli,L).
2. The number of lobbying firms (i.e., nl) and how this number is related to the
market structure (i.e., εnl,n).
Only the fourth case when the firm-level lobbying expenditures are asymmetric
and nl is endogenous captures all the effects mentioned above.
Impact ot the Rivalry of the Bill Notice that according to the equilibrium
found above the firm-level lobbying expenditure is l (n) = c−1 (−ng′ (n)). Then, in
order to know the effect of the rivalry of the bill in the lobbying expenditure, we
can take derivatives with respect to β and get ∂l
∂β
= ∂c
−1(·)
∂(·)
∂(·)
∂g′(n)
∂g′(n)
∂β
. As the cost
function is increasing in the lobbying expenditure,we can conclude that the sign of
sign( ∂l
∂β
) is equal to sign(−∂g′(n)
∂β
). Then, as g′ (n) =
[
∂E(n)S(n)
∂n
]
1
nβ
− E(n)S(n)β
nβ+1
we
can take derivatives with respect to β to get:
E (n)S (n) [lnnβ − 1]
nβ+1
−
[
∂E (n)S(n)
∂n
]
lnn
nβ
which is simplified to
lnn [β− ∈E − ∈Si ]−
1
nβ
which shows how the expected benefit and the scale of the firm elasticities matter
to understand the impact of the rivalry of the firm in the lobbying expenditures.
To understand better the relationship between industry-level lobbying expenditures
and rivalry of the bill, let’s analyze the following figures.
Figure A.1 represents three regions. Region I is the region where L′ (n) > 0
because l′ (n) > 0. Region II, has both decreasing firm and industry level lobbying
194For the case of γ = θ, β, following the order of this section, these elasticities are as follows:
ε
l,γ , εnl,γ +εl,γ ,
εl,γ
1−εl,L and
εl,γ−εl,nl,γ
1−εl,L . Notice that all but one are very similar to the elasticities of
the market structure. The only difference is when the firm-level lobbying expenditure is symmetric
and the number of firms is endogenous. This is due to the total number of lobbying firms nl
appearing in the equation defining the industry-level lobbying expenditures.
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expenditures l′ (n) , L′ (n) < 0. Finally, region III |l′ (n)| < l(n)
n
which implies that
L′ (n) > 0.
This graph is obviously not general as I have assumed that the average lobbying
expenditure is decreasing in the the rivalry of the firm. However, given the equilib-
rium found we can make some remarks on the behavior of the firm-level lobbying
function on the level of rivalry of the firm. In this section I am concerned about the
existence of region 3. First, notice that if g′ (n) > 0, the the lobbying function is
0. That means, that our lobbying function cannot be negative. Second, notice that
g′ (n) =
[
∂E(n)S(n)
∂n
]
1
nβ
− E(n)S(n)β
nβ+1
.
Then, when the bill is not rival this function is
[
∂E(n)S(n)
∂n
]
, which means that if
∈E + ∈Si< 0, l(n)n > 0, while ∈E + ∈Si> 0, l(n)n = 0. Notice that if the bill is purely
rival l (n) ∝ − [∈E + ∈Si −1]. Then, either l (n) = 0 if ∈E + ∈Si> 1 or l (n) > 0 if
∈E + ∈Si< 1.
If the average lobbying expenditure is decreasing there will always be points
where the (negative) marginal lobbying expenditure is lower than the average lob-
bying expenditure. Also, notice there cannot be horizontal lines representing the
relationship between average lobbying expenditure and rivalry of the firm. Also
notice that if l (β = 0) > 0 or l (β = 0) = 0, but ∂l
∂β
> 1 there is no any problem
as there will always be point to the left of the 45 degrees line below the average
lobbying expenditure.
Figure A.2 represents two relevant increasing curves. Both curves are charac-
terized by l(β) = 0 for some range of values in the domain of β. Both curves
start at the right of the point (0,0) but one has a higher slope than the other.
The curve at the left allows the existence of region 3 while the second curve is
the only case where region 3 does not exist. Increasing curves happen if we have
1
nβ
+ lnn [∈E + ∈Si −β] > 0. Notice that if ∈E + ∈Si −β > 0, g′ (n) > 0 and
therefore l(β) = 0 for all β. On the other hand, if ∈E + ∈Si −β < 0, g′ (n) < 0 and
therefore l(β) > 0. This is the only relevant case where region III may not exist.
In this case we also need that 1
nβ
> − lnn [∈E + ∈Si −β]. There is nothing that
guarantees us that this is impossible.
Finally, notice that as l (n) = max(c−1 (−ng′ (n) , 0) which is equal to g′ (n) =[
∂E(n)S(n)
∂n
]
1
nβ
−E(n)S(n)β
nβ+1
, then sign(∂l(n)
∂L
) = −sign(∂g′(n)
∂L
). Then notice that sign(∂g
′(n)
∂L
)
is equal to the sign of [ ∂ES
∂n∂L
] 1
nβ
− ∂ES
∂L
β
nβ+1
which is:
sign
([
∂ES
∂n∂L
]
− ∂ES
∂L
β
n
)
and defining ESL =
∂ES
∂L
and applying Young’s theorem we get:
sign
([
∂ESL
∂n
]
− ESLβ
n
)
= sign
([
∂ESL
∂n
n
ESL
]
− β
)
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sign(
∂l (n)
∂L
) = −sign(∈ESL,n −β)
This means that if the expected benefit is submodular in the total lobbying
expenditures and the number of firms, then there are positive externalities, while if
these benefits are supermodular in L and n, there are negative externalities.
An alternative and more intuitive way to see the previous result is the following.
Let’s denote F = Si
nβ
[
∂pi(L)G(L)
∂li
]
− ∂ci(li)
∂li
= 0. Notice that this equation is continuous
and ∂F
∂l
6= 0, then l may be expressed as a function of n in some domain of F . That
is, there exists a function over the domain such that l = l(n). Then, l′(n) = − ∂F∂n∂F
∂l
equals to:
−
[
−β Si
nβ+1
(pi (L)G (L))′
Si
nβ
(pi (L)G (L))′′ − ci (li)′′
]
Notice that the sign of this derivative is represented by the following function:
sign(l′(n)) = −1sign((pi(L)G(L))′′)=sign(ci(li)′′)
{
sign
(
Si
nβ
− ci (li)
′′
(pi (L)G (L))′′
)}
where 1sign((pi(L)G(L))′′)=sign(ci(li)′′) is an indicator function that is equal to
sign
(
Si
nβ
− ci(li)′′
(pi(L)G(L))′′
)
if the the expected benefit and the cost function are both
concave or both convex. In the first case, only one of these functions is concave and
the other is not, then l′(n) < 0.
If we are interested to understand the effect of the rivalry of the bill in the total
lobbying expenditures, we know that ∂L
∂l
∂l
∂β
, then using the same intuition as above
we know that ∂l
∂β
= −
∂F
∂β
∂F
∂l
equals to:
−
[
− Si
nβ
(pi (L)G (L))′ ln(n)
Si
nβ
(pi (L)G (L))′′ − ci (li)′′
]
Then, sign(∂L
∂β
) = sign( Si
nβ
(pi (L)G (L))′′ − ci (li)′′). A common assumption will
be that the expected benefit is concave and the cost function is convex, then, in this
case, industries lobbying for non-congestible bills will spend more on lobbying than
industries lobbying for fully rival bills.
The results from this section summarize the importance of the concavity assump-
tion in both functions pi (L)G (L) and ci (li).
3.6.3.4 Other Results of the Model
In the previous section we were able to establish that sign(∂Pr(li>0)
∂n
) = sign(∈∆i
+ ∈Si −β). I have been able to make some empirical inference to support the idea
that ∈Si< 0 but I have still remained silent about the possible sign of ∈∆i . In order
to advance in this direction notice that:
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∂∆i (L (n) , L−i (n))
∂n
=
∂∆i (L (n))
∂L (n)
∂L (n)
∂n
+ θ
∂∆i (L−i (n))
∂L−i (n)
∂L−i (n)
∂n
Notice that by assumption and definition ∂∆i(L(n))
∂L(n)
> 0 > ∂∆i(L−i(n))
∂L−i(n)
. Then, for
the sake of simplicity we can assume that sign(∂L(n)
∂n
) = sign(∂L−i(n)
∂n
)). Then,
sign(
∂∆i (L (n) , L−i (n))
∂n
) = sign(
∂∆i (L (n))
∂L (n)
+
+ θ
∂∆i (L−i (n))
∂L−i (n)
−
)
Part I
sign(
∂L (n)
∂n
)
Part II
Notice that if the bill is perfectly excludable, the effect of n on the industry-level
lobbying expenditures uniquely determines the effect of the market concentration in
the level of ∆i.
195 However, if the bill is not perfectly excludable, then we need to
not only see the sign of ∂L(n)
∂n
but also the relative size of θ ∂∆i(L−i(n))
∂L−i(n)
with respect
to ∂∆i(L(n))
∂L(n)
. Finally if ∂∆i(L(n))
∂L(n)
= θ ∂∆i(L−i(n))
∂L−i(n)
, then ∂∆i(n)
∂n
= 0 and it is true that
industries with more firms will tend to lobby less (i.e., ∂Pr(li>0)
∂n
< 0).
To analize this condition, I will separate the analysis between two parts: Part I
which talks about the relative size of the derivatives of ∆i with respect to the total
lobbying expenditures and Part II which is concerned about the effect of the number
of firms in the total lobbying expenditures.
Part I. Although we know that ∂∆i(L(n))
∂L(n)
> 0, it is possible that the slope of the
function ∆i in the point L−i (n) is larger than the slope in the point L (n). This
for example would happen if the curve is sufficiently concave such that the function
has decreasing marginal benefit. The next result shows that if the expected benefit
function is concave in the lobbying expenditure, this function is actually concave in
the total lobbying expenditure.
Lemma A.1. If the expected benefit function is concave in the firm-level lob-
bying expenditure, then it is concave in the industry-level lobbying expenditure.
Proof. We know that ∂pi(L)G(L)
∂li
= ∂pi(L)G(L)
∂L
∂L
∂li
, then ∂
2pi(L)G(L)
∂l2i
=
(
∂2pi(L)G(L)
∂L2
)
∂L
∂li
∂L
∂li
+
∂pi(L)G(L)
∂L
∂2L
∂l2i
. As L =
n∑
i=1
li, then
∂L
∂li
= 1 and ∂
2L
∂l2i
= 0. Then, ∂
2pi(L)G(L)
∂l2i
=(
∂2pi(L)G(L)
∂L2
)
. If pi (L)G (L) is a concave function in L, then[pi (L)G (L)]′ (L−i − L) ≥
pi (L−i)G (L−i)−pi (L)G (L) for all L−i, L. If L−i = 0, then [pi (L)G (L)]′ ≥ pi(L)G(L)L
.
Unfortunately, this would mean that we are not be able to say too much about
the sign of the first part. To understand better the problem, let me explain the
problem with the Figure A.3. The figure shows the expected benefit as a function of
the industry-level lobbying expenditure. There are three points of interest: A,B and
195As in Section 3.2 we showed that ∂L(n)∂n > 0, we can conclude that if θ = 0,
∂∆i(n)
∂n > 0.
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C. Let’s denote Lx as the lobbying expenditure at the point x = A,B and C. The
slope of these points are represented by ∂pi(Lx)G(Lx)
∂Lx
and notice that ∂pi(LB)G(LB)
∂LB
>
∂pi(LA)G(LA)
∂LA
> ∂pi(LC)G(LC)
∂LC
≥ 0. Notice that the assumption of ∂pi(L)
∂li
, ∂G(L)
∂li
> 0, rules
out the cases where ∂pi(Lx)G(Lx)
∂Lx
< 0.
Let’s assume that L−i = LA. That is, the point A corresponds to the level of
industry expenditure without the lobbying expenditure of firm i-th. Then, firm
i-th lobby the amount li > 0. Then, the new point will be L. As we know that
L−L−i > 0, there are three relevant cases where L may be located: In the boundary
of A, in B or in C.
Case I. L−L−i = ε. That is, the lobbying expenditure of firm i-th is relatively
small to the preceding total lobbying industry (i.e., li
L−i
→ 0). In this case the new
level of industry-level lobbying expenditure is around a vecinity of the previous point.
This implies that ∂pi(L−i)G(L−i)
∂L−i
≈ ∂pi(L)G(L)
∂L
, which makes ∂∆i(n)
∂n
→ 0. Therefore
∂Pr(li>0)
∂n
< 0. The same conclusion also applies if we start from point B and C.
Case II. L = LB. In this case, the new point has a higher slope than the
previous point ∂pi(L)G(L)
∂L
> ∂pi(L−i)G(L−i)
∂L−i
. Then, if ∂pi(L)G(L)
∂L
> θ ∂pi(L−i)G(L−i)
∂L−i
we know
that ∂∆i(n)
∂n
> 0. If point B is sufficiently steep, then ∈∆i can be sufficiently high
to make ∂Pr(li>0)
∂n
> 0. However, this case does not imply that we will always get a
positive relation between the probability of firms lobbying and the concentration of
the industry as we can have ∂pi(L)G(L)
∂L
> ∂pi(L−i)G(L−i)
∂L−i
with
∂pi(L)G(L)
∂L
∂pi(L−i)G(L−i)
∂L−i
< 0.
Case III. L = LC . In this case, the new point has a smaller slope than the
previous point, so ∂pi(L)G(L)
∂L
< ∂pi(L−i)G(L−i)
∂L−i
. If point C is sufficiently steep (i.e.,
θ <
∂pi(L−i)G(L−i)
∂L−i
∂pi(L)G(L)
∂L
), then ∂∆i(n)
∂n
is negative and as a consequence ∂Pr(li>0)
∂n
< 0. The
same conclusion also applies if we start from point B and we move to a point C.
Case III represents a case where the lobbying expenditure of a firm is relatively high
compared to the already existing lobbying expenditures, that is li
L−i
>> 0, while
case II can be considered as an intermediate firm case.
To sum up, if we start from any point and a new firm contributes small lobby-
ing expenses, then the probability of lobbying from a new firm decreases as there
are more firms in the market. However, the entry of a firm willing to contribute
medium or big lobbying expenditure (case II or case III) can increase or decrease
the probability of lobbying as the market structure changes. In these two last cases,
this probability will depend on the relative size of the rivalry of the bill θ.
Part II This part is included in the text and corresponds to the discussion of
sign(∂L(n)
∂n
).
Comparing Industries and Entry (Exit) of Firms This section is answering
two questions. First, if we are in an equilibrium what happens if there is entry or
exit of firms. Second, how can we compare the equilibrium expenditures among
different industries when they only differ by the number of firms.
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The lobbying firms choose the level of lobbying expenditure when the marginal
cost equals the marginal benefit. That is Si
nβ
[
∂pi(L)
∂li
G (L) + ∂G(L)
∂li
pi (L)
]
= ∂ci(li)
∂li
(as-
suming an interior solution, otherwise Si
nβ
[
∂pi(L)
∂li
G (L) + ∂G(L)
∂li
pi (L)
]
− ∂ci(li)
∂li
≤ 0,
li ≥ 0). Then, marginal benefit equals marginal cost can be represented as:
mbi =
∂pi(L)G(L)
∂li
Si
nβ
=
∂ci (li)
∂li
= mci
Now, let’s take derivatives of both marginal benefit and cost with respect to the
number of firms. Let’s first analyze the case of the marginal benefit mbi(n). Taking
derivatives with respect to n, we get:
∂mbi
∂n
=
∂pi(L)G(L)
∂li∂n
Si
nβ
+
∂pi(L)G(L)
∂li
(
S ′in
β − βSinβ−1
n2β
)
which is equal to
∂pi(L)G(L)
∂li∂n
Si
nβ
+
∂pi(L)G(L)
∂li
[
S ′i
nβ
− βSi
nβ+1
]
and dividing by
∂pi(L)G(L)
∂li
Si
nβ
> 0 we get:
∂pi(L)G(L)
∂li∂n
∂pi(L)G(L)
∂li
+
[
S ′i
Si
− β
n
]
Then, multiplying by n we get
sign(
∂mbi
∂n
) = sign(∈li,n + ∈Si −β)
where ∈li,n= ∂pi(L)G(L)∂li∂n n∂pi(L)G(L)
∂li
is the elasticity of the marginal expected benefit
with respect to the number of firms.
Now, to see what happens with the marginal cost mci(n), let’s take derivatives
with respect to the number of firms:
∂mci
∂n
=
∂ci (li)
∂li∂n
Then, if we are initially in an equilibrium and there is entry (exit) of firms, the
lobbying expenditures of the old (remaining) firms will raise or fall according to
both the signs of ∂mbi
∂n
and ∂mci
∂n
. In particular, there are 6 possible cases. The first
two cases are when the signs of both derivatives are equal and the four remaining
cases where the signs of the derivative of the marginal benefit and marginal cost
with respect to the number of firms differ:
Case I. In this case, both derivatives are non-negative, so the new equilibrium
lobbying expenditure is located to the right (or the same level) of the initial equi-
librium. That is, as ∂mbi
∂n
, ∂mci
∂n
≥ 0 the sign of l′ (n) is non-negative.
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Case II. In this case, both derivatives are non-positive, so the new equilibrium
lobbying expenditure is located to the left (or the same level) of the initial equilib-
rium. That is, as∂mbi
∂n
, ∂mci
∂n
≤ 0 the sign of l′ (n) is non-positive.
Case III. In this case, the marginal benefit is non-negative but the marginal
cost is non-positive. That is ∂mbi
∂n
≥ 0 ≥ ∂mci
∂n
. Then, there are two relevant cases,
one where the marginal cost is more sensitive to the entry (exit) of firms than the
marginal benefit and other where the marginal cost is less sensitive. Case IIIa rep-
resents the situation where the marginal benefit is more sensitive than the marginal
cost: ∂mbi
∂n
≥ ∣∣∂mci
∂n
∣∣. Therefore, in this case the firm-level lobbying expenditure
is non-decreasing l′ (n) ≥ 0. The other case is Case IIIb and happens when the
marginal cost is more sensitive than the marginal benefit ∂mbi
∂n
≤ ∣∣∂mci
∂n
∣∣. In this
case, the lobbying expenditure is lower (higher) when there is entry (exit) of firms
l′ (n) ≤ 0.
Case IV. This case can be analized similarly to case three. In this case ∂mci
∂n
≥
0 ≥ ∂mbi
∂n
. Then, there are two possible cases, one where the marginal benefit is more
sensitive than the marginal cost and other in which the opposite happens. The first
case is Case IVa and is represented by the condition
∣∣∂mbi
∂n
∣∣ ≥ ∂mci
∂n
. This inequality
implies that l′ (n) ≤ 0. Finally, we have Case IVb where ∣∣∂mbi
∂n
∣∣ ≤ ∂mci
∂n
and then the
lobbying expenditure is not to the left of the initial equilibrium l′ (n) ≥ 0. A more
concise way to summarize these results is the following. If sign
(
∂mbi
∂n
)
= sign
(
∂mci
∂n
)
,
then
sign (l′ (n)) = sign
(
∂mci
∂n
)
On the other hand, if sign
(
∂mbi
∂n
)
= −sign (∂mci
∂n
)
, then
sign (l′ (n)) = sign
(∣∣∣∣∂mbi∂n
∣∣∣∣− ∣∣∣∣∂mci∂n
∣∣∣∣)
That is, if the signs are equal, the supermodularity of the cost function in the
lobbying expenditures and the number of firms, determines if more firms imply more
lobbying expenditures or not. If the signs are not equal, then the relative sensitivity
of the marginal benefit with respect to the marginal cost determine the sign of l′ (n).
Lets assume that the cost function is convex in li and the pi(L)G(L) is concave
in li. This assumption implies that mbi is decreasing in li and mci is increasing
in li. Figure A.4 represents the problem. Let’s assume we start in the point where
mci(n) = mbi(n). Then, assume there is entry of firms in the industry. The firm-level
lobbying expenditure will increase if there are more firms in cases I, IIIa, and IVb.
A necessary condition for the first two regions to happen is that the expected benefit
is positive, while a necessary condition to see cases I and IVb happening is that the
lobbying cost function is supermodular in the level of the lobbying expenditure and
the number of firms. Therefore, a necessary condition to observe l′ (n) ≥ 0 is that
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either the expected benefit pi(L)G(L) or the cost function is supermodular in the
lobbying expenditure and the number of firms.
The function E(L, n) = pi(L, n)G(L, n) is supermodular in L and n if when
L > L−i, E(L, n) − E(L−i, n) is non decreasing in n. If E is supermodular in (L,
n), then the incremental gain to choosing to have a larger lobbying expenditure is
greater when the number of firms is higher. This definition is equivalent to n > n′
implies E(L, n)− E(L, n′) non decreasing in L.196
Firm Size distribution We can assume different distribution functions for the
scale of the firm. The notation assumes that firms are organized. In the case of
the arithmetic progression, firms are organized in ascending order (that is, S1 is the
smallest firm) whereas the last four columns are organized in descending order (that
is, S1 is the largest firm of the industry). Sn should be understood as the size of
the n-th firm (the largest for the arithmetic progression and the smallest one for
the firm rank specifications). There are least three variables where the assumption
of the relationship between the scale firm and the number of firms may have an
impact. First, how the scale parameter of these specification change the probability
of the n-th firm lobbying ∂Pr(ln>0)
∂δ
. Second, how the assumption in each of these
specifications affect the elasticity of the scale of the firm with respect to the number
of firms for the n-th firms (i.e., ∈Sn) . This elasticity in turn, would affect not
only ∂Pr(ln>0)
∂n
but sign(l′ (n)) and sign(∂mbn
∂n
) as it was specified above. Finally, the
functional form of these specification affect αSn which in turn affect sign(l
′ (n)).
Table A.3. shows a summary of the impact on the assumed distribution. Notice
that each of these five specifications allow both even and uneven distributions. The
advantadge of the arithmetic progression besides its simplicity is that the HHI can
be written in terms of only one firm. HHI can also be written for each of these
specifications as a function of the number of firms. As sometimes these equations
are long I have decided to leave it out. The advantadge of the last four specification
is that the parameters of the model can be statistically estimated using existing
data. If Si is distributed pareto the probability of seeing firm i-th lobbying will be
Pr(firm i− th
lobbying) =
{
Smnβ
ci(li)[pi(L)G(L)−θpi(L−i)G(L−i)] if
ci(li)[pi(L)G(L)−θpi(L−i)G(L−i)]
nβ
≥ Sm
1 if otherwise
}
This simple step allows me to estimate by GMM or Maximum likelihood β or θ
when I assume parametric forms for the cost and the expected benefit.
196Applying Topki’s theorem, we know that if E is supermodular in (L; n), then L(n) is non
decreasing in n. Notice that if E(L, n) is supermodular, then the entire objective function is also
supermodular, as the cost part does not depend on the (L, n). E()satisfies the single crossing
condition if for all L > L′ and n > n′, E(L, n) − E(L′, n) ≥ 0 implies E(L, n′) − E(L′, n′) ≥ 0.
If E is single crossing in (L, n), then L∗(n) = arg max
x
E(L, n) is nondecreasing in n. Moreover, if
L∗(n) is nondecreasing in n for all choice sets, then E(L, n) is single-crossing in (L, n).
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Lobbying associations The difference between private and social benefits could
be seen by contrasting the marginal benefits of a lobbying association (joining all
the firms in the industry) and a typical firm. The marginal benefits differ by the
effect of a change in total lobbying expenditure on a firm’s marginal benefit.
The total benefit of the industry-association is BA =
n∑
i=1
Bi (li, L). Taking deriva-
tives with respect to L
∂BA
∂L
=
n∑
i=1
∂Bi
∂L
+
n∑
i=1
∂Bi
∂li
∂li
∂L
Then substracting from both sides the marginal private benefit we know that
∂BA
∂L
− ∂Bi
∂li
is equal to:
n∑
i=1
∂Bi
∂L
+
n∑
i=1
∂Bi
∂li
(
∂li
∂L
− 1
)
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3.6.4 Proofs
Theorem 3.1 Firms are more likely to lobby when they are bigger, when they can
be affected more by the bill, when the firm can affect more the expected benefit of the
bill, if the lobbying costs are smaller or when the bills is more excludable and less
congestible.
Proof. Follows from the text.
Lemma 3.1 ∂Pr(li>0)
∂n
=∈b −β ∂nθ∂n .
Proof. See section 3.6.3.2.
Theorem 3.2 sign(∂L
∂n
) = sign(1− ∈l,n) where ∈l,n= −nl′(n)l(n) .
Proof. As the total lobbying expenditure is L (n) =
∑n
j=1 l (n) = nl (n). Taking
derivatives with respect to the number of firms we get ∂L
∂n
= l (n) + nl′ (n) .197Then,
this condition can be summarized as sign(∂L
∂n
) = sign(1− ∈l,n).
Theorem 3.3 sign(∂L(n)
∂n
) = sign(
n∑
i=1
wi ∈li,n)sign(1−
n∑
i=1
wi ∈li,L).
Proof. The objective function for the firm i-th ispi(L)G(L)
nβ
Si − ci (li). This equa-
tion can be written in a more concisely way as follows, B (li, L) − ci (li). Notice
that ∂B(li,L)
∂li
≥ 0 and if ∂B(li,L)
∂L
> (<)0 there are positive (negative) externalities.
In the lobbying context there are positive externalities, because larger lobbying ex-
penditures not only increase the size of the bill but also changes the probability of
the bill being accepted. Then, taking the First Order Condition of the objective
function with respect to the lobbying expenditure implies ∂B(li,L)
∂li
− ∂ci(li)
∂li
= 0 which
is equal to ∂B(·)
∂li
+ ∂B(·)
∂L
∂L
∂li
= ∂ci(li)
∂li
= mcli . Notice that
∂B(·)
∂li
, ∂B(·)
∂L
, ∂L
∂li
, ∂ci(li)
∂li
> 0.
Then, inverting the equation we get the demand of political manipulation or sim-
ply the lobbying expenditure function li = di(mcli , n, L). In equilibrium
n∑
i=1
li =
n∑
i=1
di(mcli , n, L) = L then taking derivatives with respect to the number of firms n
we get ∂L(n)
∂n
=
n∑
i=1
(
∂di
∂mcli
∂mcli
∂n
+ ∂di
∂n
+ ∂di
∂L(n)
∂L(n)
∂n
)
. Now let’s define ∂di
∂n
+ ∂di
∂mcli
∂mcli
∂n
=
∂d˜i
∂n
. Then, ∂L
∂n
=
n∑
i=1
∂d˜i
∂n
1−
n∑
i=1
∂di
∂L(n)
which implies ∈L,n=
∈
d˜i,n
1−∈di,L
, where ∈L,n= ∂L∂n nL , ∈d˜i,n=
n∑
i=1
d˜i
L
(
∂d˜i
∂n
n
d˜i
)
and ∈di,L=
n∑
i=1
di
L
(
∂di
∂L
L
di
)
. Then, we conclude that −sign(∈L,n) =
sign(∈di,L −1) · sign(∈d˜i,n). The empirical finding showed at the beginning of this
chapter is−sign(∈L,n) < 0, which means that sign(∈di,L −1) = −sign(∈d˜i,n)). That
means that if the weighted demand elasticity of the lobbying expenditure is inelastic
197The reader should realize that l′ (n) includes both the indirect effect of n through the marginal
cost and the direct effect.
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(elastic) (i.e., ∈di,L< (>)1), then the weighted demand elasticity of the number of
firms should be positive (negative). To understand better this result notice that
di = li and
∂li
∂n
= ∂d˜i
∂n
. Then, sign(∂L(n)
∂n
) = sign(
n∑
i=1
wi ∈li,n)sign(1 −
n∑
i=1
wi ∈li,L),
where wi =
li
L
is the proportion of the i-th lobbying expenditure to the total industry
lobbying expenditure, ∈li,n is the elasticity of the lobbying expenditure of the i-th
firm to the number of firms of the industry and ∈li,L is the elasticity of the firm-level
lobbying expenditure of the i-th firm to the industry-level lobbying industry.
Theorem 3.4 The lobbying expenditure (thruthful schedule) of one firm is given by
l (n) = max(c−1 (−ng′ (n) , 0).
Proof. With n firms are lobbying and truthful contributions, the cost associated to
the lobbying expenditure of one of these lobbying firms is c(l (n)) = pi(L)G(L)S(n)
nβ
−
a (n) = g (n)−a (n), where a (n) is the payoff anchor of the contribution schedule of
a lobbying firm. To find the equilibrium with n firms lobbying, let’s assume that a
measure4n of firms decide not to lobby. Then, the change of welfare for the lobbyist
is (n−4n) [g (n−4n)− a (n)]. In equilibrium the lobbyist gets (n) [g (n)− a (n)].
Then, a (n) has to be such that (n−4n) [g (n−4n)− a (n)] = n [g (n)− a (n)]
which is equal to: 4na (n) = n [g (n)− g (n−4n)] +4ng (n−4n). Then, solving
for the payoff anchor: a (n) = n[g(n)−g(n−4n)]4n + g (n−4n). Now taking the limit
when 4n → 0, we get a (n) = ng′ (n) + g (n). By assumption, the cost function
is increasing, so applying the inverse function theorem we know that the lobbying
expenditure is l (n) = max(c−1 (−ng′ (n) , 0).
Lemma 3.2 ∂l(n)
∂θ
, ∂L(n)
∂θ
< 0.
Proof. Follows from noticing that ∂g(n)
∂θ
> 0 and that the relationship between θ
and l (n) is maintained when the firm-level expenditure is multiplied by a positive
constant.
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3.6.5 Tables of the Appendix
Excludable Non Excludable
Rival sign(∈E + ∈Si −∂nl∂n ) sign(∈∆i + ∈Si −1)
No-Rival sign(∈E + ∈Si) sign(∈∆i + ∈Si)
Table 3.A.1. Sufficient Conditions Defining the Sign of
∂Pr(li>0)
∂n
εL,n nl
Exogenous Endogenous
l Symmetric ε
l,n εnl,n (1 + εl,nl) + εl,n
li Asymmetric
εl,n
1−εl,L
εl,n−εl,nl,n
1−εl,L
Table 3.A.2. Relationship Between Industry and Firm Levels elasticities.
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Arithmetic As a function of the Firm Rank
Progression Linear Power Exponential Quadratic
Functional Form of Sn S1+ (n− 1) δ A+ δn Anδ Aeδn A+ δn+ Cn2
∂Pr(ln>0)
∂δ
(n− 1) 1
n
− A
nδ
lnn −An
eδn
n
∈Sn δnS1+(n−1)δ − δAn+δ −δ −δn δn+2Cn
2
A+δn+Cn2
αSn
2[S1+(n2−1)δ]
S1+(n−1)δ
δ
An+δ
1 2
3∑
j=0
njηj
3∑
j=0
njµj
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Table 3.A.3: Firm Size Distribution.
Note: All the columns assume A, δ > 0 except the quadratic form. All the specifications have
∂Pr(ln>0)
∂δ
> 0,
except the exponential. All the elasticities are negative exept the one using the arithmetic progression. αSn is
positive for the arithmetic progression if there are at least two firms, and if there is only one we need that S1 >
δ
2
.
αSn is positive for all the specification of the firm rank except the quadratic one, where is not possible to conclude
the sign of this coefficient.
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3.6.6 Figures of the Appendix
Figure 3.A.1: Three regions denoting the relationship between elasticities, average
lobbying expenditure and rivalry of the firm.
Figure 3.A.2: Relationship between elasticities, average lobbying expenditure and rivalry
of the firm with.two relevant increasing curves
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Figure 3.A.3: Three relevant cases where the slope of the expected
Figure 3.A.4: Six Relevant regions when there is entry (exit) of firms
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